

THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC BISHOPS
AND
FOREIGN POLICY - VIETNAM AND LATIN AMERICA

Vol. I

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S U M M A R Y

The thesis considers the dialectic of "institution" (the Catholic Church) and "ideology" (the Church's teaching on justice and peace), and the response by the American Catholic Bishops to foreign policy issues (Vietnam and Latin America) involving them in this dialectic, as leaders in the institution and as those principally responsible for preaching the gospel of justice and peace.

The first section traces the evolution of the structure of ecclesiastical government, in which episcopal authority was subordinate to the papal primacy, and its domestication of the prophetic-millennarian challenge (social and religious reform) in the interests of preserving the structure and the political power of the papacy (Chapter 1). The aggiornamento of Vatican II has heralded a change in structure - episcopal collegiality - and the establishment of social prophecy as the Church's mission in the world, but this calls in question the present character of the institution and its forms of authority.

The second section considers themes from American Catholic Church history which exemplify the tension - the reconciliation of the Church with the American way of life (Chapter 1), the constricting influence of hierarchical autocracy on social criticism (Chapter 2), the formation of structures for episcopal collegiality and for the work of justice and peace (Chapter 3), the prophet of social criticism within the institution (Chapter 4).

The third section considers the response of the American bishops to the war in Vietnam-- from support of government policy (Chapter 1), to an attitude of questioning, under the influence of Vatican II (Chapter 2), but without lasting effect on the tradition of acquiescence (Chapter 3). The only episcopal debate on the war at last establishes it as a moral issue and a collegial resolution is passed calling for its ending, as a moral imperative (Chapter 4). The number of individual episcopal voices critical of the government's policy increases, but the most powerful voice is "diplomatically" silent (Chapter 5).

The fourth section considers the response of the U.S. bishops to the situation of the Church in Latin America. The initial formation of collegial structures is directed to the institutional interests of the Church in Latin America and in opposition to the danger of Communism (Chapter 1). The movements of social change and revolution in the countries of Latin America and the experience of Vatican/

Vatican II's aggiornamento provide the background to Medellin, 1968, at which the Latin American bishops commit themselves to a mission of prophetic social criticism. The initial response of the U.S. bishops is evasive and lacking in awareness of a responsibility for the promotion of justice and peace (Chapter 2).

The fifth section records the response to the Vietnam War in one diocese of the United States, by the diocesan priests' senate and a non-territorial parish. Here we see the consequence of accommodating the Church to the demands of social acceptance - the voice of criticism emerges only from within an experience of the inadequacy of present institutional forms.

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ABBREVIATIONS:

<u>AAS</u>	- <u>Acta Apostolicae Sedis</u>
<u>AID</u>	- Agency for International Economic Development (Department of State)
<u>APA</u>	- American Protective Association.
<u>BAH</u>	- Booz, Allen and Hamilton, Inc.
<u>CALCAV</u>	- Clergy and Laymen Concerned about the war in Vietnam.
<u>CAIP</u>	- Catholic Association for International Peace.
<u>CELAM</u>	- <u>Consejo Episcopal Latino Americano.</u>
<u>CHR</u>	- <u>Catholic Historical Review.</u>
<u>CICOP</u>	- Catholic Interamerican Cooperation Program.
<u>Chr.Sc.Mon.</u>	- <u>Christian Science Monitor.</u>
<u>Congr.Rec.</u>	- <u>Congressional Record.</u>
<u>Corriere</u>	- <u>Corriere della Sera.</u>
<u>CRS</u>	- Catholic Relief Services.
<u>Documents</u>	- Walter M. Abbott, S.J. gen.ed. 'The Documents of Vatican II'
<u>D.T.C.</u>	- <u>Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique</u> , 15 vols. (Paris, 1905-1950)
<u>FERES</u>	- International Federation of Catholic Institutes of Social and Socio-Religious Research.
<u>FM</u>	- Augustin Fliche and Victor Martin eds. <u>Histoire de l'Eglise Depuis Les Origines</u> <u>Jusqu'à Nos Jours</u> , 21 vols. (Paris, 1946-1952)
<u>GS</u>	- <u>Gaudium et Spes</u>
<u>HL</u>	- <u>Human Life in Our Day.</u>
<u>HV</u>	- <u>Humanae Vitae</u>
<u>ICI</u>	- <u>Informations Catholiques Internationales.</u>
<u>IDOC</u>	- <u>International Documentation</u> (Third World Documentation and Research)

Abbreviations (contd.)

<u>JEH</u>	- <u>Journal of Ecclesiastical History.</u>
<u>LAD</u>	- Latin America Division (<u>USCC</u>)
<u>LG</u>	- <u>Lumen Gentium.</u>
<u>L.T.K.</u>	- <u>Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche</u> , 10 vols, 2nd rev.ed. (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1957-1967).
<u>NC</u>	- <u>National Catholic News Service.</u>
<u>NCC</u>	- National Council of Churches of Christ in the United States.
<u>NCCB</u>	- National Conference of Catholic Bishops.
<u>NCR</u>	- <u>National Catholic Reporter.</u>
<u>NCWC</u>	- National Catholic Welfare Conference.
<u>NFPC</u>	- National Federation of Priests' Councils.
<u>NORC</u>	- National Opinion Research Center.
<u>NYT</u>	- <u>The New York Times.</u>
<u>OAS</u>	- Organization of American States.
<u>ODCC</u>	- <u>The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church</u> (London, 1961)
<u>ODC</u>	- Overseas Development Council.
<u>PP</u>	- <u>Populorum Progressio.</u>
<u>QA</u>	- <u>Quadragesimo Anno.</u>
<u>RN</u>	- <u>Rerum Novarum.</u>
<u>RPP</u>	- Committee on Research, Plans and Programs (<u>USCC</u>)
<u>S.M.</u>	- <u>Sacramentum Mundi</u> , 6 vols. (London and New York, 1968-70).
<u>Th.St.</u>	- <u>Theological Studies.</u>
<u>USCC</u>	- United States Catholic Conference.
<u>SIPRI</u>	- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
<u>Vorgrimler</u>	- Herbert Vorgrimler, ed. <u>Commentary on the Documents of Vatican II</u> (5 vols.)

Abbreviations (contd.)

- WCC - World Council of Churches.
- WJP - Division for World Justice and Peace (USCC).
- WP - The Washington Post.

I N T R O D U C T I O N

This thesis attempts to relate theology¹ and international relations², in the specific context of the American Catholic bishops' response to the events of the Vietnam War and the contemporary political situation of Latin America. The general warranty for such an endeavour, and the source of my synthesis in what follows, is to be found in the writings of pioneer social scientists like Max Weber and Ernst Troeltsch, the contemporary works I have found relevant, and in the writings of socially and politically conscious theologians like Reinhold Niebuhr, Paul Tillich, Johannes B. Metz, Gustavo Gutierrez. This by now well established tradition of trying to address social and political issues from a theological perspective³, and placing theology in a social and political context, has been given authoritative impulse within the Roman Catholic Church by Vatican Council II (in particular its 'Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World' - Gaudium et Spes and its aftermath, which is considered at various points throughout the thesis.

In turn, the events in Vietnam and Latin America have impinged on the American Catholic bishops who took part in Vatican II, and who now live in its shadow and within a society which resonates with the consequences of American foreign policy in those countries. The "response" by the bishops to these experiences is characterized by the common "reaction" of Americans to their nation's foreign policy (whatever the form

that reaction may take, from indifference to protest), but involves the extra dimension of "responsibility" in consequence of their position as religious leaders to preach the Christian gospel of love, peace and human community (a gospel given depth and specific applications to life in society in the documents of Vatican II). The twofold character of their response is considered here.

In order to make sense of that response (which is described in Sections III and IV) I place it in an ecclesiastical context of a general (Section I) and a specific nature (Section II), which tries to come to terms with the Catholic and American traditions in which they have been formed as American Catholics and as Catholic bishops (at Vatican II the supra-national character and responsibilities of this latter category were given authoritative expression⁴). Finally (Section V), I attempt to form some 'Conclusions' from this material, by utilizing a particular local example of the American Catholic contemporary experience with which I am familiar, in the diocese of Louisville, Kentucky, as a take-off point for a consideration of theology in relation to international politics in the light of the preceding sections.

Since my own upbringing is Catholic and my education eclectic, I will use here both the language of theology and that of the social sciences⁵. No pretence of a 'wertfrei' social science will be made, nor an unwillingness to recognise the presence of conscience and moral judgment in any human enterprise. Confidence in making such value judgments has been enhanced by my

reading of respected exponents of the social sciences⁶, but the iii
most significant factor has been the whole process through which
I have been formed myself by Vatican II theology, my course of
study and itinerant-life experience in the past five years,
almost equally divided between periods of time in Britain and
in the United States. In the Latin American section such a
process will be described as "conscientización" (conscientizacão
in the original analysis of Paulo Freire) - this thesis is the
product of my experience of conscientización.

As such, it exemplifies the inevitable limitations of time,
opportunities, intellectual capacities, range of experiences
While I enjoyed the advantage of doing research at the head-
quarters of the 'United States Catholic Conference' (the central
institutional agency of the American Catholic bishops) in
Washington, D.C. it was necessary to do so discretely, known
only to a limited range of staff people there. My views and
impressions, therefore, reflect those of the 'Divisions' in
which I did the research, and the people with whom I was able to
talk and who provided me with the research opportunity. As far
as possible I have relied on written evidence, since I had
neither the opportunity nor the resources to undertake a more
personal approach, and since the accessibility of such evidence
has enabled me to deal with the Vietnam and Latin America issues
as comprehensively as possible within my limitations, without having
to undertake the impossible task of soliciting information from
bishops themselves. The drudgery of going through boxes and
drawers of files (classified and unclassified) is the ultimately
rewarding price to pay for the opportunity, however limited, of

discovering many details of information which would not otherwise be available and which are often unknown or forgotten by the people involved (in this case, the American bishops).

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Within each section I shall try to include the ideas and method of consideration appropriate to that section as a supplement to these initial remarks. This study is intended to be a mosaic, hopefully bringing clarity through the successive stages, leading to a comprehensive panorama. The notes, which I include in a separate binding, are intended to serve this same purpose of mosaic comprehensiveness. I do not pretend to have covered all the possible points of discussion: but I attempt to deal comprehensively with those I consider to be the most significant.

Without the hospitality, advice, and help of many people, this study would not have been possible. To all of them I am deeply grateful. Consciousness of the study's limitations cannot detract from the value of the materia prima which I have had the opportunity to consider, and I owe that opportunity to their friendship and assistance.

S E C T I O N O N E

THE CENTRALIZATION OF CHURCH
GOVERNMENT AND THE AGGIORNAMENTO
OF VATICAN II

PROLEGOMENON

"In general, it would be true to say that the hierarchy, as the guardian of the integrity of the institution and also, therefore, of its relations with the social system, reacts more strongly than the rest of the Church against social change. And this opposition is all the more accentuated when the relationship between the religious institution and civil society is one of reciprocal guarantees. In this case, those in charge of the ecclesiastical institution are not in a position to take a stand of critical opposition to the existing regime except on the level of secondary norms, whereas they must be fundamentally opposed to the introduction of a new regime."¹

"The Catholic Church has possessed its own distinctive body of political philosophy for many centuries. It is a philosophy which, whatever other objections may be raised against it, is innocent of one charge. It does not possess the characteristic economic and political conception lying at the base of Western liberalism.....

Secondly, the Roman Catholic Church has never been whole-

heartedly sympathetic to the European nation-state.

Finally, the Roman Catholic Church has never made peace, so to speak, with capitalism. It always maintained a critical position toward capitalism's amoral stance on economic justice. It always identified itself - at least on a doctrinal level - with the cause of the poor."²

"Religious forces, and religious forces alone, have had sufficient influence to ensure practical realisation for political ideas."³

The tensions which these quotations describe run through all that comes to our attention in this study. In Section II I deal with what I consider to be relevant themes from American Catholic Church history which exemplify these tensions, particularly as they relate to the bishops. In Sections III and IV the case-studies I have chosen (Vietnam and Latin America) provide specific examples of the operation of these tensions. In the final Section whatever 'Conclusions' one can draw from all this accumulated evidence revert to the same debate. Therefore, in this Section I I try to situate the debate in its original theological-social-political perspective. This is a very limited venture, since the bulk of the thesis must rest in Sections II, III, IV, but in this first section I have found important insights into the problems raised in these later sections.

The summary description I choose to give this debate is that it is a form of dialectic between "ideology" and "institution". By "ideology" I mean the superstructure of values and beliefs which determine the character and purpose of a social entity (in this case "the Church"), by which it defines itself, its relationship to other social entities, and its "mission" or social project⁴. In the case of the Church, "ideology" is based on the original Christian kerygma ("preaching") preserved in the New Testament and promulgated by the Church through the agency of its official spokesmen and its members (a division arises in the corresponding "authority" claimed and accepted in the case of "spokesmen" and the general membership - the Roman Catholic Church emphasizing the authority of the bishops, with the pope as their head: the Churches of the Reformation giving more room to others, while retaining the concept of "ministry", involving the primary responsibility of the "ministers" for the preaching of the word.)

The "ideology" which is our principal concern in this study, and which is described in the second set of quotations above as a "body of political philosophy", has traditionally been called "Catholic social doctrine", particularly as this has been given focus and evolution in the "Social Encyclicals" and in Vatican II's 'Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World'. This tradition of Catholic social teaching, incorporated in a series of documents from Rerum Novarum (1891), Quadragesimo Anno (1931), Mater et Magistra (1961), Pacem in Terris (1963), Gaudium et Spes (1965), Populorum Progressio (1967), to Octogesima Adveniens (1971) and the Synod of Bishops' 'Justice in the World' (1971), is the

source of reference for this "ideology" throughout the sections of the thesis. In Section IV we shall see this "ideology" given more particular focus for its application to Latin America, while in Chapter IV of Section II I describe the contribution of the American ecclesiastic who did more than anyone else to promulgate this "ideology", within the American Catholic Church and as an instrument of general social reform.

Since this is an evolving "tradition", its specific content becomes manifest in relation to particular situations and historical environments. The second set of quotations above point to its tendency to oppose dominant political and economic structures. This "tradition", this "ideology", is a "theology" - a form of discourse based on a relationship of faith with God, who reveals himself to man in the community of faith called the Church. Although this "theology" speaks to the issues of "community" and "power", which are the issues of politics⁵, the tendency to stick to the more institutional and abstract analyses of these issues, as distinct from the operational has been a major lacuna and has led to social conservatism and political acquiescence.⁶ However, the existence of that corpus of social doctrine (the "tradition", the "ideology") remains to challenge the compromises and betrayals of the original "gospel", even to the extent of initiating a new form of politics.⁷

It is these latter two phenomena which we shall consider in this section - the "institutional" and the "millenarian" impulses in the Church. The establishment of ecclesiastical government

which filled the vacuum left by the collapse of the Western Roman Empire¹². The prophetic role to which the Latin American bishops committed themselves and their Church at Medellin in 1968 is the most outstanding example of the social and political expression of that aggiornamento to which Pope John and Vatican II committed the Catholic Church.

Here we shall consider the dialectic between the centralization of church government as the institutionalization of the "Kingdom" and the millenarian challenge, as this has been expressed in the aggiornamento of Vatican II in the attempt to reconcile the institutional and prophetic elements of the Church. This synthesis of Vatican II is ambiguous both in its origin and in its character: without the centralization of ecclesiastical authority in the papacy the aggiornamento could not have become the official ecclesiastical programme; the "institutional" Church and the "prophetic" Church seem to be irreconcilable and yet indispensable elements of the one religious reality:

"Every enduring human enterprise must exist in institutional structures, and the enterprise of the Christian community is no exception."¹³

"The church must conceive itself as prophetic not political. Acting prophetically it will express values related to the political dimension, but it will not be playing politics..... The church has to show its function is not that of social control."¹⁴

In this historical consideration my attention is directed to those historical memories in the consciousness of the Church which have continued to affect the Church's contemporary experience. I look upon Vatican II as an experience of these memories and as an experience of a shift in the Church's historical consciousness of those memories. This consideration of history concentrates on the "institutional" formation of ecclesiastical government at four crisis points - Middle Ages, conciliar movement, Trent, Vatican II. The "prophetic", "millenarian", challenge is expressed in the shift from a "premillenarian" (Martin Marty's distinction, note 7) to a "postmillenarian" influence on the "institutional" order of the Church. From the "prophetic" being institutionalized (e.g. the undae monasticae I refer to in Chapter 1) or failing to overcome the integrist direction of papal monarchy (John Hus, Peter Waldo; conciliar movement); the "institution" is confronted with the problem of incorporating the prophetic dimensions of the Christian gospel, in the structure of authority ("collegiality", "co-responsibility") and in its mission as "the pilgrim people of God", by the aggiornamento of Vatican II. Although this issue has not been resolved, indeed I would consider it impossible of resolution (in line with the view of international relations as the domain also of the tragic and the unresolvable problems) I think this framework is, at the least, an important structure of historical memories to support the various strands of consideration presented in the following sections¹⁵.

CHAPTER I

A. PAPAL MONARCHY

"Medieval thought in general was saturated in every part with the conceptions of the Christian faith." ¹

"In the Middle Ages politics was a branch of theology, with whatever admixture derived from Aristotle and Civil Law. Its basis was theocratic."²

"Medieval politics, in fact, are a philosophy of universal right, and that, in its turn, is a theory of ethics, which is a part of theology. Men, accordingly, may not transgress it, since they dare not transgress the will of God. It is thus the ultimate criterion by which all human action must be judged."³

In the "Corpus Christianum", the "Societas Christiana" of medieval Europe Church and Society were coterminous. The Europe founded by Charlemagne, who considered himself the "vicarius Christi", entrusted with the ordering of the society of Christians,⁴ had inherited the religio-political character of the Roman Empire and the Church was its foundation. The struggle between Pope and Emperor was for religio-political supremacy in "Christendom" - "the Kingdom" had been institutionalized in conventional political form. While the most powerful emperors aspired to the Carolingian suzerainty, the popes claimed supremacy in this all-embracing Christendom

and looked on the emperor as the papacy's anointed protector.

Even the millenarian impulse became part of this struggle for institutional supremacy. As this impulse was expressed in the undae monasticae which have continuously broken over the Church⁵, it was coopted by the Salian emperors (Otto I, II, III) as a reforming instrument in their rescue of the papacy from the control of the Roman aristocracy ('Les Tribulations du Siège Apostolique')⁶ and in the imposition of their own control, which attained its symbolic expression at Sutri (1046) when Henry III deposed one pope, Gregory VI, and controlled the election of his successors. The same Cluniac reform produced Gregory VIII (1073-85), who strove to assert the freedom of the papacy from imperial control and the subordination of the emperor to the position of "protector".⁷

Church government and the conception of ecclesiastical authority was given its monarchical form in this struggle, in which a distinction between 'political' and 'spiritual' authority was impossible⁸. Not until the re-discovery of the Greek philosophers in the 13th century and Marsilius of Padua in the 14th century was there possible a theory of society and polity which was not theological and hierocratic⁹. The expression of this hierocracy was the work of the Canon Law. This combination of theology and Roman law became in the middle ages the dominating influence in political thought and practice, and has continued its control of ecclesiastical government ever since¹⁰. Although this has been expressed overwhelmingly in a centralizing direction under papal domination, the Canon Law contains

other precedents and concepts (as we see in the next chapter) favourable to the collegiality emerging once more at Vatican II.

Canon Law gave a juridical character to politics in the Middle Ages because it defined the terms of political debate and the practical issues to be resolved¹¹. This was exemplified in the controversy over investiture, resolved in favour of the papacy by the Concordat of Worms (September, 1122) and the 1st Lateran Council (March, 1123). Although this resolution was not final, as the long history of Gallicanism has shown, with its variations like the "Real Patronado" in Latin America, Canon Law continued to control political consciousness and any challenge to papal or imperial hegemony found in it the only source of legitimation. Its all-pervasiveness reached even the movements of religious reform, which became "Orders" (Ordo Sancti Benedicti, Ordo Fratrum Minorum, Ordo Praedicatorum), approved by the papal sovereign of the Corpus Christianum and serving as an important pillar of support for the papacy in its political disputes with princes and prelates.

The inspiration of Francis and Dominic was dynamic, but the previous monastic conception of stabilitas loci continued to prevail influencing a static view of the world, with renunciation and social pessimism influencing people's attitudes.

"Like the cultural life in general, the devotional life of this period bore a monastic allure."¹²

The monastic institutionalizing of Christian millenarism is the classic medieval expression of that fuga mundi, which the original Christian monks and hermits had expressed by withdrawing from a corrupt world to the desert, but which had to adopt changed forms in a world ostensibly Christian in its structures and institutions. The monastery had moved from the periphery to the centre of the world, but it was ill-equipped for any work of social reconstruction and reform. Like the "premillenarian", "revivalist", "evangelical", party in American Protestantism, its concern was individual regeneration in view of the Judgment - "Kingdom" at hand. In the medieval feudal society the monastery and its view of eschatology-millenarism was a pillar of the social order¹³.

Where the lay political power was strong, the monastic sacerdotium supported that power and prevented the break-up of imperial domains into hereditary fiefdoms, as had happened to Charlemagne's empire, since church property could be made dependent more easily than others on the central political authority¹⁴. This made it vulnerable to the corresponding process:

"L'Évangile est, plus ou moins, mais parfois
expresément, pris en charge par le pouvoir
terrestre comme un moyen efficace de ~~g~~gouverner,
de moraliser une politique, d'idéaliser un régime."¹⁵

For the papacy, the sacerdotium was the means at hand by which a sufficiently autonomous pope (free of imperial domination)

could exercise his authority throughout Christendom at the expense of the lay "protectors" when these were unwilling to accept the role marked out for them and submit to the papal yoke.¹⁶ This required a central control of the sacerdotium, in which the priests' role and functions were juridically defined as flowing from the apex of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, and the removal of lay appointment of the clergy. While the Canon Law could take care of the juridical formulae, lay power took care to prevent the practical application. This was more easily accomplished in the case of the non-monastic parochial clergy who often depended for their benefice on the local lay authority. It was more difficult to control papal power over the monastic orders whose independence of lay control could be overcome only by dissolution or the confiscation of their property.

The papal effort to control the sacerdotium in the Middle Ages was expressed in the formation of the corporate body of cardinals as the pope's inner council, and in the establishment of the papal curia as the central papal civil service, which took place in the period from Gregory VII to Innocent III (1198-1216). The edifice of hierocratic medieval government built on the foundations of Canon Law and sacerdotium depended, however, on a unique combination of religious prestige, expressing itself in an exercise of political power in a society which respected its authority, and an absence of alternative sources of power able to usurp this prestige with their own resources. It also depended on the character and

capabilities of the individuals occupying Peter's chair. Less than a century after Innocent III the medieval papacy came to its nemesis with Boniface VIII (1294-1303), who combined the most explicit and most universal statement of papal sovereignty in the Bull 'Unam Sanctam' with an inability to sustain papal political power in the face of lay opposition. In the break-up of medieval Europe those forces which had worked against the centralization of authority in the papacy asserted themselves with increasing success¹⁷. For the sacerdotium this was expressed in the Conciliar Movement.

B. THE CONCILIAR MOVEMENT

The central historical point of reference is the resolution of the Great Schism (1378-1417) and the first half of the 15th century, the so-called "conciliar period". The Schism had followed the period of the Avignon Papacy (1309-1378)¹. The long process by which Europe broke up into a congeries of separate states and principalities could only lead to a weakening of the power and prestige of the central agency representing the unity of Christendom. This was helped by the pretensions of Boniface VIII and the debacle at Anagni (1303); the disputes among the cardinals, expressed in the eleven-month conclave to elect Bertrand de Got as Clement V (June 5, 1305) after the short pontificate of Benedict XI; the inability of the papacy to escape the embrace of the factional struggles of late medieval Christendom². This process found its logical conclusion in the compromised election of Urban VI (April 8, 1378) and the subsequent election of Clement VII (September 20, 1378) as a rival pope.

The Schism was resolved only under the auspices of the Council of Constance (1414-1417) and it is that fact which must always be taken into consideration in any discussion of church government.

".... the deposition of the three Popes of the Schism and the validity of the election of Martin V - hence also the legitimacy of his successors - rested on the authority of the Council of Constance."³

The decree 'Sacrosancta' (5 April 1415), in which it was

declared that everyone, even the pope, owed obedience to a Council, which derived its authority immediately from Christ, represents the historical antithesis of Boniface VIII's Unam Sanctam and the constitutional counterpoint to the establishment of papal monarchy represented by Gregory VII and Innocent III⁴. Later popes were to declare that Constance was a legitimate ecumenical council (they could hardly do otherwise and not compromise their own legitimacy), excepting its 'conciliarism' as expressed in 'Sacrosancta'; but this cannot remove the historical fact of 'Sacrosancta' and its companion decree 'Frequens', which called for frequent councils and thus would have established them as a guaranteed constitutional reality in the life of the Church.

The conciliarist position had a tradition in the canonical writings just as venerable as the tradition of papal supremacy⁵, since the concept of the Church as the Corpus Christi⁶ involved both the idea of a visible head - a central sign of unity (represented by the papacy), and the corporate body of the faithful - congregatio fidelium⁷ - which likewise demanded some visible expression in keeping with the spirit of the age⁸. The resolution of the Schism by the 'via concilii' did not spring from some new source of ecclesiastical life. The General Council was recognized as the ultimate court of appeal in the Church, whether for questions of orthodoxy or papal legitimacy⁹.

Two aspects of the conciliar controversy and its historical unfolding are of interest here - the relationship of the controversy to general politics (not just the specific ecclesiastical question

of the relationship between Pope and Council); the question of the representation of the Church at a General Council. The conciliarists manoeuvred to overcome the agreement of interests between a monarchical papacy and a civil order of monarchies. A form of "the balance of power" was necessary, since the three parties could be distinguished. The fact that Basle dragged on for almost twenty years (1431-1449) was due in no small measure to the existence of separate interests. John of Segovia's speech at the Diet of Mainz (1441) expressed both the conciliarist case and the attempt to reconcile this with civil political interests. The conciliar sovereignty which he supported was declared to be confined to the Church as a religious body and not a general political principle¹⁰. This was necessary to allay the suspicions of the civil rulers and to ward off the attempts by the papal partisans to point to the revolutionary implications of the attack on papal sovereignty¹¹. But the argument stood on weak ground - not only the fact that the tradition went against any attempt to confine the debate to the purely ecclesiastical sphere, but also the general acceptance of a common political theology¹².. Nevertheless, the Baslean conciliarists were emphatic in distinguishing ecclesiastical and secular constitutions, and insisting on divine revelation as the explicit foundation of the former. In the formulations of Cracow University, they were willing to support a monarchical form of government for the Church considered as a "political body" - a series of individuals under a single president: but, as a "mystical body governed by Christ" - the Church as a whole, "that is, in a general council", the pope was held to be subject to the authority of the Church as a whole - the universitas¹³.

Such a distinction would have been impossible in earlier centuries, when the 'corpus politicum' was the 'corpus mysticum' and vice-versa. The conciliarists of Basle were expressing the change of consciousness from those times which the changing political circumstances and the influence of the new learning was bringing about at the very core of the medieval juridical theology¹⁴. This theology was losing its unique hold as the universal ideology in favour of a multiplicity of "professional ideologues", an emerging class of courtiers who began to replace the canonists and whose oratory became the art form of new political ideas and the developing art of diplomacy¹⁵. The conciliarists failed to avoid the consequence of the convergence of interest between the papacy and the lay dynasties¹⁶,

Thus, a new twist was given to the changing relationship between "theology" and "politics", and an element which would continue to exercise an important influence in policy was the emerging policy of "concordats", by which the papacy strove to bargain with the secular powers in order to gain advantage - in this case to remove the conciliarist challenge. In the changed situation of diminishing papal hegemony, this policy became necessary to maintain papal influence and prestige. But a price had to be paid, involving an increase of secular power in national church affairs (principal symbol of this was the Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges of 1439) and a confusion of religious concerns and the political ambitions of the papacy in Italy¹⁷.

The historical record of the councils of the conciliar period expresses the ambivalence of the idea of "representation".

The political potentates would like to have exercised that role; as would the Cardinals who had provoked the Schism and who would have formed an ecclesiastical oligarchy; the more concerned bishops; the doctors and masters of Basle¹⁸. However, the fundamental élan which the Conciliar Movement expressed, away from a concentration of ecclesiastical authority in the monarchical papacy to a scheme which better represented the Church as a collectivity, a 'communio', is more important than the difficulties experienced in determining what group within the 'communio' should represent the 'Church-in-Council'. It was this fact of the conciliar period which expressed an anti-dynastic impulse at the centre of ecclesiastical authority, validated as we have seen by the theologico-juridical system itself, and established the "collegial" concept of the Church as an historical memory of relevance to the resolution of issues of church government and policy¹⁹.

Although the conciliar movement was overcome by a re-assertion of papal monarchy, especially at Trent, it has remained the principal historical precedent for a re-establishment of the more ancient form of ecclesiastical government, some form of episcopal collegiality, which could express better the unity of the Church as a communion of local "ecclesiolae" bound together in the one "Ecclesia" presided over by the chief bishop, the successor of Peter, as the centre of that communion²⁰. The spirit of the conciliar movement had incorporated the opposition to papal authoritarian irresponsibility, which in turn reflected the innate Christian opposition to tyranny in all its forms²¹. The identification between the cause of reform and this movement, which Luther

was to seize upon has persisted in spite of the resolution of Trent in favour of papal monarchy, so that in a new age, when once more the excesses of the latter had discredited ecclesiastical government and the mission of the Church, this spirit resulted in the unexpected resolution of Vatican II.

C. THE COUNCIL OF TRENT

The Protestant Reformation was an attempt to remedy the deficiencies of church teaching, morals and government, which had reached their nadir under the auspices of the Renaissance papacy. It was an event whose consequences continue to be decisive for the whole Christian Church. The response to the Protestant challenge as it took shape in the Council of Trent (1545-1565)¹ coloured the image and self-understanding of the Roman Catholic Church at least until Vatican II (in this perspective Vatican I is a council of the Tridentine era). The break up of the unified organization of the Church reached its second stage with the decisive end of Western Christendom and the establishment of a "Europe des Patries". The demands of the reformers, to some of which the Catholic Church responded in Vatican II, challenged the legitimacy of the forms of church teaching and government which had evolved from the medieval period, so decisively that "the Protestant principle" has become a common inheritance of Western Christianity and an essential element of European civilization².

At the level of church government, the Reformation was one answer to the situation of the Renaissance papacy, which devoted more attention to the cultivation of art and classical culture, and internal Italian politics, than to the conditions of religious living in the Church. The papacy had once more become the preserve of Italian family concerns (Colonna, Orsini, Farnese, della Rovere) and later arrivals (the Borgia of Spanish origin; the Medici of Florence). The concerns of such family pontiffs were directed more to the promotion of their family ambitions and the military defence

of the papal states than to causes associated with the New Testament (in this regard Alexander VI and Julius II were but the most notable promoters of a tradition which continued throughout this period.)

In spite of periodic calls for reform, "in head and members", of the Church, nothing changed, and the intended reform decrees of the fifth Lateran Council of 1517 became the classic dead letter of the age³. Once in the chair of Peter a typical Renaissance pope was jealous of his prerogatives and anxious to use his position and powers of patronage to outrival any fellow Italian potentate in style of living and conventional prestige. Avignon and the Great Schism were but a distant memory of more uncomfortable times; the re-established post-Basle papacy was back in the seat of command, and from Rome it could strive to determine the course of political events in the peninsula, while aspiring to make use of its traditional position of power and prestige in the rest of the continent.

However, the successors of Gregory VII and Innocent III were in no position to attempt a serious challenge for real European hegemony and confined their practical political ambitions to their immediate neighbourhood on the Italian mainland. A Gregory or an Innocent advanced claims to what was in practice a universal political sovereignty, but their claims at least were based on genuine religious and theological ambitions and ideas (the unity of Christendom, their responsibility for the promotion of the moral teaching of the Gospel and the religious living of the Christian world). They did not confuse the prestige of their office with their own private or family ambitions (who bothers to note their family name⁴!) Whatever reservations one may have about the

consequences of a full realization of their claims, it remains that a church/society polity of those dimensions presented a vision of the societal common good, in comparison with which the squalid intrigues of the Borgia and Medici popes and their imitators represent a grotesque form of "corruptio optimi pessima". In place of Canon Law was Il Principe in person - Cesare Borgia, furthering the family cause, without benefit of law or theology except the convenience of the ancient theological justification of the papal office now held by his father.

The religious dynamism which might have counterbalanced papal preoccupation with political intrigue and steered the Church in the direction of religious reform and the renewal of the institutions was not forthcoming. There was no Francis of Assisi to inspire a re-direction of universal religious energies. The undae monasticae had dried up for the present. There were examples of outstanding religious life and individual church leaders of renown (Lawrence Guistiniani in Venice, Antonino of Florence), but no successors of Cluny or the Mendicants to infuse new life into the tired limbs of a languishing Church. The re-establishment of the papacy at the head of the Church had not led to an invigoration of religious life throughout the Church. Instead, it served to fortify the identification of the institution of the General Council with the cause of religious reform in the Church. Patterns of monastic and clerical life in many places had proliferated in pre-Hildebrandine directions. Theology was at a low ebb; piety had taken off into extremes of frivolity and superstition, incapable of nourishment from a liturgy now at the advanced stages of formalism and aridity.

Into such a scene came Martin Luther, fresh from his experience of conversion. The occasion was provided by the preaching of indulgences to raise funds for the building of a new St. Peter's (a typical Renaissance project). The clash of Luther's theological enthusiasm and Roman sharp practice was archetypal. The papacy was in no fit condition to meet the challenge of Luther once it had gathered steam, and was unwilling and unable to reform itself or to initiate a real reforming Council, where the Protestant critique could have had a hearing and been accommodated. Such a Council, in the eyes of the papacy, would have resurrected the old question of Council vis-a-vis Papacy, thus presenting yet another challenge to papal supremacy in church government.

In addition, the political conflict between the emperor Charles V and the French king Francis I provided another distraction. Left to himself it is possible that Charles V could have initiated a reforming council in answer to the Lutheran challenge, but the papacy continually thwarted his initiatives, played for time, or intrigued with Francis I when it considered the conduct of the emperor a direct challenge to its own pretensions. The papacy still considered Europe in a medieval perspective, as did Charles V. Francis I was more perceptive - the first wide screen realpolitischer.

Charles respected the papal initiative in the calling of a General Council, and was unwilling to act like a Constantine in that regard, although he tried to impress on successive popes the importance of the project, of his own interest and willingness to cooperate - without success. While the supreme ecclesiastical authority, finally recognized as a beata possessio of the papacy by

its only other possible legitimate claimant (Charles), dithered and dallied, intrigued and ignored the changed circumstances, the societas christiana disintegrated. Local potentates in Germany found in the new challenge Protestantism offered to papal supremacy a convenient tool for their local ambitions and above all their desire to make a break with any imperial control. In this their Protestantism, whether a real religious conviction or not, dovetailed with their political instincts - the papacy had for long enjoyed the benefits of this type of convergence.

Only in the late 1530's was a reforming group in a strong position in the college of Cardinals - Contarini, Carafa, Cervini, Pole, Giberti, Morone, del Monte. Once more an unda monastica provided some of the inspiration, this time a movement of spiritual renewal based in some circles of the secular clergy in Italy and having lay associates - the Oratorio del divino amore, the Somaschi, Barnabites and Theatines, and the like. This influence slowly penetrated into the Roman centre, to set a tone of renewed clerical and Church-wide life, but too late to save the unity of the Western Church⁵.

This was the price the Church paid in consequence of that movement towards papal supremacy and institutional centralization we have seen established in the Middle Ages and surviving the Conciliar Movement. Such an arrangement demands a degree of excellence at the centre which cannot be procured by legislation. This excellence in the character and ability of the pope himself, in the competence and responsibility of the papal Curia, was absent at the crucial time -

the end of the fifteenth and beginning of the sixteenth centuries - and the Reformation took its course outside the unity of the institutional Church. Within what was left of the Catholic Church, the issues of church government (the balance between centralization and localization; the papacy as an ecclesiastical and not political authority - with its presence in Rome involving an immersion in Italian politics; papal lack of concern for transalpine affairs), continued to be left unresolved.

The period between Luther's initial outcry (1517) and the beginning of Trent betrayed the organizational paralysis at the centre of the Church. Contarini stood out for his concern with reform and willingness to meet the Protestants halfway - he was opposed by the curial conservatives and died prematurely. The only non-Italian pope of the period, Adrian VI, represented the case of the lonely individual overpowered by the system - treated as an interloper by the Curia, his reforming instincts of no avail in the middle of an organizational shambles, and another who died too soon⁶. The careers of Cervini, Carafa, Pole, each in their own distinct fashion testify to the power of the curial bureaucrats to stifle the enthusiasm and abilities of outstanding churchmen. The suffocating hold the Curia now had on the organizational wheels of the Church, and the private concerns of its autocratic head combined to prevent a reforming council.

The beginning of the Council itself was a symbol of the state of the Church⁷. After delays and false starts the intended "great reforming Council" began at Trent on December 13, 1545 with a pathetic turn-out, the majority of the twenty-five bishops Italians.

In the circumstances of public apathy and curial indifference, the papal legates - Del Monte, Cervini, Pole - did well to guide the first session of the Council, until the summer of 1547, to an initial confrontation with the questions of doctrinal formulation and church reform.

The duration of the Council reflected the dilatory process by which reforming attitudes only gradually overcame the apathy and hostility to reform at the organizational centre of the Church⁸. Trent was not concluded until twenty years after its opening - the twenty-fifth and last session taking place December 3-4, 1565 - and even after that it took until the end of the century before its programme of reform was wholeheartedly embraced as papal policy. Many elements of medieval Christendom had disappeared by that time, in particular the unity of the Catholic Church of the West in doctrine and organization (the consequences of the initial break were not appreciated by most of those involved)⁹. One element which did remain was the position of primacy enjoyed by the papacy at the centre of the Roman Catholic Church.

If we consider two crisis points in the course of Trent's unfolding, the priority given to the preservation of papal authority will be manifest as an overriding concern, putting the questions of doctrine and religious reform (the questions of substance) in jeopardy. These are - the transfer of the Council from Trent to Bologna (March 11, 1547), and the final resolution of the Council. This ecclesiastical, constitutional factor is our concern here.

In 1547, of the legates Pole had left Trent, Del Monte and

Cervini were deferring to the susceptibilities of the Roman Curia. A compromise had been struck allowing discussion of doctrine (the principal concern of Pope and Curia) and discussion of reform (the demands of the Catholic reformers) to go hand in hand, with each doctrinal debate and decree to be accompanied or immediately followed by a reform one. This had resulted in the "Decree on Justification" being completed by Session VI (January 13, 1547), the opening of debate on the question of the bishops' obligation of residence (June 9-10, 1546), and in Session VII (March 3, 1547) a reform decree to affect some aspects of the pastoral ministry.

Those who were committed to reform realized that only a break with "the traditions of the Roman Curia" could effect a change for **the better in the Church's pastoral ministry, but the members of the Curia were both unaware of the** pastoral conditions their "traditions"

brought about and jealous of the power their juridical hold on ecclesiastical institutions gave them. The whole style of dealing with the ecclesiastical order of ministry under the rubric of 'beneficium', conferring such beneficia on minors, relatives of prelates and princes, court favourites, had led to a system of absenteeism and pastoral neglect.¹⁰ Only a change whereby bishops would once more reside in their dioceses and concern themselves with pastoral ministry to the people entrusted to their care could bring about a fundamental reform of the Church and a rebirth of Christian living, without which all the institutional scaffolding, including the Curia, was meaningless. Such a change was supported only by a minority of the leadership in the Church. The Popes, in general, had shown less interest in reform and a renewed Christian life than the Emperor, and when at last a pope was persuaded to initiate a Council he considered it an answer in doctrinal terms to

the Protestants more than an instrument of reform. Only a pope committed to reform could give Trent the impetus necessary to establish it as the central reforming agency for the Church. The lack of such papal commitment stymied the Council throughout, rendering it at best a half-hearted effort at reform and eventually transforming its character into a partisan attack on the Protestant Reformation.

The first step along that road, the crucial dismissal of the opportunity to repair the breach of the Reformation and to institute a real reform of the Church, was taken by the transfer of the Council from Trent to Bologna. The guardians of papal supremacy - in particular the legates Del Monte and Cervini - sacrificed the credibility of the Council to papal prerogative and convenience and destroyed the hope that the alliance of Pope and Emperor would repair the schism. This was done at the very time when the Protestant princes were in disarray and the possibility of conciliating the Protestant reformers at Trent was at hand. By the short-sighted action of transferring the Council - on the weak excuse that the plague was about to engulf Trent (in fact disproved) - the ecclesiastical schism was made irreparable and the cause of Catholic reform once more compromised¹¹.

The true reason for the transfer to Bologna was not the physical climate of Trent but the fact that the theological climate, just beginning to emerge at the Council, was uncongenial to Del Monte and Cervini. Del Monte had always disliked Trent and complained that it would lead him to an early grave, but the timing of the move to

Bologna - not at the onset or in the middle of winter, but at the beginning of Spring - and the fact that he survived to become Pope Julius III (1549-1555) and to exemplify yet another misplaced hope in a change for the better at the top, points to other reasons rather than these convenient excuses. In fact, the signal for getting out of Trent was not the plague but the call for a recognition of the ius divinum of episcopal residence, with all this implied for the "traditions of the Roman Curia", coming with the news of the successes of imperial policy in Germany¹². Cervini, like his compatriot Carafa later, made no secret of his dislike of Charles V and his fears of another Constantine, and was prepared in the event to destroy the credibility and effectiveness of the Council as the instrument of reform and reconciliation in order to save the ecclesiastical and general political power of the papacy. This expressed the dominant mood among the Italian bishops¹³.

Thus the scene was set for future events. The Council took its course as a moderate, house-cleaning operation, and a preparation for the papal counterattack on Protestant opponents. This was precisely the view of the curial party, whose most respectable adherents at this stage were not concerned to meet the Protestants half-way. The more conciliatory view was inspired by the Catholic humanists, whose prophet was Erasmus, and who tried to reconcile the Protestants with the Catholic Church. The Catholic humanists either failed to establish positions of influence and authority at the institutional centre, or like Erasmus, in reply to Adrian VI, preferred to stay away from the suffocating embrace of curial Rome¹⁴.

The second crisis point, the final resolution of the Council, represents an ecclesiastical compromise - abuses in the ecclesiastical order were to be corrected, but only in terms of the constitutional status quo ante-Reformation. This involved a tightening-up of what remained of Catholic Europe, a re-assertion of institutional centralism and papal monarchy, a policy of confrontation with those considered to be heretics and schismatics. The question of a re-interpretation, decentralization, de-curialization of church authority, which had been mooted in the first and final period of Trent with the question of the 'ius divinum' of episcopal residence was resolved in favour of the papacy, which continued to keep the reins of the Council in its own hands and in consequence the future direction of Catholic reform based on Trent¹⁵.

The question of 'ius divinum' was shelved, the practical question of residence was taken care of, there was a papal reform of the Curia, but the underlying question remained - was church government monarchical, collegial, or a mixture of both, and what were the implications for the whole conception of the Church and its mission? If it had been decided explicitly that the bishops' duty of residence in their own dioceses was not just a matter of ecclesiastical law or custom, but demanded by the very nature of the episcopal office (emphasis on pastoral care and not the juridical arrangements), then the authority corresponding to the office would be iure divino and not just iure ecclesiastico, inherent in the office of bishop and not dependent on a separate delegation of jurisdiction from the Pope. But to allow this in the eyes of the curialists would have been tantamount to destroying the basis of their

ecclesiastical power. In the same framework, the institution of religious exemption provided yet another instrument of central jurisdiction inherited from the Middle Ages¹⁶.

The final period of Trent (1563-65) brought to a head also the conflicting interests of the political powers. While the Pope and Curia could protect their juridical authority ecclesiastical, gone were the days when they could directly affect the Emperor and the independent sovereigns politically. One main consequence of the Reformation was to render the Church even more dependent on the goodwill of the Catholic princes¹⁷. Trent itself could not be successfully completed until this necessity was recognized and the diverse interests of the powers reconciled. This is the other side of the coin of papal supremacy. At the end of the conciliar period the papacy had opted for the politics of concordats, with their consequent proviso of conciliating the interests of the powers.

The Concordat of Bologna between Leo X and Francis I (December 1516) neutralized conciliarism at the price of closing up the French Church within herself and turning conciliarism into a "Gallicanisme du Roi". This was demonstrated by the lack of involvement of the French Church in the first two periods of Trent¹⁸.

Other nations too witnessed the consolidation of national and religious absolutism as a concomitant of the break-up of medieval Christendom¹⁹. In this the Protestant Reformation provided the definitive impetus and corresponded with the aspirations of the different potentates.

"The viewpoint of Christendom conflicted with that of the national State."²⁰

Men like Seripando and Sadoletto saw in the dispute between France and the Emperor another aspect of the tragedy that had struck Christendom, where in their eyes wars could only be civil wars.²¹ They shared with Charles V a medieval conception of the world, in which the only legitimate form of warfare, beyond moral reproach, was the crusade against the infidel. A period which at one time saw Francis I allied with the Turks against the Emperor, and at another Francis and the German Protestant princes united in opposition to Charles, was clearly a watershed. The Interim of 1548 and the Peace of Augsburg (February–September 1555) consecrated the principle 'cuius regio eius religio':

"Such was the solution of the religious problem in Germany in the middle of the sixteenth century. It was at least original. Freedom of worship exists for the princes; it does not exist for the subjects."

What had once been the geographical centre of Christendom thus became the most conspicuous exemplar of the new Europe of "'territorialism', the religious despotism of the new sovereign State which rose out of the ruins of Christendom."²²

In France where the identification of national aspirations with a religious, cultural and educational mission had been given expression since the beginning of the fourteenth century; where a war for the king of France was defined as a war for justice, for

France, for culture, and education, for the Church, for the Christian faith; where "une foi, une loi, un roi" was invoked; a policy of conciliation ended with the failure of the Colloquy of Poissy²³ (1561) and the eventual emergence of the Politiques. In the policy of conciliation inspired by Erasmus and the Christian humanists, religion and the state remained inseparable, religious considerations predominated, the goal was a reunited Christendom: for the Politiques, the national point of view and national political considerations predominated, religion was considered as only one element of the political picture and subject to the raison d'Etat. The Counter-Reformation and the Protestant principalities, by contrast with the Erasmians, gave a denominational cast to their religious politics and political religion, and unlike the Politiques considered religion the defining instrument of the political picture, qualifying the character of any raison d'Etat.

Philip of Spain wanted Trent to be firmly established as the basis of Catholic reform and the religio-theological foundation of the Counter-Reformation. The Emperor Ferdinand wanted a Council of re-union, in effect a new Council, whether at Trent or elsewhere. The French under the Cardinal of Lorraine came to Trent in search of that solution to the schism which they had been unable to achieve in their own national councils. Pius IV found himself in the position of having to conciliate these interests. The decrees of the first two periods of Trent had not been ratified by the pope and made universal Church policy. Thus there remained doubts about their validity, and the question of a new Council which would be distinct from Trent, now twice suspended and its work incomplete. To conciliate all interests - those who wanted the first two periods

accepted and the Council of Trent completed; those who were concerned for re-union with the Protestants and the first two periods' decrees left open for the sake of reconciling any Protestant objections to them - an ingenious formula was used to re-summon the Council at Trent: "Quacumque suspensione sublata".

However, it was too late in the day to be operating with the ingenuity that would have been appropriate in the first period. By now the divisions were irreconcilable, what were soon to become the battle lines were already drawn up, and all that remained to give Trent its final imprint was the working out of the dynamics of the conciliar process, in which the ecclesiastical interests of the curial party corresponded with the religio-political aspirations of the strongest group of bishops present - the Spaniards²⁴. The vestiges of reconciliation disappeared with the establishment of a reformed Latin Catholicism based on Trent as the instrument of a political Counter-Reformation led by Spain. Lepanto (1571) was a symbol of its military vigour, St. Bartholomew (1572) the sign and the Thirty Years War the reality of its nemesis.

Its ecclesiastical consequence was the re-establishment of the power and prestige of a renewed papal monarchy. Once more a prophetic challenge to this ecclesiastical polity had failed to become established within the institution and "the Protestant principle" became the Protestant Churches. The millenarian impulse had however not been without effect. The condition of the papacy at the end of the century in comparison with what it had been at the beginning was testimony enough to that, and the millenarian movements within the Roman Catholic Church such as the Jesuits,

the reformed Carmelites, the Oratorians, were leading forces in the work of Catholic regeneration and in the forms of Catholicism brought to North and South America. Four hundred years later an unexpected turn of events set in process a movement which brought the Tridentine era to a close, and inaugurated a new era which not only witnessed the establishment of what Tillich describes as "the Protestant principle" within the Roman Catholic Church, but potentially established the forces of millenarian prophecy as the institutional expression of the Church in the modern world.

CHAPTER II

THE AGGIORNAMENTO OF VATICAN II

The Second Vatican Council (1962-1965) is the single most important reality in the life of the Catholic Church in our age. Every institutional expression of Catholic life and practice now must be considered in the light of Vatican II. Although there is no adequate historical precedent or analogy for this council, it can be compared to a parliament or congress which convened for a period of four years, for the first time in a hundred years. There is first of all an enormous backlog of business to attend to, an attempt to deal with the issues and problems which had arisen during the preceding century. In the course of the assembly, policy guidelines for the future would have to be drawn up, especially if it was not known when the next assembly would be held. In the formulation of such guidelines compromise would be essential for a heterogeneous body like a congress, a parliament, or a council. Afterwards, dissatisfaction would be expressed on all sides with decisions, official acts and statements, considered to give less than full support to the most interested partisans. Nevertheless, what would be of primary importance, and what would determine the course of future events, more than anything else, would be the general tone of the proceedings, "the spirit of the meeting," and its impact on the respective constituents. By this criterion, the Second Vatican Council can be ranked with Philadelphia 1776 or Westminster 1946 in its significance for present and future ages.¹

It is a remarkable irony that a history of monarchical papacy ("institutionalized charisma") had prepared the way for the charismatic individual whose personality set a new tone, not only for the papacy

but for the whole Church.² This became of vital importance in the actual operation of Vatican II, because the central issue to which the bishops addressed themselves was the concept of "the Church". The language they used was that of Catholic theology, but, as the Council itself was to demonstrate, that language was polyglot; and what became more important than the actual vocabulary was the "spirit of the meeting" - for this the personality of Pope John was the fundamental determining factor.

Catholic theology is not something which takes place in vacuo, but reflects the self-understanding of the Church of a particular era; and 'ecclesiology' - that branch of theology which sets out to formulate explicitly the Church's understanding of herself - is essentially historical.

"Our concept of the Church is basically
influenced by the form of the Church."³

Again, the short pontificate of Pope John modified "the form" of the papacy, and that, along with his initiation of Vatican II, was destined to modify "the form of the Church."

The actual formulation by Vatican II of its ecclesiology shows the tension involved in this "modification.". In order to answer the question, "What is 'the Church' according to Vatican II?", all the conciliar documents must be taken into account. The Council's understanding of the Church is stated explicitly in Lumen Gentium (LG), and the implications of that understanding are worked out in the course of formulating the other documents (for our purposes, the most important being Gaudium et Spes) - 'The Church in the Modern World' (GS). But, if we want to understand the nature of self-understanding of the Church as formulated by Vatican II, and the tension between the past and the present of the Church, the

first three chapters of Lumen Gentium are of primary concern.

In those chapters, Vatican II expressed an understanding of the Church by a juxtaposition of biblical liturgical and juridical concepts which attempts to balance what had been for centuries an overwhelmingly juridical and legalistic way of speaking about the Church, with a return to a more ancient tradition of biblico-liturgical discourse. The form of the Church as dictated by the exigencies of the Counter-Reformation is clearly different, in the understanding of the bishops of Vatican II, from the form required to carry out the pastoral mission of service in the world as it is today (Pope John had from the beginning insisted on this "pastoral" character of the Council he had called, and the majority of the bishops never lost sight of that fact). However, the weight of the recent tradition still continued to influence the whole course of Vatican II, and in LG, when the priority of the more traditional biblical and liturgical theological formulations was established in the first two chapters, the juridical was re-asserted in chapter three.⁴ No amount of special pleading for their compatibility, and for the unity of the "institutional" and the "charismatic" in the one Church, can disguise the fact that the "forms" are destined to live in tension.⁵

The co-existence of "juridical" and "pastoral" is not only a historical necessity, reflecting the existence of the Church, whose form had been defined in the era of the Counter-Reformation, striving to assert herself in a new age; but a manifestation of the transitional character of Vatican II. The Church, which has been conceived, until recently, overwhelmingly in juridical terms, is now facing problems of re-definition, not only in theology but

especially in practice.⁶ This involves questions of church order, the relationship of the Catholic Church to other Christian Churches, and the direction of Christian presence in the world today.⁷

The abruptly terminated Vatican Council I (1870) is best known for its definition of papal infallibility. Whatever the specifically theological meaning and origin of this definition (its historical roots were to be found in the Middle Ages),⁸ the political context was most significant. Somewhat like Boniface VIII and 'Unam Sanctam', this assertion of papal authority came just in time to be waived aside by the usurpation of political power unfavourable to the papacy. The Risorgimento put an end to the remaining territorial expression of papal power - the Papal States - where the conventional political expression of papal authority had all begun with the dubious 'Donatio Constantini', the papacy took some time to adapt to the new situation which was leading inexorably to a new conception of the Church's position in the world.

The centuries after Trent exemplified the ossifying effects of the papal and curial victory there. This had been achieved in league with the Catholic heirs of Charles V and the price to pay was papal support of Catholic protectors and their imperial ambitions, while the papacy was left in possession of its estates. This period was dominated by that experience described in the first quotation of the trilogy introducing this section - the hierarchy opposed to social change as guardians of the integrity of the diminished institution, in particular under a system of reciprocal guarantees with the powers. The integrist claims were not diminished when their papal holders were ignored or treated with contempt - rather, the stridency with which they were proclaimed grew (the Syllabus of Errors of 1864) as

the denouement approached. The content was minuscule, in accordance with a phenomenon we shall observe in the American context - conservative upholding of the status quo against the movement of change in favour of a radical restructuring of society.⁹

"Ainsi à la mort de Pie IX la situation est tragique."¹⁰ The recovery of the papacy, and the corresponding recovery of confidence in the Church's position in political affairs as a responsible participant and not just as a spectre of the "ancien régime", was to be slow and full of setbacks.

Rerum Novarum (1891) today symbolizes the inauguration of the Modern Church's role as a partner in dialogue with the world in which it exists, and the papacy as a teacher of those mortal principles which the Church is commissioned to preserve and proclaim. While Leo XIII still retained many of the attitudes of his predecessors¹¹, his attempt to come to terms with the social question, the employment of Christian concepts of the dignity of work and the necessity to give justice to the workers, opened the way for a new relationship between church and world in which the tradition of Catholic social teaching would be brought to bear as a standard of judgment for the economic and political forms of society. From the condition of being more a victim of social and political circumstances, this new evolving role opened up the prospect that the Church once more would be an active agent in the shaping of the world.¹²

The ecclesiastical institution, however, was still not prepared to put aside those attitudes and practices of the past which necessarily limited its prospective role in society and undermined the credibility of its own message. The "anti-Modernism" witch-hunt

gave vent to all the excesses of absolutism within the Church and obsessive fear of the world not under the control of ecclesiastical authority which, the resolution of Trent in a Counter-Reformation and aggressively Catholic direction had encouraged.¹³ Since my sympathies in the consideration of Trent were with men like Erasmus, Contarini, Seripando, I see the anti-Modernist period as another spasm of the Leirathan unwilling to come to terms with its limited, though in my opinion proper role as the inspirational critic in favour of that vision of the Kingdom which the Church holds as its "ideology." Instead, ecclesiastical authority attempted to control society, in favour of that institutional memory which had haunted the papacy since the Middle Ages - the Church as the perfect society which alone gave expression to the primacy of the spiritual. While this vision was not unworthy, it failed to attend to the human side of the Church and this debased the Gospel message into something recognizable in terms of the pejorative sense of "ideology" - an instrument to promote the vested interests of the papacy and curia.

This was given its most obvious expression in Italy, where the papacy had not reconciled itself to the loss of power. The story of Italian Christian Democracy and Catholic Action has been punctuated by Vatican efforts to control the State and promote its own organizational interests.¹⁴ The change of emphasis which Pope John expressed in his pontificate - his policy of dialogue, which encouraged the formation of the Centro-Sinistra, the slackening of Vatican preoccupation with the course of Italian politics - was a remarkable contrast: the contemporary divorce controversy a symbol of the recrudescence of integrism.

However, the new lease of life which Catholic social teaching realized with RN continued. Although the prevailing capitalist

order in Europe encouraged an emphasis on the anti-communist and anti-socialist passages of the encyclical, it was impossible for the Catholic activists ("militants") who were formed in the Catholic tradition not to be preoccupied with questions of economic justice - the very questions which could not be answered within the capitalist framework. Even when the papacy's policy of concordats led to a compromising relationship with fascism, the anti-authoritarian and social justice principles of the Church's social teaching stood in contrast to this policy,¹⁵ and in Quadragesimo Anno (1931) Pius XI had described the evils of "economic nationalism" and "economic imperialism" - "the ultimate consequences of the individualist spirit in economic life" - on the one hand:

" ... on the other, a no less deadly and accursed internationalism of finance or international imperialism whose country is where profit is."¹⁶

It was this critique which Pope John developed in Mater et Magistra (1961) and Pacem in Terris (1963), and which came to its most comprehensive expression at Vatican II, with Schema XIII and Gaudium et Spes.

Two points of this critique are of immediate interest here since they define the terms of the "justice and peace" issues considered in Sections III and IV. These are - what Pope John called "socialization" in MM, and the concept of a world order introduced in PT and given further expression in GS. RN had spoken emphatically about the rights of private property, but it had also expressed the Christian doctrine of creation's social character, which leads to the consideration that the goods of the earth are intended by the Creator to be used on behalf of all men, so that the right to possess and make use of private property is not unlimited. QA underlined

this social responsibility of property, and MM gave it its fullest expression - that the 'bonum commune' takes precedence over the 'bonum individuale' of the individual possessor of private property; private property is not an absolute in the tradition of Catholic social teaching. The emphasis on wide-scale distribution of private property in this scenario is opposed to the concentration characteristic of capitalism,¹⁷ and the use of the word "socialization", with approval, to describe the modern process of increasing social management and control of all sectors of the economy, symbolized the shift from a presumption in favour of capitalism to the establishment of the Church's acceptance of a position of philosophical neutrality in the economic order. While this was implicit in QA's equal condemnation of the evils involved in the socialist and capitalist scheme, the continuance of a policy of support of the capitalist side of the Cold War, particularly under Pius XII¹⁸ had obscured this fact.

What was perhaps even more important than the actual works of MM was Pope John's pontificate. His policy of openness to dialogue with all philosophies and religions, the welcome given to representatives of all governments and countries, the impression made on the world by his affable and friendly personality, changed the face of papacy and made possible the new spirit of concern to serve the interests of peoples, without arrogance and in a spirit of partnership with "all men of good will", which Vatican II expressed in GS. This involved a willingness on the part of the Church to look for common ground with those men of good will who were serving the needs of people for justice and peace, whatever their "ideology" - Pope John made a break with the recent tradition of the papacy to condemn the objectionable doctrine and its supporters unconditionally. Respect for persons in Pope John's philosophy was unconditional, and where

their doctrines were not in accordance with the Christian gospel only a policy of dialogue was appropriate.

It was the second point of Pope John's critique, expressed in PT, which has been the most significant factor in the shift from what I have called a "premillenarian" to a "postmillenarian" influence on the institutional Church. It is my contention that only the latter is an effective antidote to integrism, which is the constant historical memory which ecclesiastical authority has carried from the Middle Ages. The prophetic dimension of the Gospel - the call to reform ("Ecclesia semper Reformanda") - is unable to overcome this integrist tendency if its influence is not somehow paradoxically institutionalized in the structures of the Church. The shift which the papacy of John XXIII and Vatican II represent is precisely the attempt to incorporate the prophetic, "charismatic", element into the institutional order (structures of authority, ecclesiastical involvement in society). Since this is a juxtaposition of conflicting tendencies (the prophetic being dynamic, the institutional a static tendency) they are destined to coexist uncomfortably in tension.

The international politics of the papacy had been an integrist attempt to dominate and control Christian Europe. The international politics to which Pope John, his successor, and the Vatican Council subscribed are the support and encouragement of the attempts to go beyond nationalism (in line with Catholic political philosophy's opposition to the nation-state) in the direction of some form of world order.¹⁹ Since the United Nations is at present the only embryonic expression of internationalism, the Church's support has been given to that organization, as documented in PT and GS and symbolized by Pope Paul's visit to UN headquarters in October 1965. Thus, the internationalism which the Catholic Church expresses as a religious organization

becomes the inspiration for the Church's effort to encourage political and economic internationalism. The Church today is in a more credible position in this endeavour because since Pope John and Vatican II it has re-discovered the difference between unity and uniformity. The Church as the instrument and sign of the unity of mankind can only be effective if it is an expression of this Catholic unity.

The aggiornamento has manifested certain characteristics of the Church's nature and its mission which have been obscured by the practice of recent centuries and whose absence had led to misconceptions about the nature and mission of the Church. For example, that the prophetic - millenarian impulse was somehow foreign or illegitimate in the Church. In Norman Cohn's classic work, "The Pursuit of the Millennium, this impulse is identified with its extreme forms, messianism and utopianism. While he recognizes the "traditional" nature of beliefs about a future golden age or messianic kingdom, his concentration on the social situations of insecurity and disorientation which produced anarchic millenarian movements has obscured the continuing importance of these beliefs in all situations.²⁰ His own social conservatism leads him to a remark like the following:

"Most curious is the way in which Catholic doctrine incorporated and conserved the idea that all things on earth ought to belong to all human beings communally."²¹

The only "curious" thing about this is that the Church has not, in its practice, encouraged the belief that such an idea is in fact part of its ideology! He goes on to show his annoyance that Christianity encouraged egalitarianism, and this betrays him into the gratuitous, not to say exegetically incorrect remark:

"... it was nowhere appreciated how far St. Luke had allowed his imagination to overrule his sense of historical fact." ²²

He is referring to the early chapters of Acts, in which it is quite clear that the original Christian inspiration in the early Church was in the direction of a form of communism. The recent history of the Church is a corrective to Cohn's conservative interpretation of Christian millenarism. The statements of the Latin American bishops quoted in Section IV show clearly that the identification between the millenarian-prophetic impulse and its extreme, violent forms is an inadequate interpretation.²³

Another misconception is that millenarian movements inspired by religion are archaic - as society advances educationally, politically, and in its social experience these are transformed into conventional political parties (Peter Worsley's analysis)²⁴. I have found Worsley's analysis of "charisma" a corrective of Weber's which is supported in the case of recent Catholic experience. His emphasis on the social relationship between the charismatic individual and his followers- the message as the most important element, not the person of the leader which can vary, although the message tied to the leader is an important element in centralizing the movement; and his qualifications of the leader as symbol, catalyst and message-bearer: all these points are well exemplified in the case of Pope John.²⁵

However, other elements of his analysis do not correspond to the experiences of the Church. Worsley maintains that as the dominant form of protest millenarism always gives way to secularized forms and becomes marginal, pacific and other worldly. While this is true of "premillenarian" form of Christian sects, it does not take into account the "post millenarian" influence which endures precisely because it refuses to accept the dubious distinction between "religious" and "secular", and is only pacific if this denotes a

reluctance to accept that only the extreme forms of protest are effective - but it is far from passive (as the "orthopraxis" in Latin America is presently demonstrating).

Worsley does describe very well the cooptation of the millenarian by the institutional Church:

"The Kingdom of God on earth, orthodox dogma had it been established by Christ's first coming, and was being perpetuated in the Church and its members. The gradual perfection and growth of the Church would lead to the New Jerusalem."

And he is aware of the persistence of millenarism:

"... the secret history of the Middle Ages is the history of millenarian and allied sects, a history which is only now being written."

But his analysis cannot account for the persistence of what Marty calls "postmillenarian" tendencies even after the development of politics as a secular cult. If the Christian tradition of social criticism was solely "premillenarian", a transition to secular politics and the "privatization" of religion would be the only result. The 'Social Gospel' phenomenon in American Protestantism (Section II) and the experience of Meddlin (Section IV) demonstrate the continuing importance of "postmillenarian" religious inspiration, and make Cohn's and Worsley's analyses less than comprehensive.

In spite of this disagreement with Cohn and Worsley, I have found their books and Barrington Moore's the most valuable foundation for locating the issues of Church history in their social context. While I have inevitably had to concentrate more on the history of

church government than on social history, their perspective is a vital part of a comprehensive analysis. The social preconditions for that shift in the Church which the word aggiornamento has come to define are to be found in the circumstances which they describe - social and economic changes causing disorientation, upsetting the hold of the established patterns of society, leading to social agitation and demands for a message and leadership which will realize the possibilities of political liberation and economic prosperity for the masses of the oppressed. It is I think obvious that one of the main differences between the Tridentine Vatican Council I and Vatican II was the lack of awareness and the inability of the former to appropriate the social and economic changes of the 19th century, and Vatican II's building on the foundation of the Social Encyclicals in its attempt to come to terms with these changes. One has only to read GS to have demonstration of the difference between the two Councils. ('Profoundly changed conditions', 'Changes in the social order', 'Psychological, Moral, and Religious Changes', 'The role of the Church in the Modern World', are some of the issues addressed in GS.)

Throughout the following sections, while the influence of these social science works, and those explicitly cited in the sections, is often only implicit, it is a very important part of the consideration. Without their analyses the theological issues are abstract and incomplete. While I tend to emphasize the priority of the religious forces which have influenced the American bishops' response to foreign polity, Vatican II has expressed the impossibility of separating this ecclesiastical context from the cultural situation of which it is part and by which the ecclesiastical is formed, and vice-versa. The aggiornamento of Vatican II has been set forth in comprehensive terms

by GS. The dialectic of "institution" and "ideology", the continuing tension between the ecclesiastical and the prophetic, between the Curia and the prophets, is testimony to the novelty of the re-discovery of the Church's original mission of service, the continuing temptation of integrism and self-serving ecclesiastical politics, the need for the prophetic as a constituent part of the ecclesiastical order, and the nature of the Church as the "pilgrim people of God."

S E C T I O N T W O

SECTION II

THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC CHURCH

In this section I shall consider four themes from American Catholic Church history, since they serve to place the response of the bishops to the war in Vietnam, and the presently unfolding situation in Latin America, in an explanatory context which I shall develop in the concluding section of the thesis, by relating the "Roman" character of their position as bishops of the Church (Section I) to the American Catholic experience. The four themes are - the conflict between "separatist" and "Americanist" tendencies in the American Catholic Church; the character of ecclesiastical government, in the relationship between bishops and priests, and between bishops and the Vatican; the institutionalization of ecclesiastical government of the American Church (in particular, that branch of the national 'Catholic Conference' dealing with international affairs and foreign policy issues); the example of an historical precedent for political involvement by the institutional Church.

CHAPTER I

'SEPARATISM' AND 'AMERICANISM'

The first theme - 'separatism' viz -a-viz 'Americanism' - expresses the ambiguity of the response of the American Catholic Church to its historical position in the United States. The attitude to religion of the Constitution itself - disestablishment and voluntary-ism - was ambiguous:

"Whereas Jefferson wanted a line drawn to keep clerics from meddling in civil matters, those in the lineage of Roger Williams wanted to be sure that civil authorities would have no say in matters of conscience and belief. The clergy won most: it has been more difficult for government to intrude on religion than for clerics to intrude on civil territory."¹

Likewise, discrimination rather than tolerance has punctuated the history of religious liberty in the United States (in the Catholic case, frequently in tandem with ethnic prejudice against Irish and Spanish-speaking Americans).

The "Americanist" attitude was the attempt to win acceptance in the society for Catholics and their institutions, as legitimate according to the canons predominant in the socio-cultural pantheon. The obstacle facing the Americanists was the conventional establishment of Protestantism in its various forms as the religious ethos of the country, in the course of the nineteenth century. The Republic had been founded at a time when religious institutions were entering a period of decline,² thus favourable to minorities like the Catholics,³ but the growth in numbers of Catholics came when



a reinvigorated Protestantism could impose itself on the established social order, shape it in favour of its own religious interests and in opposition to those of others, the most obvious antagonists being the Catholics⁴. The attempt to establish the compatibility of Catholicism with established American social and political institutions, which gathered force throughout the course of the 19th century and came to its most symbolic expression in the age of Cardinal Gibbons and Archbishop Ireland in the 1890's, suffered the disability of being preempted by anti-Catholic Protestantism.

This in turn gave support to the "separatist" tendency, which reacted to the recurring spasms of 'nativism' and 'know-nothingism', the Ku-Klux-Klan, the APA, with an assertion of Catholic separatist identity in a basically hostile environment. Since a formal union between American institutions and Protestant Christianity dominated the society, this 'separatism' was in many ways a natural defence for the Catholic "minority" (even though they formed the major Christian denomination since the Civil War). In the first half of the century this 'separatism' is identified with the figure of Archbishop Hughes of New York⁵. It was Hughes who insisted on the absolute necessity for Catholics to have their own schools under the strict control of the Catholic hierarchy, where the Catholic faith could be nurtured and preserved in an environment cut off from the influences of the "public", i.e. Protestant schools. Where Protestantism in America gloried in its "denominationalism", which corresponded to the individualism and voluntarism celebrated in the constitutional mythology, Catholicism insisted on the unique character of its authoritative teaching. The growing number of immigrants, in particular the

Irish⁶, by the middle of the century, magnified the concern of the Catholic hierarchy for the preservation of the immigrants' faith, in a society which many of them interpreted as fundamentally hostile to that Catholic faith and bent on its elimination - the outbreaks of 'nativism', which expressed American identity in terms of the dominant social race (Anglo-Saxon), as distinct from Celtic, Latin and any other non-acceptable stock⁷, intensified the separatist pressure, particularly in New York, the centre of Irish-American Catholicism.

Another result of the religion/race conflict was dramatized by the Civil War. This event faced all the Christian Churches and denominations with the necessity to express the political implications of their religion, and in circumstances which demonstrate the univocal character of politics (who could doubt that the Civil War blurred the national/international distinction!) For Protestants, not only did it manifest the fact that the Protestant empire was built at the expense of black inhabitants⁸, but it also solidified those currents of individualism, expressed in personal salvation at the expense of social responsibility, which have stilled the prophetic/social-critical voice of Protestantism and rendered it for the most part a conservative upholder of the status quo⁹. Particularly was this the case in the South, which by the time of the Civil War and later was the most Protestant part of the country¹⁰. There the conservative social pressures of the dominant race reinforced and were reinforced by the conservative pressures of biblical fundamentalism; in which an individualistic conception of holiness and "salvation" (the dominant category of American Protestant theology, as distinct from "justification" in

European), with a rigorous legalistic moral code addressed to the categories of personal vices, identified the Church with the "rock of ages" (the symbol of resistance to all religious and social change), just as vigorously, if unknowingly, as that identification being promoted at the same time in Europe by the Papacy.

The nemesis of this society/religion/race confusion has worked itself out in the United States ever since, as these very attitudes and their theology conquered American Protestantism¹¹ and reinforced the Social ethos, itself based on the same individualistic conception of social/political/economic salvation, to the neglect not only of the racial oppression which continued in North and South but even of the social question itself - was the society indeed observing "liberty and justice for all", and was the identification of American democracy with "free-enterprise capitalism" legitimate, according to the principles of the Constitution and (for the Christian) the New Testament?

The Civil War for the Catholic Church challenged the political insularity of the now largely immigrant Church, which had since Carroll stayed aloof from episcopal involvement except where Catholic interests were directly affected, as in the protection of Catholic institutions and property. With one exception, the episcopal response was to acquiesce in the acceptance of regional loyalties, and Catholics took sides accordingly. The exception was Bishop Augustin Verot, Vicar-Apostolic of Florida and later Bishop of St. Augustine, who, not content with simple acquiescence, came out strongly in support of the Southern cause. In a famous sermon delivered on January 4,

1861 - "Slavery and Abolitionism" - Verot supported the institution of slavery as legitimate, not a malum in se, while condemning the evils which attended the practice¹². Although this was a common Catholic opinion at the time, only Verot introduced it into the political arena. Part of the reason for Verot's position was his awareness that many abolitionists were nativists, who were quite prepared to discriminate against Catholics, and whose anti-slavery views were encouraged by their anti-South antagonism. (It was this latter reality which helped to fasten the South to its "peculiar institution!") Verot set a precedent in this case, by involving himself in a national political matter which had nothing directly to do with Catholicism. It would be difficult to find a similar example of such episcopal outspokenness in the whole course of American Catholic history, but, as he demonstrated at Vatican I when he opposed the definition of papal infallibility, Verot was an outspoken bishop.

After the Civil War, the Catholic population became ever more concentrated in "the fertile crescent" (from Boston down the east coast to Northern Virginia, through Pennsylvania to Ohio, round to Chicago and St. Paul), and while Catholic pockets remained in the south, there was no further expansion of the Church there, and the negro population was generally ignored. New Orleans remained the only centre of a significant Catholic population in the South: elsewhere, the absence of priests led to the loss of thousands of Catholics to the Church, and the Southern view of the Catholic Church as alien became established (no bishop of the stature of England or Verot was at hand to correct that view - Gibbons spent

too little time there on his way up the promotional ladder to Baltimore). In the North, the Catholic support of the Union cause had qualified the "separatist" approach, which had been dominant at mid-century - Catholics were now bound up with the destiny of the nation which had been forged in the war, and in the course of the next thirty years the "Americanist" tendency triumphed.

The domestic religious controversies between Protestant and Catholic Christianity did not prevent a mutual consensus on the acceptance of the American political and economic system which the Civil War had helped to establish¹³. Both separatists and Americanists within the Catholic Church were political and social conservatives. This had been most clearly demonstrated in the evolution of the Catholic parochial school system (the focus of the attention of both tendencies) - whatever its supposedly divisive religious character, it has proved itself as the outstanding instrument of the socialization of the immigrant Catholics with the political, economic, and social institutions of the society.

The "separatist" and "Americanist" conflict which reached a climax in the last quarter of the 19th century, dramatized the historical predicament of the Catholic Church, which found itself having to come to terms with cultures and political societies in an environment different from that in which its theological-political ideology had been formed - Reformation and post-Reformation Europe. The two approaches represented the responses to that situation - in the first (separatist), the European Catholic ideology dominated

(the ideal of the confessional state in which Catholicism was recognised as the one true religion, unique in its claim for state recognition and support, providing the religious legitimization of the government which supported it), and hence the American system of government could only be regarded with suspicion in its profession to regard all religions as equal and in its explicit denial of confessionalism; in the second (Americanist) the American political ideology prevailed and the European Catholic ideology was played down or ignored (the reaction only came when this attitude was reported back to a European context in an attempt to upset the "traditional" European Catholic order, and the whole 'Americanism' controversy developed¹⁴). The latter was typical in its American pragmatic approach; the former resisted American acculturation wherever this might have contaminated "traditional" Catholicism (the fact that this "tradition" was of questionable theological validity, and itself more the expression of particular political circumstances than of evangelical origin, did not prevent its predominance).

The tendency to choose between the two, and the victory of Americanist over separatist which seemed to have been vindicated in 1960, must not be allowed to obscure the ambiguous character of the historical experience. Whatever the ideological foundations, which in practice were of secondary concern, the social situations to which these attitudes addressed themselves were not such as to allow the unquestioned acceptance of one or the other. When it is recognised that the American political ideology was itself ambiguous, as we have seen, since the Constitution was and is subject to conventional interpretation within the broad limits

of the anti-establishment of religious clause, this caution becomes even more necessary.

Two facets of the historical experience may serve to illustrate - the religious roots of American Catholicism; the ethnic origins. Both of these were brought over from Europe, and the separatists and Americanists both had to plant them in the American soil. It is all but impossible to divorce the ethnic from the religious, but it can be observed, I think, that Americanists were prone to the "melting-pot" attitude to the ethnic, while striving to gain acceptance for the religious through conciliatory moves (like the Catholic participation in the Chicago World's Fair - the 'Parliament of Religions' (1893)), and attempts to show the compatibility of Catholicism and American democracy (as expressed in particular by Orestes Brownson, Isaac Hecker, Bishops John Lancaster Spalding, Ireland and Gibbons). Separatists on the other hand, emphasized the ethnic, and insisted on the distinctive marks of Catholicism, with a consequent unwillingness to be conciliatory to other Christian denominations (they in common with the Americanists, would not have considered Catholicism as one of the Christian Churches but the only true Church - the others in error) - Cardinal McCloskey, Bishops Corrigan and McQuade being the chief exponents of this attitude among the hierarchy. The ambiguity can be seen in the dominance of Irish Catholicism, particularly in the composition of the hierarchy, a tradition which became established at that time and which still exists¹⁵, so that the same kind of "melting-pot" phenomenon can be observed in the general social situation and in the situation of American Catholicism - the dominance of one group

at the expense of the others (in the social situation - the WASP hegemony; in the Catholic - the Irish). Therefore, the German-American Catholics were correct in being alert to this type of Irish take over, and the difference, in some degree at least, between Mid-West Catholicism and that of the East, which the Vatican Council era has exposed, is a tribute to their pertinacity.

Separatists like Corrigan and McQuade, and Americanists like Gibbons and Ireland, were at one in their Irish Catholicism, and at one in their acceptance of the foreign policy of the American government, along with their non-Irish confreres¹⁷. The conflict between Americanists and separatists was limited by the common acceptance of the political and social status quo; the conflict was an expression of different modes of adjustment.

This can be observed in the Irish American Catholicism which was dominant among the hierarchy, and which was better suited to adjusting to the prevailing order in the society. The Irish, unlike the other Catholic ethnic groups (Germans, Italians, Slavs, Spanish), had a lot in common with the Anglo-Americans, the dominant ethnic group - the English language, familiarity with the canons of social and political advancement (in particular, the use of the political system for the benefit of one's race, by relying on the mass support of one's own people in elections and by the judicious manipulation of the legislative process, as Daniel O'Connell and Charles S. Parnell dramatized). Whether the policy took the form of the more "separatist" type of ethnic politics which James M. Curley practised in Boston¹⁸, or the more conciliatory, "Americanist"

approach of Al Smith¹⁹ (President Kennedy relied on both), the attention given to the means of achieving political power was not notably attenuated by searching examination of the ends to which that power once achieved would be devoted. This is not to deny the fact that men like Curley and Smith were in favour of social and economic reforms - they were much more progressive than their non-Irish and non-Catholic opponents from the old order - but much of their energy and sapiential capacities was exhausted in the power struggle, so that more often than not the economic control remained in the same hands as before²⁰.

Other features of Irish Catholicism united separatist and Americanist - its clerical paternalism, anti-intellectualism, legalism and formalism, doctrinal fundamentalism and jansenistic puritanism, love of institutional power, and absence of a non-conformity which could have acted to temper that love with critical caution²¹. It is at first remarkable how many of these features were duplicated in the Protestant experience, and to the same effect - conservative upholding of the economic and political status quo and an absence of radical Christian social criticism. Yet it is clear that such were the qualifications of entry, and such the price to pay for even a grudging acceptance in the socio-political order.

The 'Americanism' controversy itself and Leo XIII's letter Testem Benevolentiae (1899) proved to be yet another ambiguous stage of the whole process, which was leading inexorably to the acceptance of the Americanist position, in practice, as the American Catholic consensus, and the virtual disappearance of separatist tendencies from

the most visible and dominant areas of American Catholicism (again, we are here concerned with the "fertile crescent"), until our own times. The condemnation of 'Americanism' (whatever the protestations of the American Catholics who favoured the reconciliation of the Church with American ways, that this was not aimed at them but at obscure European, in particular French, controversies) was initially hailed by the separatists as authoritative vindication, and the Gibbons-Ireland group, within and without the hierarchy, had to resort to a discrete silence. However, the lasting effect of the episode was not to establish 'separatism' as the American Catholic way - such had been without credence since the Civil War in the United States and since the time of Constantine in the universal Church, and was to disappear soon after this its "last hurrah" as a viable theologico-political attitude (indeed, its limited theological and political content, since it was basically a defensive denominational posture, was not as important in the long run as its ethnic-cultural component). The main result of the 'Americanism' condemnation was in the direction of that impetus to the centralization of ecclesiastical authority in Rome, which we have seen in Section I; and its most lasting effect was to bring home to the American Catholic Church that papal antarchy, which had found its sanction in the definition of papal infallibility as an expression of the papal primacy at Vatican I²². The separatists were justified in celebrating the discomfiture of Gibbons and Ireland and the papal brake thus applied to any assertion of American ecclesiastical autonomy. But they overlooked the fact that all were Americanists now, including themselves, in their conformity with and acceptance of the prevailing American social ethos. The re-assertion of papal ecclesiastical control was bereft of any

socio-economic content which might have affected that conformity - the common authorship of Testem Benevolentiae and Rerum Novarum spoke for nothing but the gap between a conservative policy and an increasingly critical conception of socio-economic conditions and philosophies (critical both of state socialism and liberal capitalism).

CHAPTER II

THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC EPISCOPAL TRADITION

"What the Church in the United States needed most during the first quarter-century of its established hierarchical life was a strong central government, profound in its loyalty and devotion to the Holy See, whole-heartedly in unison with the dominant anti-foreign and national policies of the day, with all the parts properly subordinated by the laws of ecclesiastical authority - the parish to its pastor, the pastor to his bishop, the bishop to the metropolitan, the whole Church to the Holy See - with all the prudent and necessary freedom for the merging of racial characteristics into the national ideal without, however, allowing the growth of a sectionalism that might in the end have been detrimental to Catholic American progress. This John Carroll did, and did so well that he remains for all time the exemplar of the loyal citizen and the loyal churchman of our country."¹

Whatever Guilday's estimation of Carroll, the "founding father" of the American Catholic hierarchy (1735-1815), and no matter how much one could question the validity of the criteria of ecclesiastical authority, "loyal citizen", "loyal churchman", this presents a remarkable testimony of the episcopal tradition of the American hierarchy which became established in the history of the American Catholic Church. Guilday, who preceded John Tracy Ellis as the doyen of American Catholic historians, wrote this in the 1920's, and it is the most explicit confirmation I have found of the nature of ecclesiastical government as this was conceived in theory, became

dominant in the consciousness of the Catholic Church, and determined the practice in the particular case of the American Catholic Church.

It is ironic, therefore, when one recalls the historical fact that Carroll himself became the first American bishop by way of "democratic process" - elected by his fellow priests. This established a precedent which was quickly superceded by a return to the labyrinth of ecclesiastical bureaucracy controlled by the Vatican. (Only Carroll's first two successors were not "appointed".) The United States was under the authority of the Congregation De Propaganda Fide, and the American hierarchy was formed in members and tradition according to the relationships between that Congregation, other Vatican agencies (especially the Secretariat of State), and American bishops and priests (lay people's influence was generally non-existent²). The most important of those relationships were the result of personal friendship and the establishment of a Rome-American axis. Here we shall consider some examples and particularly the more recent leadership of the American hierarchy.

We have already come across the names of representatives of the principal membership of the episcopate of the early United States Catholic Church - colonial (Carroll, Spalding - Martin Spalding, uncle of John Lancaster Spalding, was Archbishop of Baltimore at the end of the Civil War), French (Verot), Irish (England, Gibbons). This early United States Church had its centre, appropriately, in Baltimore (named after the Catholic colonist of "Maryland"), and the successive bishops of Baltimore represented the course of the dominating influences on the American episcopate - from the colonial, through a period of French influence (with the French Sulpicians founding the first American seminary - St. Mary's, Baltimore), a short

period of French succession to the bishopric, the spread of this French influence through men like Flaget (whom we come across in the Louisville chapter), and the work of the Sulpicians in clerical formation (one of the significant influences on Irish Catholicism in its Irish base was this same Sulpician control of clerical formation in the nineteenth century) - to the establishment of the Irish dominance under Cardinal Gibbons (1834-1921).

The successive waves of Catholic immigrants brought the Catholic Church to the important industrial and trade-communications centres of pre-Civil War America (New York, Boston, Philadelphia, St. Louis, Charleston, New Orleans), and these became the principal dioceses, with Baltimore at first being the centre from which these other dioceses were founded; later they in their turn becoming metropolitan sees, with suffragan dioceses. One of them - St. Louis - provides us with a first example of the workings of ecclesiastical government and the character of those relationships which controlled that government. At the period in question, the first two decades after the Civil War, St. Louis was the metropolitan see of a large part of the mid-west including Chicago. Archbishop Kenrick of St. Louis (who had himself been a priest of the Baltimore diocese) had seen to the appointment from Rome (in this case the Congregation Propaganda Fide) of his own choice to the vacant see of Chicago - James Duggan, his own Co-Adjutor, in 1859.

Unfortunately, the new bishop soon began to show signs of that mental illness which in time was to force his resignation. A dispute broke out between him and some of the leading clergy of the diocese and when he suspended their leader, John McMullen, they appealed to Rome (1868). This was a challenge not only to the

Chicago bishop but to the metropolitan - Kenrick, a formidable opponent - and showed a remarkable confidence in their abilities, in particular a political sophistication which was able to play off the autarchy of American bishops against Vatican hegemony. In the event, McMullen's group was vindicated and two of them (McMullen and Riordan) later became bishops themselves³.

This incident shows the terms of ecclesiastical - authority conflict. Whatever their protestations of the supreme advantages of the American democratic way, American Catholic bishops were as monarchical in their own home territory as their aristocratic contemporaries in Europe, in spite of the fact that there was nothing similar to the traditional French class structure among the American clergy. This applied to "Americanists" like Ireland just as much as to "separatists" like Corrigan. However, there was a supreme monarchy in Rome which could override the local satraps, and it was possible, as the Chicago episode demonstrated, to invoke that authority in the attempt to overcome abuses of the local ecclesiastical authority. To be successful, however, required some version of "friends in high places", the most obvious way, as again in Chicago, the existence of a Rome-American axis, such as the Rome education of some American priests provided. Bishops would be alert to the dangers of sending seminarians to Rome, where they could establish contact and friendships with Italian clerics, who later could offer support and assistance in such matters as the Chicago affair; but it was difficult to avoid this once the tradition of sending American seminarians had been established (an American bishop who stopped doing so would provoke 'at least' comment in the Propaganda Fide Congregation, which was in charge also

of the Urban College in which the American students did their studies and until 1908, supervised the American bishops).

The proposed appointment of an Apostolic Delegate brought this issue of ecclesiastical authority to a head, since it underlined the lack of ultimate autonomy which the American bishops experienced in their attempts to "Americanize" the Church, and put an additional check on their ecclesiastical authority. When Satolli was appointed in 1893 it was against the wishes of the Americanists like Gibbons, and although they soon came to accept him the appointment was a principal cause of the "Romanization" of the American Church⁴, in the membership and character of its episcopal leadership, which undermined the confident self-assurance displayed by men like Spalding, Gibbons and Ireland in their attempts to reconcile their Catholicism and their Americanism.

Of course, this can be seen and judged from various angles. If one questions the quality of the ingredients of "the American way" to which the Americanizers wanted to reconcile their Catholicism, the Roman obstacle appears in a different light (provided Rome offered some guidance in this matter). In the fourth chapter we shall be considering John A. Ryan, who in my opinion best exemplified the possibilities of this approach. Also, if one is not a bishop, the advantages of the possible "appeal to higher authority" are obvious, and the 'Roman' system is not to be scorned (the Chicago incident)⁵. No a priori judgment is reasonable - one must consider how the system operated and, in accordance with the actual criteria one wishes to employ to judge the character of episcopal actions and policies, the form of ecclesiastical authority can be evaluated in its practice.

From the point of view of ecclesiastical appointment, the "Romanization" of the American hierarchy did not change the undemocratic character of the system. Bishops continued to be appointed from a small group of people, with the natural tendency to perpetuate their own interests, promote their friends, form an episcopal club of regional or national proportions. The only difference now was that the club was chartered, not in Baltimore, New York, or St. Louis, but in Rome. Nor did the character of the membership change its "undemocratic" ways - priests and people continued to enjoy little say in the organization of ecclesiastical affairs. Although recourse to the Vatican still remained a possibility, if satisfaction was not to be had from the local bishop, this tended to be limited by the Roman connections of the hierarchy (in the Chicago episode an important factor was the Roman background of the priests and the non-Roman background of the bishops in the case). Unless the matter in question involved a policy or an issue in which the bishop was not in concert with Rome (which the Roman education of many bishops rendered an unlikely event), or unless the bishop had abused his authority in flagrante, this possibility of curbing the power of a bishop, to which the appointment of an apostolic delegate had alerted the American hierarchy, was virtually overcome. The price to be paid was the abandonment of any policy and the dropping of any issue which the authorities in the Vatican did not support. The pressure to conform was therefore given a Roman twist and the fate of any American episcopal initiative depended on its acceptance, or otherwise, by the Vatican. The Modernist period in the first two decades of this century completed the process in the Church universal which the "Americanism" controversy had brought home to the American Catholic Church, the same process which Martin Marty

describes for the American Protestant Churches - the prestige of religious authority grew in inverse proportion to the area of its concerns⁶.

The separatist and Americanist tendencies had led to a convergence, through the condemnation of "Americanism" and "Modernism", which manifests their social and political conservatism. Both were essentially a conservative reaction to the prevailing American social order, and the central place which Catholic schools played in both schemes is yet another indication of that reaction, since the schools served to integrate the "alien" Catholics into the social order under "separatist" or "Americanist" auspices. The separatists were jealous of the power of the Church over its members, and as a protection against the attacks of the religious and racial rulers of the society the Church offered the only sanctuary. The Americanists were secure enough in their ecclesiastical power to venture forth from the Catholic enclave in attempts to engage the good favour and esteem of the social elites, until they ventured too far and had perforce to withdraw back to the Catholic redoubt. While this did not inhibit their admiration for all things American, the ecclesiastical constraints rendered this admiration less and less attuned to the changing currents of social and political development. The successors of Ireland and Gibbons in their social and political ideas most often showed no advance beyond the 1890's, and the inheritance of Catholic social teaching (with its implicit critique of the socio-economic order) was preserved from extinction only through the efforts of a few outstanding priests and lay people, in the first place John A. Ryan, and the contact with the German Catholic social movement,

promoted by Bishop Ketteler, which the German-American Catholics of the Central Verein had established⁷. Neither separatists nor Americanists had the benefit of the social and economic ideas which the advent of Rerum Novarum (1891) was to establish since it was a long time before this began to be worked into the bloodstream of Catholic education and institutions; by the time of Quadragesimo Anno (1931) ecclesiastical leadership had undergone the constraining effects of the post-Modernism style of Romanization.

Cardinal O'Connell of Boston (1859-1944) symbolized the transition to a more "Roman" - American episcopate. The method of his promotion to Boston in 1906 as Co-adjutor cum iure successionis (after a short time, 1901-1906, as Bishop of Portland, Maine), where he was appointed only on account of Vatican influence and in opposition to the wishes of the Boston clerical leadership, was a classic example of how the American-Rome connection was now dominant. O'Connell was an American "ultramontane", a protege, of Cardinal Merry del Val, Secretary of State to Pius X, and coming back to America, after a period as rector of the North American College in Rome 1895-1901, on the anti-Modernist wave, he represented a style of leadership far removed from that of the Americanists:

"Boston's first cardinal represented a new force in the American Church - a spirit perhaps akin to that of the classical Renaissance prince....Stress was now focused on projecting a massive ecclesiastical presence, resting upon sound administration and equal to the power and wealth of government and business institutions. He succeeded in creating his desired impression"⁸.

This style in one respect was suited to the Boston Irish scene at

the time, however, because it corresponded to the Irish takeover of local politics and the projection of a massive ethnic presence. The quality of these projections in terms of the promotion of social justice and reconciliation, is of course another matter, since Boston also exemplified that other phenomenon - the prestige of religious authority growing, the area of its concerns diminishing.⁹ O'Connell's opposition to John A. Ryan is in itself comment on the limitations of this style of authority¹⁰.

Not only was it limited in terms of social and economic affairs - even at the formal level this ecclesiastical patronage system suffered the corresponding change and replacement of the patrons. When Pius X died in 1914 and Merry del Val was no longer Secretary of State, O'Connell's potential for national episcopal leadership was finished, almost as soon as it had been initiated (as long as Cardinal Gibbons lived O'Connell would necessarily have had to take a back seat, but when Gibbons died in 1921 O'Connell would have been perfectly placed to assume the mantle). Although O'Connell was Cardinal - Archbishop of Boston until 1946, his authority nationally was little more than nominal, and even in his own territory a similar fate befell him as that of which he had been the agent himself under Archbishop Williams - his intended successor was appointed without his consent (to underline the precarious nature of the Roman patronage system).

We can bring this consideration of the method of episcopal nomination full circle, since the "intended successor" was Francis Spellman (in the event New York fell vacant before O'Connell died and Spellman, the protege of Pius XII, as O'Connell

had been of Merry del Val, was appointed Archbishop). Spellman's position for national episcopal power was realized more successfully than O'Connell's since Pius XII was Pope until 1958 and Spellman continued to reap the benefit of this patronage. As a result, Cardinal Spellman was able to put his stamp on the American hierarchy, both by means of his influence on episcopal appointments (shown most conspicuously in the appointment of the New York Chancellor, the future Cardinal McIntyre, to Los Angeles, whence he proceeded to dominate ecclesiastical leadership on the west coast), and, in his enthusiastic acceptance of the role of national Catholic leader and spokesman, dealing on equal terms with the national social, economic, and political leadership (including the presidency). However, this did not lead to any fundamental change in the quality of that leadership and in the "iron law" - the prestige of authority was conditioned by the acceptance of limits to its range of concerns ("....outside were any attempts to change the whole fabric of society, to rewrite the social contract, call into question basic institutions"¹¹.) Until he died in December, 1967 Cardinal Spellman was the titular head of the American hierarchy and more than any other bishop gave it a conservative social and political stamp, in line with that Vatican policy, established in the pontificate of Pius X and brought to a conclusion with Pius XII, which had been unwilling to deal with society outside the limits imposed by the concern to protect the Church internally from any external, non-ecclesiastically-approved-and-controlled influences. When Pope John opened the window, this policy was sucked out.

It is a legitimate point of contention what the merits and demerits of such a policy are. If one accepts the validity of the

attempt to make the Church, as an institution, a force to be reckoned with in society, in terms of the conventional climate of political power and social influence, the O'Connell-Spellman policy stands in a different light than would be the case if the ideal is the Church as an agency of social change ("the leaven" of LG and GS). In terms of the traditional aspirations of the American Church, whether separatist or Americanist, the image of ecclesiastical presence and ecclesiastical authority presented by Francis Cardinal Spellman admirably combined the separatist concern for the integrity of the institution with the Americanist attempt to domesticate Catholicism by demonstrating its compatibility with all things American. In the absence of a radical critique, such as the documents of Vatican II provided for the Church and the events of the '60 s imposed on the American consciousness, those traditional aspirations prevailed. With some minor exceptions (the pro-Franco policy, which in any case the American government came to accept; and a qualification regarding the "freedom for the merging of racial characteristics into the national ideal", which was never respected without qualification at any time, either by political or religious authorities) the words of Guilday with which this chapter opened could have been written with Cardinal Spellman in mind.

The immediate contemporary leadership of the American hierarchy, through the influence of Vatican II, has manifested a contrast between the traditional method of appointment and its usual consequences. Cardinal Dearden of Detroit and Cardinal Krol of Philadelphia, past and present presidents of NCCB, in their episcopal promotions benefited, like Cardinal Spellman, from a Rome connection. In their case, it was the friendship between

the ordinary of their diocese of Cleveland, Edward F. Hoban, and the Apostolic Delegate, Amleto Cicognani, which had been established during their student days in Rome, that brought Dearden and Krol into the hierarchy (both had been in the Cleveland diocesan major seminary, whence they received their first episcopal appointments - Dearden to Pittsburgh in 1948, Krol as vice-chancellor in Cleveland in 1945, auxiliary-bishop in 1953). They are, indeed, only the two principal examples of a remarkable line of Cleveland priests who have become bishops under the aegis of Cicognani and Hoban. This method of appointment has not led to the same homogeneity promoted by Cardinal Spellman and Cardinal McIntyre. As we shall see in the following sections, the Cicognani-Hoban appointments were to include all sides of the post-Vatican II spectrum of opinion within the American hierarchy¹².

CHAPTER III

THE ORGANIZATION OF ECCLESIASTICAL INVOLVEMENT
IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

In this chapter we come to an investigation of the way in which the bishops of the United States organized themselves into a corporate body, to give institutional expression to their collective ecclesiastical authority as the leaders of the American Church, and to enable themselves to address, collectively, the social and political issues which they saw as relevant to their common responsibility as bishops of the Church (in particular, the issues of foreign policy discussed in the following sections). This, in fact, involved an unconscious anticipation of the episcopal collegiality which Vatican II was to enunciate, and it is the dialectic between this embryonic collegiality and formal subservience to papal monarchy which provides us here with an organizational scaffolding for the response of the bishops to the issues of the Vietnam War and Latin America. While this section as a whole anticipates much of the content of the "Conclusions" of Section V (since these conclusions are intended to be historically based) in this section my concern has been to take a broad sweep of the historical antecedents to the episcopal response to the issues of Sections III and IV (hence chapters one, two, and four of this present section) and tie these in with the formation of the organizational machinery of the Church in the United States (this chapter three), through which or, as the case may be, in spite of which, comes the official response of the bishops to such issues.

A central national agency of the American Catholic Church

originated in 1917 when the bishops established the 'National Catholic War Council' to coordinate the service work of the Church during World War I (organization of a military chaplains' corps, social service agencies for war relief at home and abroad - the forerunner of 'Catholic Relief Services' (CRS), which was established during the Second World War). In February, 1919, almost all the archbishops and bishops met in Baltimore to mark the golden episcopal jubilee of Cardinal Gibbons, and on that occasion it was decided to hold an annual assembly of the bishops. At the first such meeting that September the members of the American hierarchy voted to establish the 'National Catholic Welfare Council' to carry on the initiative of the 1917 Council¹.

There followed a controversy with the Vatican which underlines the "collegiality" implications of this initiative, then and later, and which is evidence of the anticipatory nature of this Council noted at the beginning of the chapter. In a decree of the 'Sacred Consistorial Congregation' (which in 1908 had taken over the supervisory-authority role from Propaganda Fide) signed by Pius XI in February, 1922, the fledgling organization was declared to be "no longer useful or necessary". The "Rome" (i.e. Roman Curia) view was that an episcopal ordinary was supreme in jurisdiction in his own diocese and accountable only to the Pope; and their fear was that national organizations like this 'National Catholic Welfare Council' might begin to formulate Church policy in a country and thus stand between the local bishop and the Holy See. (The Curia's power, as we have seen in Section I, was based on the absence of such a corporate intermediary - hence their opposition to any forms of conciliarism, in the Middle Ages and at

Trent, and their opposition to episcopal collegiality at Vatican II).

..

Bishop Schrembs of Cleveland was dispatched to Rome by the American bishops to calm such fear and to reassure the Curia that the "Council" was a voluntary organization and had no ecclesiastical jurisdiction or compulsory authority. The American bishops through Schrembs appealed to the Pope not to have the Consistorial Congregation's statement published in the Acta Apostolicae Sedis until review. The Pope agreed, and a new decree of June, 1922 let things be. To take care of Curial sensitivity the American bishops agreed to the "suggestion" that the word "Council" be changed, since in Canon Law "Council" implies legislative powers (for example, the "Plenary" and "Provincial" Councils of Baltimore, some of the former being important events in the history of the American Church²), and in 1923 the organization became the 'National Catholic Welfare Conference' (NCWC), a name which was to be retained until the post-Vatican II reorganization.

In 1923 the Conference was officially divided into two bodies - 'National Catholic Welfare Conference' (concerned only with ecclesiastical affairs); 'National Catholic Welfare Conference Incorporated' (a civil corporation, officially chartered in the District of Columbia, dealing with public matters). This division persists in the post-Vatican II reorganization, which came into effect on January 1, 1967 - the 'National Conference of Catholic Bishops' (NCCB) (which is considered to be exclusively concerned with ecclesiastical-pastoral matters (the Church's doctrine on faith and morals, liturgical reform, religious education, seminary training, ecumenical relations, etc.)); the 'United States Catholic Conference'

(USCC), an incorporated organization dealing with public affairs (hospitals; parochial schools; social work agencies; press and broadcasting media - 'National Catholic News Service' (NC), domestic and foreign))³.

In line with this reorganization the bishops had commissioned a management study of USCC, which was completed in early 1968 and approved by the Administrative Board of the Conference that April, for implementation effective June 30, 1968. This study recommended the concept of a departmental structure, based on major programme areas, with the grouping of existing and future divisions of the Conference within this structure⁴. Thus, in the "programme area" which is our concern - international affairs - there would be a 'Department of International Affairs', which would include the various related divisions of the old Conference's structure (the United Nations office in New York, the Latin American Division, "Foreign Visitors" office (which was involved with immigration and naturalization work, much like the traditional similar work of the old-style political machine and for the same reason - "our people" were involved and needed help to negotiate the equally traditionalbureaucratic steeplechase), 'Catholic Relief Services'(CRS)), and the new 'World Justice and Peace' Division (WJP), whose origin and operation we shall investigate later in this chapter, since it is the specific focus of our concern in this thesis (along with the 'Latin American Division'). Involved in this operation of restructuring would be a phase-out of some elements (the BAH study recommended the closing of the liaison office to the United Nations in New York, and this was

done), and a consolidation of others (drawing together the similar functions of CRS, WJP, the 'Latin American Division'). A "Committee on Research, Plans and Progress" would supervise the implementation of the management study's recommendations, adapting or modifying them from within the Conference itself. This is the key committee from the organizational point of view.

A statement from this committee on July 22, 1970, gives us an insight into the nature of the USCC itself, reflected in the very words of the brochure which describes USCC and NCCB to the general public. The July, 1970 statement makes it clear that USCC is an agency in the employ of the American bishops, and that power to determine budget and programming is in the hands of the bishops, working through the 'Administrative Board'; NCCB has a different orientation and purpose, corresponding to the "strictly ecclesiastical responsibilities of the bishops"; USCC represents the Church at the national level⁵.

This expresses a convoluted attempt to resolve the dilemma presented by two factors which must somehow be reconciled - episcopal control of USCC; avoidance of the identification between the bishops in their 'persona' as "religious" leaders (NCCB) and their exercise and promotion of temporal affairs, which perforce stray into "civil" territory (the traditional American bugbear of the "separation of church and state"). This also involves an attempt, at the same time, to preserve the hierarchical character of USCC while making an obeisance, now customary, if not yet entirely obligatory, post-Vatican II, in the direction of a recognition of

responsibilities peculiar to the lay members of the "People of God" for temporal affairs, in their own right and not just as the instrument of the hierarchy (the classical problem of "Catholic Action")⁶. Neither of these attempts is altogether successful - episcopal control is maintained at the expense of further erosion of the "separation of church and state" position, and the episcopal stamp of USCC prevents the initiation of comprehensive collegiality and co-responsibility (i.e. extending to the laity), in the mission of the Church in American society.

This dilemma is reflected even in the vocabulary - "USCC is the national-level action agency of the Catholic Church in the United States. NCCB is its parent body and normally carries out its action programs through USCC". - which is a concise statement of the classical problem of Catholic Action: an agency sponsored by the bishops serving as a Trojan horse for the promotion of the institutional concerns of the hierarchy, not as the vehicle for the collaborative efforts of all the "people of God" for Christian mission as "the leaven" in society (the gap between the 'Catholic Action' of Pius XI and the "Christian mission" of 'The Church in the Modern World'). Under the surface of the issues in this thesis is this dilemma of a changed conception of Christian mission which has not yet been digested in the organizational machinery of the Church. From time to time I will have occasion to refer to this shift, and in the concluding section it will be necessary to deal more directly with this aspect of the dialectic of "institution" and "ideology" (the Church's organizational structure (ecclesiastical authority), and the content of the Christian message contained in Scripture and 'tradition')

(for our purposes, the 'tradition' of social doctrine of the social encyclicals and Vatican II). Here we can see its reflection in the story of USCC.

It was dramatized in the very establishment of the organization when, as we have seen, the initial impetus came, not from the "strictly ecclesiastical responsibilities of the bishops" but from the preponderantly "secular" concerns of war relief, which underlined the other horn of the dilemma - "the separation of church and state". Throughout its history, indeed, whether as NCWC or USCC, the "national-level action agency" is best known for its involvement in "secular" affairs, beginning with the "Bishops' Program of Social Reconstruction" in 1919 which dealt with questions like minimum wage legislation, legal enforcement of the right of labour to organize, unemployment and sickness insurance, prevention of excessive profits, participation of labour in management, child labour amendment⁷. In the following chapter I shall consider the ecclesiastic chiefly responsible for this particular document and whose name symbolized the work of NCWC itself, and this work is impossible to understand if the mythical distinction of religious and secular is maintained. Vatican II served the additional function of clarifying the mission of the Church to the world and in the world, especially its final document GS, as involving a commitment to change the secular condition of man in the light of the religious message of the kingdom of God, the fulfillment of which is beyond the secular but the initiation, the "first fruits", of which have to be realized in time. The fact that the ecclesiastical organization was established without benefit of this articulated theology means that it is out of step in many respects;

but the often unconscious appropriation of the message and the mission (such as John A. Ryan exemplified) shows that Vatican II was often anticipated (just as the formation of NCWC anticipated the articulation of episcopal collegiality in LG), and that "the separation of church and state" was a confusing myth⁸.

A more helpful approach is to observe the distinction between those matters which the bishops considered to come within their domain ("matters of conscience and belief"⁹) - as we see in Section III, "abortion" is a good example - and others which they ignored or showed little concern with. Into this latter category came many of the social and political matters which come to our attention in these pages - the work of John A. Ryan involved the attempt to make the bishops aware of their responsibilities in these matters (the 1919 statement being the first result). As will become apparent later in the course of the narrative, this had mixed results - a certain amount of success in social and economic issues at the national level, much less success in the international field. In this thesis I am more concerned to establish the fact of this phenomenon: any attempt to give the reasons why is a more speculative exercise, undertaken elliptically in passing and very tentatively in the conclusion.

The history of that branch of the NCWC involved with questions of international relations - the 'Catholic Association for International Peace' (CAIP) - shows the lack of a corporate awareness among the American bishops of the importance of the issues and their responsibility to be concerned. In the first place, it struggled along on the fringes of the NCWC, never officially a part

of the corporate structure but a voluntary, loose-knit organization, dependent on the interest and support of like minded individuals - clergy, laity, religious - only some of whom were connected with NCWC, either as bishops or as staff. The secretary of the organizing committee of CAIP was John A. Ryan himself, and it was through him that the organization came under the umbrella of the 'Social Action Department' of NCWC. A description of the Association was printed on the cover of the pamphlets which they published:

"The Catholic Association for International Peace is a membership organization. Its object is to further, in accord with the teachings of the Church, the "Peace of Christ in the kingdom of Christ", through the preparation and distribution of studies applying Christian teaching to international life.

It was organized in a series of meetings during 1926 and 1927 - the first held just following the Eucharistic Congress in Chicago, the second held in Cleveland that fall to form an organizing committee, and the third in East Week, 1929, in Washington, when the permanent organization was established.

The Association works through the preparation of committee reports. Following careful preparation, these are discussed both publicly and privately in order to secure able revision. They are then published by the organization. Questions involving moral judgments are submitted to the Committee on Ethics."

The contrast between the peace appeals of Benedict XV during the Great War, and his internationalism, and the post-World War I American isolationism formed the background to the Association's foundation¹⁰. A continuing awareness of general Catholic apathy to international affairs punctuated its history¹¹.

Reading through the Association's statements, reports, and pamphlets, one finds a reiteration of papal teaching on social and international themes, much of which - on disarmament, peacetime conscription, and foreign aid - representatives of CAIP put before the attention of the Congress¹². CAIP attempted to promulgate among an American audience - Catholic and non-Catholic - of the educated elite, who might be encouraged to read their pamphlets and attend their conferences, the corpus of Catholic teaching on international relations, especially as this had been presented in papal encyclicals; and while some of that teaching advocated an internationalism which was unacceptable to many Americans, it did not result in any significant modification of the Catholic obsession with the anti-Communist crusade as the only real international issue. We shall observe this dogging especially the final years of John A Ryan's career; and particularly as articulated by Fr. Coughlin and Senator Joe McCarthy, this became the dominant representation of the Catholic view of international affairs, with episcopal encouragement¹³. Even a mild attempt by CAIP to broaden the discussion could meet with a note of caution from John Courtney Murray, S.J. - his comment on a CAIP paper, 'Co-Existing with Communism':

"It seems to me that the relations between the Christian concept of man and the Communist concept are better characterized by the word "war" than by the term "co-existence". I mean of course a war that is carried on purely by intellectual and spiritual means."¹⁴

At the beginning of Section III I shall record the response to the events of the Vietnam War of CAIP, and we shall see there its general acceptance of the anti-communist consensus. The Association was limited in its attempts to address international issues not only by the constraints of the Catholic embrace of the anti-communist crusade, to the neglect of more fundamental social and economic injustice at home and abroad, but also in its very composition and in the quality of its teaching. As a fringe group of NCWC it fell between two stools - not official enough to utilize the seal of hierarchical approval for its impact to be extensive throughout the institutions of the American Church (by contrast with Ryan and the Social Action Department itself); the potential of lay involvement limited to a small circle of the Catholic elite (not extensive enough to affect the broad spectrum of the Church's educational institutions - the Social Action Department itself faced similar limitations, and the heightened social consciousness of the clergy in comparison to that of the laity which we shall observe in the concluding section reflects the limited extension of its influence). Another limitation of CAIP, which reflects a more general deficiency in the organizations of the Church set up to address the social, economic, and political questions (in the next chapter, we shall consider Ryan's awareness of the problem:

in the following sections, we shall hear a constant refrain along these lines), was expressed in a letter of Brendan F. Brown of the Catholic University of America School of Law, dated January 24, 1940, in which he refers to a statement from the 'Law and Organization Committee' of the CAIP, and points up one notable characteristic of this kind of activity - what Brown calls "a tendency toward abstract conceptualism":

"As the report brings out, for many years the Popes and other religious leaders have been calling the world's attention to the postulates of Christian ethics in the world order but without success. While this is a very important contribution apparently the problem would have to be attacked not only from the normative side, but from the viewpoint of a study of actual economic and national and sociological conditions which in the language of scholastic philosophy would be the fundamenta in re on which the moral principles are to operate."¹⁵

Thirty years later, the response of the American bishops to the war in Vietnam and to the situation in Latin America¹⁶ is affected by a lack of attention to the fundamenta in re, or an unwillingness to accept the evidence of disturbingly unpleasant "conditions" demanding the response from the "moral principles".

By that time, however, a new dimension had been given to the Church's responsibility in international relations by the experience of Vatican II, and it is to the organization of

church involvement in this field that we now must turn our attention. Unlike the foundation of NCWC and CAIP, the initiative came from outside the United States, from the central ecclesiastical authority in Rome (Pope and Ecumenical Council), and it is my contention (to be developed in what follows in later sections) that this initiative, on balance, illustrates the possible advantage of the "Roman obstacle" to which I referred in the previous chapter (as distinct from "the American way")¹⁷.

Paragraph 90 of the 'Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World' (GS) called for the setting up of an organism of the universal Church for the promotion of development and international social justice concerns throughout the Catholic community. A working group was formed, and from January to May 1966, held a series of meetings which resulted in a 'Report to the Holy See of the Working Group charged with making proposals for the implementation of paragraph 90, Gaudium et Spes, calling for the creation of an organism of the Universal Church to stimulate the Catholic Community to promote development of needy regions and social justice among nations'. (Rome, May 9-12, 1966.)¹⁸ The co-chairmen of this working group were Bishop Edward Swanstrom, head of CRS, and Msgr. Jean Rodhain, president of Caritas Internationalis (the relief aid and development agencies of the American Catholic Church and the Vatican). The secretary was Msgr Joseph Gremillion, one of Swanstrom's deputies at CRS. Among the eighteen participant members were Msgr Giovanni Benelli (Permanent Observer of the Holy See at UNESCO), Louis Lebreton, O.P. and Gerald Mahon of Mill Hill (the former a peritus at Vatican II, the latter a spokesman for the

the "mission countries" at the Council), Henri de Riedmatten (the delegate of the Holy See to the U.N. at Geneva), and Vittorino Veronese (a prominent leader of Italian Catholic Action). Among the six consultants were Arthur McCormack of Hill Hill and Roberto Tucci of the 'Civiltà Cattolica'.

It was not by accident that Swanstrom and Gremillion were in important positions in this group. During the Vatican Council the American bishops, with few exceptions (Meyer, Ritter, Hallinan), had been silent most of the time, but no other group of bishops could equal their resources in personnel, organization, finance. When there was an evident will to influence some aspect of the Council's deliberation as on the 'Declaration on Religious Liberty', their support was decisive (this declaration, which gave the official seal of approval to the American system of the non-confessional state, was the only major American contribution to Vatican II, but does not rank in importance with the central documents - LG and GS). But on most conciliar topics the Americans stayed in the background. One other exception to this pattern came when Swanstrom proposed the amendment to Schema XIII which became paragraph 90 of GS¹⁹. As one of the group of churchmen involved with the organizations, like CRS and Caritas, for the promotion of disaster relief and economic development in the third world, and as the American bishop most familiar with the needs of bishops in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, Swanstrom had wide support for such an initiative. The subject of world poverty, justice and peace was the topic of over a hundred speeches at Vatican II, and a constituency was formed there for a commitment by the universal Church to these concerns (stimulated

by the evident interest of Pope John and Pope Paul).

A provisional committee succeeded the working group and was in existence from July to December, 1966, chaired by Cardinal Roy of Quebec. On October 17th it recommended to Pope Paul that an autonomous 'Papal Commission' be set up, separate from the 'Consilium pro Laicis' and the 'Secretariate of State'. At the same time, October 1966, Swanstrom was pressing upon the American bishops the formation of an American counterpart and constituent agency of the proposed 'Papal Commission', urging "moral leadership and inspiration" from the U.S. Church, "in view of global responsibilities of our nation as leader of the free world, with all its vast affluence and power."²⁰

Liaison had been established with other American Churches. The first meeting of the 'Joint Working Group' of the National Council of Churches (NCC) and the Catholic 'Bishops' Committee for Ecumenical Affairs' had met (May 25-26, 1966), and among the subjects they had discussed was "the complex and far ranging field of international social justice and development as the basis of world peace." After the World Council of Churches Conference on 'Church and Society' in Geneva, July, 1966, a consultation was held with the NCC in New York in October on the concerns of justice and peace, with Swanstrom, Gremillion, George Higgins of the Social Action Department, Bishop Wright (the episcopal moderator of the Department), and Bishop Carberry (moderator of 'Ecumenical Affairs') representing the American Catholic hierarchy.²¹

On January 6, 1967, in the motu proprio 'Catholicam Christi Ecclesiam' Pope Paul set up the 'Pontifical Commission Justitia et Pax, which held its first plenary meeting at the Vatican, April 18-25. The Pope also gave it its charter document - the Encyclical 'Populorum Progressio' (Easter Sunday, March 26, 1967), the latest addition to the "social encyclicals" of Leo XIII, Pius XI, and John XXIII. On February 1st, the report of the committee set up by the NCCB the previous November, in response to Swanstrom's letter, advised that a 'Bishops' Committee for World Justice and Peace' be set up:

"The strong emphasis of the Committee and its secretariat must be educational in the large sense of the term: the creation of awareness among Catholics, especially of lay leaders, of the poverty, hunger and illiteracy of half the human family; the formation of Christian conscience and commitment to influence societal, economic and political policy and structures for world justice and peace, particularly in view of Vatican II decrees and the Holy Sees present initiatives."

The educational program was to be channeled through existing structures--the departments of the recently reformed USCC, the National Catholic organizations, the diocesan and religious - order school systems. The content of this long term educational effort should include the need to re-structure world patterns of trade and finance, examining the ways in which world poverty affects peace. Efforts to influence the national society could best be done in concert with other religious, as well as secular, groups involved in the same task. The three

bishops of this Committee were Swanstrom, Dougherty and Benincasa, and this report reflected what was now a consensus of the interested parties - the officials of the NCC, the American Catholic hierarchy, the CRS, and those people in the academy and other institutions who wanted a more enlightened approach to international economic development.

At their semi-annual meeting in April, 1967, the NCCB established the official 'Bishops' Committee', and set up a 'Secretariat for World Justice and Peace' to service the committee and act as its executive or operating arm. The members of the bishops' committee were Dougherty (chairman), Swanstrom, Benincasa (auxiliary in Buffalo, N.Y.), Primeau (Manchester, N.H.), Reed (Oklahoma City-Tulsa, Okla.) Wright (Pittsburgh Pa.), Bernardin (auxiliary in Atlanta, Ga.). The secretariat was to begin operations in June and its budget (\$48 thousand) from July 1st. Msgr Marvin Bordelon of Shreveport La. was appointed executive-secretary.

The personalities involved merit some attention. We have had occasion already to describe Bishop Edward E. Swanstrom, executive-director of CRS. Later it will be necessary to go into further detail about the character of CRS but for the present it is enough to note that Swanstrom, who had been in charge of CRS since 1946, was and is an influential personality in the American hierarchy, and is not just one of the dozen auxiliary-bishops of New York. His importance is due both to the nature of his job and his long tenure which have put him in contact with the worldwide church and its material needs more than

any other American bishop. At the same time, the nature of CRS activities does not lend itself to a radical evaluation of the workings of the international economic system: it is directed to attend to the immediate needs of feeding the hungry and rescuing the victims of catastrophe, natural or man-made. Like his predecessor, the recently retired Cardinal⁹ Boyle, and a host of other American Catholic churchmen involved in trying to serve the immediate economic and social needs of the deprived, Swanstrom is concerned with the starving man at the gates whose needs cannot await a better ordering of the system. The work of 'Justice and Peace' (whether at Vatican or American Church level) for such a man is seen within the same framework - the stirring of the consciences of American Catholics, and any other potential allies, to attend to the immediate needs of the two-thirds of the world's population who do not enjoy the benefits immediately available to the reasonably contented one-third.

Bishops Ernest Primeau, Victor Reed, and John Wright, represented the minority of American bishops who stood out at the time of Vatican II and later as moderately progressive promoters of its reforms, patently competent churchmen who would speak their minds, and whose views merited attention. Reed in particular was a convinced supporter of aggiornamento; Primeau, from the beginning, represented the conciliar cause in New England, and during the period of our concern - the late '60s and early '70s - found like-minded men among his fellow members of the Boston province (as we shall see in Section III; Wright in the conciliar period and its aftermath came to be accepted by the American hierarchy as its leading theological light, and it was no surprise

when this culminated in his appointment in '69 to a leading position in the Roman Curia. Wright also, as we have seen, took an interest in the CAIP and was committed to promoting a greater attention among American Catholics to the solution of the problems of the international community²².

Two other members of this first 'Bishops' Committee for World Justice and Peace' are principal participants in the events discussed later - Joseph Bernardin and John Dougherty. Bernardin at the time was auxiliary to Archbishop Hallinan of Atlanta, another of the American bishops who had made a notable contribution to the Vatican Council²³. Hallinan was known above all for his support of liturgical reform. Those who were informed and progressive in matters liturgical, in the sense that they supported the need to respect the "pastoral" character of the liturgy - the notion of liturgy as "for the benefit of the people", for their growth in the christian life, and not just a formal act of worship bound by a rubrical code - were the same people at Vatican II who were in favour of a re-definition of the Church and its mission. There is a direct link between the 'Constitution on the Liturgy', that on 'the Church', and Gaudium et Spes. Men like Hallinan who had been in on the ground floor of the Council - liturgical reform - were in a position to advance, with the same conciliar spirit, to 'The Church in the Modern World' (GS) and its conception of Christian mission. Bernardin, as a protégé of Hallinan, came under this influence, and it is not surprising to find him in the 'Justice and Peace' committee. Shortly afterwards he became the General Secretary of the NCCB and USCC, and it is in that 'persona' that he figures prominently in this study.

John Dougherty, the chairman of the committee, in status is like Swanstrom. At face value, as an auxiliary-bishop of Newark, N.J., he could be ignored, until other details are added. The American hierarchy is not known for its intellectual competence, but for that very reason anyone with such competence, as in the case of Wright, has certain advantages. Dougherty is a fully qualified scripture scholar, and for years was president of Seton Hall University, the best known and biggest Catholic college in New Jersey²⁴. Over the years he has gained a certain standing among the American bishops, as attested by his continuing appointment to chair 'Justice and Peace' committees (at this writing he is the chairman of the 'Secretariat for Social Development and World Peace', which oversees all the programs of social action, justice and peace of the USCC.) In addition, he enjoys the advantage traditional in Catholic Church structures of being, and looking like, a venerable sexagenarian (in this regard, the low profile of Cardinal Spellman's successor in the American hierarchy does nothing to undermine the tradition). In retrospect, and as this narrative will show, 'World Justice and Peace' (WJP), as a second-level structure within the USCC, has been fortunate to have a "father figure" like Dougherty.

The man appointed chief administrative officer of the new committee and secretariat, Marvin Bordelon, brings us full circle back to the world of CRS, although with a twist which will be of importance in the later evolution of affairs. We have already seen the connection between CRS and the conciliar-Vatican origins of 'Justice and Peace'. It remains to add some personal details.

Gremillion, chief administrative officer of the Pontifical Commission, who before his appointment had been an auxiliary of Swanstrom as "director of socio-economic development of the overseas social agency of the national conference of the Catholic Bishops of the United States" (as he described himself in a speech at Notre Dame University in March 1966²⁵); as his name suggests, a native of Louisiana, the immediate predecessor of Bordelon in the same parish in Shreveport, in the diocese of Alexandria, La., and a confrere and friend of Marvin Bordelon and his brother, who is regional director in South America of CRS. The three thus form an interesting triumvirate and an important one for the formation of 'Justice and Peace' .²⁶ Their institutional locus in the CRS underlines the symbiotic relationship of CRS and WJP. Already we can detect, in the very description Gremillion gave of his job at CRS, before he moved to the Pontifical Commission, a change in ideology which would be accentuated in the future and eventually would lead to the critical fissure we shall witness between CRS and WJP: "Socio-economic development" is a stage along the road from relief work to critical questioning of the economic system.

Bordelon conceived his task along the lines of a more enlightened approach to international economic development, dependent on an educational mission to the American Catholic public, in cooperation with similar efforts of the 'National Council of Churches' and any non-ecclesiastical initiatives (Bordelon soon was to become involved in the establishment of the 'Overseas Development Council' (ODC)); in league with efforts to reform official U.S. government aid, directed by the State Department through its 'Agency for International Economic Development' (AID).

It was not envisioned by him that 'World Justice and Peace' (WJP) should be involved with more direct questions of war and peace, like the war in Vietnam. This point has to be emphasized, strange though it may seem in light of the involvement of Americans at that time in Vietnam on a massive scale, and in view of the events to be discussed shortly - Bordelon took up his job with no awareness that Vietnam was an immediate issue. This is clear from a letter he wrote to Bishop Dougherty in July, 1967, after their initial discussions about the work of 'Justice and Peace':

"The matter of statements came up, for example, on Vietnam, on peace, and on foreign aid. We agreed that we were too new, or at least not ready to make statements on these significant issues immediately."²⁷

This initial reluctance to become involved in controversy was reflected at a meeting of the Bishops' Committee itself, in New York, January 15-16, 1968. CALCAV ('Clergy and Laymen Concerned about the War in Vietnam') was sponsoring a meeting in Washington and an invitation to the Catholic hierarchy had been passed along to the Committee, to send a spokesman, but they shied away from this exposure, even suggesting that a non-member be asked to speak for the hierarchy (the names mentioned were Archbishop Hallinan or Bishop Fulton Sheen).

Behind this reluctance lay an even more significant factor - lack of support from the bishops for the whole 'Justice and Peace' enterprise. A proposed seminar on 'Justice and Peace' issues to be held in St. Louis in June, 1968, had to be cancelled.

"We began in early spring with a well founded hope that some 35 bishops and 50 religious superiors would attend. The religious superiors held rather firm but in the weeks before the seminar we ended up with only seven bishops firmly committed."²⁸

The following year the Archbishop of Chicago (the largest diocese in the country) declined Bishop Dougherty's suggestion that an archdiocesan committee be formed for 'Justice and Peace', as part of a national network²⁹. A seminar, December 2-4, 1969, to prepare a guide to assist dioceses throughout the U.S.A. in implementing the Church's teaching on 'justice and peace', issues drew representatives from 34 of the 160 dioceses. Throughout the course of the following chapters it will be noticeable how often the same few bishops become involved in 'justice and peace' issues³⁰, and that the majority of the American hierarchy remain silent.

With the establishment of the 'Bishops' Committee for World Justice and Peace' the issues of international relations entered the organizational structure of the Catholic hierarchy. This was one important difference between the new institution and the CAIP. After the BAH management study the 'Division for World Justice and Peace' (WJP) became part of USCC (before, as servicing the 'Bishops' Committee', it had "technically" been part of NCCB - as we have already noted, this distinction between USCC and NCCB, like the earlier one between NCWC and NCWC, Inc., is in fact only an unsuccessful subterfuge, made more absurd by the fact that it is a case of the same people wearing different hats³¹.) From

that point on 'Justice and Peace' was in a position to be integrated with the operation of the various structures and societies of the American Church, under hierarchical auspices (the dioceses, parishes, religious orders of men and women, and their institutions - schools, colleges, social services - in the U.S.A. and abroad). An officially established 'Justice and Peace' network was now possible, and this the new Division began to inaugurate. Even though the specific issues we are to consider here came too soon in the fledgling organization's history for it to make adequate use of this network, we shall witness something of its operation and the importance of its establishment³².

The more fundamental dilemma of Church "institution" and "ideology" remains unresolved - the hierarchical character of USCC and WJP militates against the missionary vocation of all the Catholic people to be conscious of a collegial responsibility as members of the Church to work for the promotion of the conditions of the Kingdom in society (the "leaven" - LG, paragraph 31) because the proprietary instincts and interests of the bishops which have been established in an "Americanist" direction (Chapter I) are opposed to the prophetic mission of the Church to be critical of the socio-economic-political order; and their style of episcopal authority has emphasized form at the expense of substance, power and prestige at the expense of responsibility (Chapter II). In the following sections we shall see this being dramatized as WJP becomes involved in controversial issues, and as it and the 'Latin American Division' attempt to influence the attitudes and actions of the bishops. Before that, to give a

more personal precedent, of historical importance to the themes of this section, and in many respects a prophetic harbinger of the actual issues discussed in Sections III and IV, let us consider the figure of John A. Ryan.

CHAPTER IV

THE FORGOTTEN INHERITANCE OF
JOHN A. RYAN

"....the entire heritage of American Catholic social action and of the Protestant Social Gospel often seems to have been forgotten."¹

We can complete this historical survey by considering now that part of American Catholic history which is most directly relevant to the contemporary issues which are the subject of the following two sections. One name stands out in such a consideration, since as first head of the 'Social Action Department' of the NCWC he was the most important teacher and prophet to the American hierarchy on the issues of social justice and international peace - John A. Ryan².

Ryan's professional career as a teacher and promoter of social justice began in that age of American Catholic history which was the heyday of Gibbons and Ireland (the latter Ryan's own ordinary), and ended in the twilight of the New Deal, which had seen Ryan's social concerns vindicated as a legitimate programme for Church and State. The two most influential experiences of his formative years were his contact with Minnesota populism and his reading of Rerum Novarum in 1894³. Not only did this give Ryan an understanding of the compatibility between the progressive social ideas of populism and Catholic social teaching; it gave him that confidence, which he possessed all his life, in the possibilities of reconciling the best in

Americanism, as represented by the heritage of populism and social progressivism, with the social Catholicism of the great encyclicals, without sacrificing the radical character of either as a critique of the economic, political, and social order which they had inherited from the past. Ryan's career is significant because of the radical, critical character of the Americanism and the Catholicism which he exemplified. In later times, and in a different historical context, many of Ryan's ideas could not be considered radical, but conservative (like the New Deal itself). But this is to miss the point of Ryan's example - it is because his example was not followed that the American Catholic bishops and the American Catholic Church in general did not respond to the issues raised by Vietnam and Latin America in the way that Ryan did² to social and economic problems from the populist era to the New Deal: that is the character of "the forgotten inheritance".

Today, it is difficult to appreciate that Rerum Novarum (RN) could ever be considered a radical document, but its acceptance of the possibilities of state intervention in the economy, the advocacy of "a just wage", and the recognition of labour unions as legitimate instruments for securing the rights of employees, were unwelcome interferences with the prejudices of the Gilded Age⁴. It was not just Ryan's acceptance and promulgation of the principles of RN which marked him out as a social reformer, but his ability to relate specific economic policies to the realization of those principles - the theory of under consumption of John A. Hobson, the concept of a "living wage", increasing the purchasing power of the poor. Ryan came up against a lack of social concern in the Church and an unwillingness to support measures of social justice⁵.

This was further enhanced, and exploited by conservative upholders of the status quo, by the use of the communist and socialist bogey to discredit social reform (a tactic which has continued to be exploited throughout contemporary American history)⁶. The Catholic hierarchy in particular articulated a strident anti-communism which made them susceptible to this conservative trap. In spite of this, Ryan's first achievement at the NCWC was a remarkable fillip to the promotion of ecclesiastical support of social reform - the "Bishops' Program for Social Reconstruction" of 1919 which Ryan hastily assembled and had no time to edit properly. Within the Church, this "Program" gave authoritative sanction to Ryan's reforms, even though in fact only four bishops and Ryan were responsible for the document and it had no legislative or definitive character. No bishop came out publicly against it, several showed their enthusiasm for it, and it came to be accepted, with the approval of the Catholic press, as a standard, along with RN, for the efforts of the Church in the field of social action and economic reform⁷. Even though the succeeding lean years of the Harding-Coolidge-Hoover era put back the fulfillment of Ryan's vision⁸, he displayed courage and perseverance in continuing his efforts at education and persuasion. This he did through his teaching at Catholic University, where he formed a whole generation of "social action" priests, and from his important forum at the 'Social Action Department'⁹. He had to fight again the old battles over a "living wage", union recognition and union rights, along with the new battle over the child-labour amendment¹⁰. In spite of the 1928 setback¹¹, all came right in the end, with the confirmation from within the Church of Ryan's position in the publication of Quadragesimo Anno¹² and the accession of Roosevelt.

Ryan had been outspoken in his criticism of the Hoover administration:

"Ryan knew that fundamental reform would not occur until Hoover left the White House."¹³

Now he set out upon the crowning accomplishment of his career:

"All in All, Monsignor Ryan was more the New Deal's Ambassador to Catholics than a Catholic legate to the New Deal. He helped create the social mood and the program that the New Deal embraced. But his greatest service was in acclimating that program to Catholic Americans."¹⁴

In that role Ryan clashed with another priest--Charles Coughlin. In his famous radio speech of October 8th, 1936 Ryan answered Coughlin's criticisms of the New Deal and defended it against the "communism" bugaboo. As the Second World War approached Ryan vigorously opposed the isolationism in American Catholicism which Coughlin articulated. In 1926 Ryan had been the chairman of the small committee which had organized the CAIP, and during these years had been associated with its efforts to promote among Catholics that concern for international affairs which Benedict XV in particular had promoted¹⁵. But Catholic opinion had crystallized around the menace of communism¹⁶, and Catholicism had been compromised by the support given to Franco's revolt in Spain¹⁷ and the Vatican's diplomatic embrace of Fascism¹⁸ - Ryan was on the defensive, and Coughlin was in the ascendant until America entered the war.

The 1930s were the crucial period in contemporary American Catholic Church history. The memories of 1928 lingered on to reinforce Catholic suspicions of the nativist anti-Catholicism of their fellow citizens and their own lack of confidence in social acceptance¹⁹, making them easy prey to the appeal of Coughlin, and later Joe McCarthy, when these particular Catholics seemed to identify a cause which reconciled Americanism and Catholicism²⁰. During these years also Coughlin was able to feed on German and Irish - Catholic opposition to European wars (WASP wars) and his simplistic appeals to narrow nationalism, xenophobia, ethnic prejudice, suspicion of political parties and financial powers, struck a chord which has resonated throughout American history. Coughlin diverted attention away from the needs of social reform and economic and political reorganization (Ryan's concerns) to a confused and confusing appeal to quasi-apocalyptic crusades against the anti-Christ. In doing so he demonstrated another possibility of religiously based and legitimated "social action" which could take the experience of personal and social distress and dissipate its reforming energies in some cathartic release as the extreme millenarists had done in all ages²¹. Even when Coughlin was silenced by Archbishop Mooney the tensions lived on. Some were mitigated through the experience of the war, from 1943 to 1946, and the anti-communist crusade of the Cold War; while the conservative Catholicism predominant until after Vatican II gave to American Catholics a vicarious experience of authoritarianism.

Ryan was a representative of those Catholics whom the experience of the Depression and the vacuity of the Harding-Coolidge period had rendered sceptical of the prevailing socio-economic order and

receptive to the radical elements in Catholic social teaching²², while at the same time responsive to the potential of strong government action to change that order²³. The depth and pace of change, however, were hostage to the inertia and apathy in Church and nation which had halted the flow of progressive social policies promoted for quarter of a century by the mid-west populists like Ryan²⁴. The Church was still vulnerable to the intimidation of those who controlled the agencies of economic power and privilege and who would resist any encroachments. The achievements of the New Deal, like the meaning for the American Catholic Church of the efforts of John A. Ryan, cannot be gauged in an anachronistic calculus based on more recent experience, but must be assessed in light of the situation which they attempted to change. In that context, the most significant comparison for the American Catholic Church is that the work of John A. Ryan grows in stature when it is compared with the absence of similar progress along the radical path he pioneered.

Ryan himself was apprehensive about the future and the possible return of the "Bourbons". He himself had experienced the set backs of the '20s, when the causes of the 1890s had to be taken up again²⁵. His own approach, which relied on the power of the federal government, was dependent on holding in check the Catholic suspicion of federalism, which could be used by the majority Protestants to impose their own form of religion nation-wide. Ryan had opposed since his formation under the influence of populism and RN's corporatism²⁶ Catholic acceptance of American economic individualism, and he had always seen the necessity of

government intervention to control the monopolistic power of the "Bourbons". While supporting the unions, Ryan considered them inadequate to promote economic reforms necessary for social justice without the overarching control of the economy by a powerful reform-minded federal executive. In his singlemindedness Ryan was less concerned with the dangers of the state than other Catholics who, suspicious of the power of government in the wrong hands, appreciated better than he the pitfalls of an all-powerful state, and concentrated their efforts on support of the unions as the instrument for attaining social justice²⁷. Into this category came some of Ryan's own proteges. In the first place McGowan, his assistant, who conceived of a system of economic self-government within the political state, and the need for an industrial democracy in which labour would share in management and in the profits of industry. These ideas (state control, industrial democracy) could find justification for their claims in QA and RN, since Catholic social teaching cast a wide net.

In addition, the presence of the Catholic Worker Movement, and the social implications of the Liturgical Movement led by Virgil Michel, made visible yet more possibilities of realizing the fundamental principles of that teaching: respect for the human person and the family, within a social order geared to the needs of both; respect for the freedom of the individual and his right to form intermediate associations. Ryan was vulnerable to the criticism that he neglected the religious, liturgical-spiritual foundations of social justice, in favour of a too exclusive concern with the nuts and bolts of economic reform²⁸. However, if these various strands of

Catholic social action are seen as complementary, not exclusive, the indispensability of Ryan's contribution is apparent, as the way by which the principles of Catholic social teaching formed the foundation for a set of economic policies to reform the prevailing economic order in favour of social justice²⁹. The Liturgical Movement and the Catholic Worker Movement expressed elements of a comprehensive approach to social and personal reform founded on Christian principles³⁰. Ryan understood the indispensable task of changing³¹ the system.

All three approaches were complementary and have come down to the contemporary American Catholic Church as a valuable inheritance. Unfortunately, they have not been sufficiently appropriated by American Catholics. The Liturgical Movement is the one which has impinged most directly on contemporary American Catholic consciousness, through the liturgical reforms of Vatican II. The mixed reception which these have been accorded is a manifestation of the spotty, neglected, unresponsive reception earlier given to the liturgical movement³². The Catholic Worker Movement remains very much a minority concern - undoubtedly, it has influenced many of the more active and committed Catholics, in particular those who like the Berrigans protested against the war in Vietnam from the prophetic stance of Christian pacifism, and who have been involved in the movements for racial and social justice, in opposition to the dominant values of American society. But until recently it has been considered a maverick phenomenon, with minimal episcopal support. The Social Action Movement, which is the focus of our attention, did not incorporate the example of John A. Ryan into an on-going work

of radical social criticism and reform, or extend Ryan's vision internationally³³.

It is this particular "forgotten inheritance" which can give us a point of reference for the variety of events and issues which will be considered in the following section. The failure to integrate the Liturgical-Catholic Worker - Social Action movements has been a corporate loss for the American Catholic Church. The unpreparedness and confusion which attended the Church's assimilation of Vatican II in the United States attested to the absence of a corporate awareness of those concerns to which the Council addressed itself - the very same concerns adumbrated in the three movements we have been considering. However inadequate his understanding of the spiritual and theological dimension of his apostolate, no matter how minimal his comprehension of the place of the lay Catholic in such work, Ryan had tried to involve the Church as a religious institution in the work of social and economic reform. He had pioneered a conception of christian mission in society which a renewed theology of the Church could have built on, to engage the attention and energies of those Catholics (lay, in addition to priests and religious) who were being formed in a broader and more authentic Christian apostolic tradition. The question to be asked is, why did Ryan's vision and his work remain a *persona* enterprise, its authentic radical character a forgotten precedent in the American Catholic Church?

One reason can be found in the domestication of what was at one time considered radical (minimum wage legislation, state intervention in the economy, massive public works programmes) and

was now the law of the land. The same apathy which had originally worked against the radical proposals now acted to limit their scope (or, as Ryan had discovered in the '20s, grasped any opportunity to turn the clock back.). The men of vision, like Ryan, were upsetting the established order in Church and State, and no matter how many people were to come under his influence, their number was not to be compared with that of the others, clergy and laity, who were not exposed to Ryan's presentation of Catholic social teaching, and who were daily subject to other influences³⁴. In spite of all, a certain amount of the message has been installed in the consciousness of many churchmen, so that on certain issues (racial justice, poverty programmes) even the most conservative Catholic bishop reacts to manifestations of plutocratic disinterest in the poor. Cardinal O'Boyle did not appear at any White House Sunday service in recent years. As a member of the "social action" tradition, his ecclesiastical conservatism had its limits.

Another reason was that the bugaboo of "socialism" and "communism" ensnared the American Catholic Church where it had not succeeded with John A. Ryan. In that sense, Coughlin had prevailed³⁵. The emphasis given to the negative condemnations in the papal encyclicals ("anti-communism", "anti-socialism") and the corresponding neglect of their anti-capitalism (especially as expressed in QA) suited those who, for whatever reason, were more concerned to reconcile their Catholicism with the American way of life as defined by the Bourbons than to undertake the task of promoting critical social reform in the light of the relevant parts of the encyclicals³⁶.

"As the anti-communist stance became identified with

patriotism and virtue, the prestige of the church was vastly enhanced and its loyalty to America was less and less questioned."³⁷

This put people like Ryan on the defensive on two counts - the need to defend the New Deal and social reform in general against the charge of communism, and the need to defend his clerical involvement. Ryan could answer the first charge, but the second exposed the vulnerability of his position - the isolation which had once been his protection, since it had allowed that independence from congregational pressure not enjoyed so easily by Protestant and Jewish spokesmen, and the insulation within the NCWC³⁸, were drawbacks in the public confrontation with Coughlin in 1936, and thereafter underlined the absence of a sufficiently broad base of support for Ryan's and the Social Action Department's concerns within the American Catholic people.

This exposed an important flaw in NCWC, and later USCC, which we come across in the following sections - the clerical cast of the ecclesiastical institutions prevented the extension of responsibility to lay Catholics, formed in the Church's social teaching and equipped to spread the influence of that teaching in all sectors of society, including government. Instead, the Church continued to be identified with the clerical leadership, so that even the most energetic social reformers like Ryan were not supported by an informed Catholic opinion able to extend the scope of such work beyond the circumscribed confines, however important, of the few professionals. There was a gap between the clerical specialists like Ryan, Dietz, Haas³⁹, who were involved nationally

and the majority of the parish clergy and the Catholic people. The latter were, as Catholics, preoccupied with the domestic concerns of running their schools, financing church building, attending to social concerns through their voluntary societies like the Knights of Columba, the St. Vincent de Paul Society, rather than through organized efforts to change the social and economic order. They were jealous of their own institutions and opposed to cooperation with non-Catholics. Corresponding to this was a conception of the priesthood which was geared to the narrowly defined image of the Church and its mission - the Church as a religious institution, perfect in itself, dispensing the salvific and sanctifying grace of God through its sacramental rites, and teaching with absolute authority the doctrines and moral prescriptions which the Church alone possesses. It was the priests' job to serve this institution, and whatever extra he might do, for example by attending to the social needs of his people, his primary concern was to promote the good of the institution⁴⁰. In such a scheme, someone like Ryan was inevitably isolated, and the theological interpretation of what he was doing lay in the future. His form of ministry was suspect.

The demagoguery of Coughlin discredited any public political action by priests, and Ryan, who had been the soul of discretion, fell out of favour with Archbishop Curley in his embroilment with Coughlin. This breach was soon repaired, but Ryan was by now an old man and the war intervened to put an end to another stage, the final one, of his long career. In 1945 he once more gave the benediction at a Roosevelt inaugural, but by the end of the year both men were dead.

Ryan's achievement had been to establish a programme of radical social reform as the official policy of the American hierarchy, expressed at various times in their statements and pastorals (in particular the 'bishops' Program of Social Reconstruction' of 1919 and 'The Church and the Social Order' of 1940), and to make use of this official endorsement of his combination of traditional Catholic social teaching and the American populist-progressive tradition to promote support of the New Deal in the American Catholic Church. Whatever the attitudes and opinions of individual bishops, the official policy promoted by the hierarchy through the 'Social Action Department' had been solidly established in a progressive direction. Two things remained to be done to complete Ryan's work - a deepening and broadening of this progressive social ideology (nationally and internationally); the complementary and increasingly important task (especially with the social and educational improvements) of extending the knowledge of and commitment to the concerns of social justice and reform among the Catholic people. Unfortunately, both were stymied by the anti-communist crusade.

The narrow definition of patriotism and the corresponding simplicities of defending the city (i.e. "the West", "the free world") against the anti-Christ prevented the extension of a radical socio-economic critique. The New Deal itself had to be preserved from attack: far less could its extension be promoted. Many of the energies of Ryan's successors were devoted to supporting and defending the labour movement and the unions, preventing their takeover by communists, making them respectable as the focus of the social-reform

Catholics' apostolate⁴¹. Other social action priests were involved with the Church's welfare agencies ("Catholic Charities"), others with CRS - both were directed to immediate relief assistance rather than the more fundamental work of economic change, through legislation and federal action, promoted by Ryan. Little was done to integrate Catholic social teaching into the educational systems of the Church, which continued to be dominated by the teaching of doctrinal faith and dogma as a defence against heresy, rather than an initiation into a way of life inspired by the liturgy and the biblical Kerygma⁴².

The gap continued between NCWC (the bishops, the clerical personnel in charge of the national ecclesiastical organizations) and the local dioceses and parishes. The "remote bureaucracy" of the NCWC was bound to be increased by the clerical-episcopal domination of the ecclesiastical institution. Episcopal involvement in voluntary local community efforts at social change, such as Bishop Shiel's support of Saul Alinsky in Chicago⁴³, was the exception, and the post-war leadership of the American hierarchy (in the first place Cardinal Spellman) showed little or no awareness of the pioneer work of Ryan. Their interests were parochial - protection and promotion of the institution - and they displayed no urge to go beyond the reforms of the New Deal in response to the changing social conditions⁴⁴. Whatever contribution might have been made by the Catholic colleges and universities was limited because of the lack of contact between them and the bishops.⁴⁵ Even Catholic University, which in the Ireland-Gibbons era had been the focus of intellectual and religious ferment for the bishops, and

with Ryan the centre of social action education for American priests, was reduced to a centre for the production of seminary teachers and canon lawyers.

S E C T I O N III

In this section I shall record the response of the American bishops to the war in Vietnam as its course unfolded from 1966 to 1973. Having traced in Section II, Chapter 3 the history of the official (or in the case of CAIP, semi-official) organisations set up in the American Church to represent "the Catholic voice", "the Catholic response" to international questions, this Section shows these in operation. After a first chapter which establishes the initial episcopal support of the American war in the period before the establishment of WJP (Part A records the response of CAIP and serves the dual purpose of integrating this Section with Section II while referring Catholic support for the war back to the period before direct American involvement), I shall go on to describe the course of events from the setting up of WJP and the '68 pastoral to the end of the American war in early 1973 and the character of episcopal response. In doing so I have attempted to include all the public statements of the American bishops on the subject, but with the main attention given to their collective response.

CHAPTER I

A. CAIP AND VIETNAM

As an introduction to the consideration of the response of the American bishops to the war in Vietnam, we shall trace here the course of CAIP statements on the subject.

The earliest in the files is one from the 'Subcommittee on Asia', dated June 14, 1953, which speaks about "Communist aggression" and the "immoral attack upon peaceful peoples", and calls upon the United Nations to take action under Articles 34 and 35 of the Charter. The reaction to this statement from the Public Affairs Office of the U.S. Mission to the United Nations:

"It is helpful to have expressions of opinion from citizens and citizen organizations."

An interesting gloss is provided by a letter from Rev. Thomas A. O'Melia, M.M. of Maryknoll College, Lakewood, N.J. dated June 4, 1953:

"You will find France blocking the road. Mendes-France proposes a deal with the Reds. The Reds are not the chief problem in S.E. Asia. Colonialism is the key."

The Secretary of the Committee replied:

"We discussed the colonial problem and recognized that it is one of the most dangerous factors out there, but we felt that it would not be wise to inject it into the statement on aggression.....In spite of French shortcomings, we felt it would not be wise to highlight the colonial issue at the same time, especially since we took a clear stand on these problems in February, and because there

apparently is great pressure on France for pulling all troops out of Indo-China, which might be disastrous."

This reflected the consensus of the American foreign policy, rather than any specifically Christian critique.¹

The CAIP continued to reflect conventional Cold War attitudes, as in the July 17, 1965 statement of its 'World Order Committee' which brushed aside the Geneva agreements of 1954 and 1962:

"Whatever the merits of these agreements, they are not now a help in bringing order out of the situation. Indeed they have become part of the controversy."²

The main points of this statement will be reflected throughout this survey of the bishops' response - basic support for the American war against the Communists (a patronising attitude to the natives, with one eye on the Reds coming down from the horizon); qualms of conscience about the possibility of civilian bombing and reciprocal use of "terrorist tactics" unaccompanied by an effort to find out whether or not this was actually happening (the "fundamenta in re" again neglected³); "peace" meaning victory over the Communists and their expulsion from Indo-China (in this scenario the fact of indigenous communism is discounted - applying an American analysis, "communist" equals "alien"):

"We support the government of the United States in its use of armed force, provided always that this force is measured and is calculated to bring about a negotiated peace. Deliberately to bomb civilians or to seek to match the Viet Cong in terrorist tactics would be, in our

judgment, an immoral use of legitimate power.... (how "immoral" can possibly be "legitimate" is not discussed)

..

We think the United States should be prepared to continue the use of military power for as long as the Viet Cong with its supporters continue hostilities. This may be a long time. We need to match communist patience with our patience..... We must hold out for peace because the peoples of Asia now living quietly in their misery expect the U nited States to check the threat of the overshadowing power of China."

A letter of August 24, 1965 from James L. Greenfield, Assistant Secretary, Department of State, to Msgr. George C. Higgins, the head of the Social Action Department of the NCWC (and who had continued his predecessor John A. Ryan's supervision of CAIP) underlines the July 15th statement's character:

"I know the President would want me to express his appreciation for your support of our policy in Viet-Nam."

Likewise, from within the Church, a letter in the files from Archbishop Lucey of San Antonio, dated July 21st, 1965:

"I think it is excellent and also timely."

Archbishop Lucey, a friend of President Johnson, was a long-standing member of the CAIP, one of the few active episcopal members from the time of the Second World War, when he was Bishop of Amarillo. During the Vietnam period Lucey was one of the most outspoken supporters of American government policy in Vietnam among the ranks of the American Catholic hierarchy. In this regard, it will be of note as this Section progresses that such outspokenness, whether supportive or critical of government

policy, was limited to a minority of the bishops, and part of the reason why I give priority to their corporate statements is because in most cases this is the only means of determining their response. In the case of Archbishop Lucey - the record of his reactions to CAIP statements is one way of determining their tone, supportive of American government policy until 1967, then increasingly critical.

The change came with the presidency of CAIP of William V. O'Brien of Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. On December 30, 1966 and September 11, 1967 he issued statements in his name as CAIP president, protesting the bombing of targets, even military ones, in heavily populated areas such as Hanoi and Haiphong. In doing so he was following the advice offered him in a letter of January 10, 1967:

"CAIP has been silent all too often....since the committees are so difficult to rouse, it is necessary for the President, after consultation with qualified members of the board, to let the voice of CAIP be heard."

O'Brien was criticized by the older establishment of CAIP - Archbishop Lucey, Charles Fahy, and Harry W. Flannery (the latter two, past presidents of the Association). Fahy's reaction:

"I opposed the issuance of the statement (December '66) as untimely and for other reasons. I thought the Association would be of greater service at this time by encouraging continuation or renewal of the truce, and by supporting the recent initiative of the United States with Secretary General U Thant. Moreover, I did not think we

had enough data about the recent bombing with regrettable loss of civilian lives in or near Hanoi to make a public statement in that regard, especially as I felt certain the bombing was being restricted to military objectives."⁴

Flannery's reaction:

"I cannot believe that the United States has deliberately and directly attacked population centres in North Vietnam. Perhaps I am too naive. Maybe you, as you may well be, are better informed."⁵

There was no consensus within CAIP which would have caused the Association to criticize the Vietnam policy of the administration; and O'Brien himself expressed support for President Johnson's general policy, but drew attention to the distinction between the legality of a war and that of the means employed (an important point, as we shall see in the following chapters):

"The moral justice and legal permissibility of a war are distinct from the permissibility of the means used in war."⁶

This CAIP pattern was reflected among the bishops - from a basis of general support of government policy in Vietnam, the question of the destructive means being employed to carry out that policy begins to insert itself into the debate in 1968, until in 1971 it leads to an ambiguous criticism of American policy by the national Catholic hierarchy.

B.

THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC BISHOPS AND THE VIETNAM WAR :
1966 - 1967

The terminus a quo of the response of the American Catholic hierarchy to American involvement in Vietnam is their 'Statement on Peace' of November 18, 1966 and its reiteration in a shorter 'Resolution on Peace' of November 16, 1967⁷. These express the bishops' view of international affairs, and of the specific case of Vietnam, in the period immediately following the conclusion of Vatican II in December 1965. The influence of Vatican II, and in particular GS, is merely formal: what is more obvious is that American Catholic tradition of unquestioning support of government policy, absence of a will to find out the facts of that policy independently of the government, and the consequent presumption of government probity, which we have observed in the historical sketch of the American Catholic Church and above in part A:

"While we do not claim to be able to resolve these issues authoritatively, in the light of the facts as they are known to us, it is reasonable to argue that our presence in Vietnam is justified." (Italics mine)

In the matter of nuclear disarmament, the 1966 statement insinuates the view of nuclear deterrence which some of the American bishops had striven, without success, to insert in GS:

"While the stockpiling of scientific weapons serves, for the present, as a deterrent to aggression, the Council has warned us that....." (Italic's mine)

This presents a subtle change from the corresponding paragraph 81 of GS, by stating boldly the argument justifying the possession of nuclear weapons for deterrence which was side stepped in paragraph 81⁸. In the actual debate at Vatican II on this Chapter V of GS, Archbishop Hannan of New Orleans had been one of the principal opponents of the whole tone of the chapter, which condemned the counter-city form of nuclear deterrence (then as now part of American nuclear strategy), in the context of the papal condemnations of total war (the opponents denied that recent popes had condemned total war)⁹. Hannan was in this matter a spokesman for that policy of support of the American government which dominated the American Catholic hierarchy¹⁰. While at Vatican II this policy could not be translated into anything except the prevention of a condemnation of nuclear stockpiling, back home it was possible to go further. What the 1966 statement shows is the absence of that "entirely new attitude" to war advocated in GS, and the continuation of that stance of the American Catholic hierarchy supportive of American policy.¹¹

This was dramatized in December, 1966 by Cardinal Spellman, the dean of the hierarchy since the end of the Second World War, when in Vietnam he set the crusading seal on American involvement, declaring that "total victory means peace", and "my country, right or wrong."¹²

CHAPTER II

1968 - 1970

A. THE 1968 COLLECTIVE PASTORAL

By 1968 the effects of the changed order post-Vatican II were beginning to influence the concerns of the American hierarchy. With a 'World Justice and Peace Commission' established in response to GS, plans were under way for a collective pastoral to be presented at the November meeting which would seek to relate the concerns expressed in GS to the American experience, just as the collective pastoral of 1967 had related LG to the American Catholic Church.¹ The appearance of Humanae Vitae (HV) in mid-summer affected the preparation of the proposed collective pastoral, which now had to respond not only to the general concerns of GS but to the particular concerns of HV². As a result, the 1968 collective pastoral - 'Human Life in Our Day' (HL) - has two sections: one on 'The Christian Family', the other on 'The Family of Nations', which are two separate productions (the latter prepared by WJP)³, written from different perspectives (the former dominated by HV, the papal encyclical, and constituting the American bishops' response to HV; the latter in the line of GS, the conciliar pastoral constitution, and making applications to the American context of the Vietnam war and the nuclear war debate). Most of the attendant publicity was given to the first section, on account of the controversy surrounding HV.

It was not the first section, however, to which John Tracy Ellis was referring when he made this comment:

"With it (HL) the bishops may be said to have made the kind of break with the American Catholic thinking and practice of the past that would allow for no reversal."⁵

'The Family of Nations', especially when it is compared with the '66 and '67 statements (which reflected that "American Catholic thinking and practice of the past"), represents a response, accepted as their official response by the American Catholic hierarchy, to the changed circumstances of the American consciousness as that most traumatic of years in recent American history was drawing to a close.

Gone is the complacent tone ("....the moral sensitivity of the American people has not diminished but in fact increased and intensified." '67 Resolution), and in its place an awareness of some implications for American bishops of that "entirely new attitude" to war of GS paragraph 80:

"This compelling obligation is the greater in our case since we are citizens of a nation in many ways the most powerful in the world. The responsibility of moral leadership is the greater in the local Church of a nation whose arsenals contain the greatest nuclear potential for both the harm that we would wish to impede or the help it is our obligation to encourage. We are acutely aware that our moral posture and comportment in this hour of supreme crisis will be assessed by the judgment of history and of God."⁶

By contrast with the old formalism of the opening paragraph of the '66 statement, a recognition of the question of credibility (in line with the new perception of 'the Church in the World'):

"We speak as witnesses to that Gospel, aware that the issues of war and peace test the relevancy of its message -- for our generation, particularly in terms of the service of life and its dignity."

On the specific point of nuclear deterrence, progress is made from the policy adopted at Vatican II by the Hannan party - while noting that the Council did not condemn the "possession" of nuclear weapons, they go on to quote that part of paragraph 81 of GS which declares the arms race as "an utterly treacherous trap for humanity", and for the first time attempt to lend their support to specific policies of arms' limitation - strengthening of the Partial Test Ban Treaty, ratification by the Senate of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, negotiations for balanced reductions of nuclear weapons, opposition to the proposed American ABM system.⁷ Continuing a critique of contemporary government policy, the bishops urge the ratification of the genocide convention of the United Nations and "...of every sound implementing instrument by which the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights can be translated from the level of ideals to that of actuality."⁸ The support of the United Nations, which the bishops declare to be normative for Catholics in light of the public support given by Pope Paul at his 1965 visit to the headquarters of the UN in New York, is in line with the internationalism of the Catholic Church's official statements, in particular those of Benedict XV, and reiterated throughout the history of the CAIP. This doctrine is opposed to the reduction of peace to the "maintenance of a balance of power between enemies",⁹ and demands more than the promotion of the national interest, which indeed can only be promoted in the context of an international common good.¹⁰

This statement of Catholic internationalism now provides us with a standard, in the very words of the bishops' pastoral, with which to judge the official response by the bishops to the events in Vietnam, and, to a somewhat more limited extent, in their relationship with the world of CELAM. Unfortunately, the judgment must be predominantly negative, as shown in particular in Chapter four of this section.

In the first place, the forthrightness of this 'doctrinal' section of HL contrasts with the following section on Vietnam, which is intended as an updating of the '66 and '67 statements. The bishops recall their judgment in the '66 statement, "that, on balance, the U.S. presence in Vietnam was useful and justified." They acknowledge the widening of the national debate on "the moral aspects of our involvement in Vietnam", and state their estimation of the issues:

"In assessing our country's involvement in Vietnam we must ask: Have we already reached, or passed, the point where the principle of proportionality becomes decisive? How much more of our resources in men and money should we commit to this struggle, assuming an acceptable cause or intention? Has the conflict in Vietnam provoked inhuman dimensions of suffering? Would not an untimely withdrawal be equally disastrous?"

They do not attempt to answer their own formulation of the issues! Instead, after stating some clearly defined questions, they look for some means of evading a response and find it in pro forma incantation:

"While it would be beyond our competence to propose any technical formulas for bringing the Vietnam War to an end, we welcome the bombing halt and pray for the success of the negotiations now underway."

The very mention of "moral lessons to be learned from our involvement in Vietnam that will apply to future cases" (the limitations of external military power and technology to solve internal political conflicts; the recognition that existing evils "...such as under-nutrition, economic frustration, social stagnation, and political injustices, may be more readily attacked and corrected through non-military means, than by military efforts to counteract the subversive forces bent on their exploitation"; the discrediting of violence as a means of remedying human ills - when it is recalled that the Vietnam experience was not past history but should have been present reality for them, merely compounds their schizoid response (just as later we shall see the same syndrome of anticipating the end of the war while ignoring its present realities, and their responsibilities, which in HL they have just enumerated).

It is this example of "studied ambiguity" and the "total absence of any attempt at answering" their questions which prompts Drinan to dismiss this '68 statement.¹¹ He takes up the words of HL which note "that opinions among Catholics (re. "the moral aspects of our involvement in Vietnam") appear as varied as in our society as a whole; one cannot accuse Catholics of either being partisans of any one point of view or of being unconcerned." He describes the possible inferences of this phenomenon:

"1. There is nothing in Catholic teaching which would assist Catholics to come to an informed judgment about the morality of any modern war or at least about the war in Vietnam.

2. Whatever wisdom the highly developed Catholic theory of the just war might have had in the past, it has been lost or at least has not been communicated to American Catholics.

3. War today is a matter of "realpolitik" on which Catholics have no moral principles which differentiate them from other citizens."¹²

Noting the implication in the statement (the absence of a particular Catholic viewpoint regarding Vietnam) that this is a healthy phenomenon, he describes it rather as an example of turning shame into glory; and taking exception to the words, "The Council did not call for unilateral disarmament, Christian morality is not lacking in realism." (which he regards as a sanction for the continuation of the arms race), he declares:

"There is a persuasive case for the proposition that the Church can never tailor its moral judgments so that they will not be criticized as "lacking in realism""¹³

Finally he delivers the argumentum ad hominem:

"In its condemnation of duelling the Church did not try to enunciate a judgment which would be in accord with "realism". Nor has the Church done so in its position on abortion...."¹⁴

(We shall find the latter contrast expressed more recently by Bishops Gumbleton and Kelly.)

The unwillingness of the NCCB to apply their own principles to the war in Vietnam finds no better expression than here in HL, where the very statement of some of the 'just war' criteria is not followed by an attempt to address themselves to the facts, and to an evaluation of the facts of the war in the light of these criteria; or indeed, one of the criteria, since the application of the just war doctrine demands the fulfillment of all the conditions. HL is a significant advance with regard to the Vietnam War over the '66 and '67 statements only because it does not gloss over the dilemma of the juxtaposition of principles of traditional Catholic 'just war' teaching and the need for an application to situations like the Vietnam war¹⁵

A much more credible image of Catholic teaching is presented in the final section - 'The Role of Conscience'. Here the right of conscientious objection and selective conscientious objection is upheld as in conformity with that teaching (the first based on traditional moral principles regarding the primacy of conscience, the second applying these not to all wars but to a particular war, in the light of "the norms for the moral evaluation of a theoretically just war".)¹⁶ That this traditional teaching was not and is not yet the common property, not only of establishment political and military people like General Hershey,¹⁷ but even of the Catholic public, has been demonstrated by its low profile throughout the continuing debate and even after the more comprehensive statement of October, 1971.¹⁸

B. 1969 - 1970

The absence of an NCCB statement on the Vietnam war for three years - until November, 1971 - signified that the limits of episcopal consensus had been reached in the ambiguity of those few words in HL. The vacuum left by the NCCB was filled by individual bishops who spoke out in the national debate, by a group of bishops (the fourteen bishops of the New England province¹⁹), and from within the USCC by the Division for World Justice and Peace (on its own or through the Department of International Affairs).

As we review here and in the following chapters this variety of voices which filled the vacuum left by the hierarchy as a corporate body, from 1968 until 1971, the increasing volume of criticism of American government policy in Vietnam contrasts with the unanswered questions of the 1968 Pastoral and prepares the way for the debate at the November, 1971 meeting when once more the hierarchy collectively addressed itself to the issue. A 'Resume - 1969, Public Statements on Crucial International Issues and Events' (sent to Archbishop Benelli at the Vatican²⁰) details the response of the Division to Vietnam and other international issues - expressing disappointment with the Senate's vote authorizing development and deployment of the Safeguard ABM system, but encouragement at the closeness of the vote (August 7, 1969); welcoming President Nixon's statement (November 25th) that the U.S. would not engage in germ warfare; a joint statement from the directors of WJP, the 'Division of Campus Ministry', the 'Division of Youth Activities', favourable to the October 15th moratorium against the war (October 3rd); a statement (December 10th) from the director of WJP (Bordelon) in the

Division's name, on the occasion of the My Lai revelations and related practices.²¹

The principal response of the Division in 1969 was a November 7th 'Statement on Vietnam Situation' which emphasized the need for genuine political and social change in Vietnam.²² However, the most informative evidence of the position of WJP on the American war is to be found in a memo of May 23, 1969, which records a meeting of representatives from official religious bodies like the Division (the corresponding departments of the NCC and AJC - 'American Jewish Committee') with Dean Moor, chief adviser to Henry Kissinger on Vietnam.²³ This shows, in its tone of skepticism regarding the rationale of American government policy, that WJP had advanced far beyond the uncommitted rhetoric of HL and the original "hands off" attitude of Bordelon, to a position of radical criticism of the American war policy. The December statement on My Lai²⁴ underlines the distance from HL, in the very different character of the rhetorical questions now being asked - in place of the neutral ones of HL, no doubt remains about the implied answers. The only trace of the American consensus remaining in the WJP response is the continuing naivete with respect to the capabilities of American attempts to affect the underlying social and political realities of Vietnam, a naivete described throughout Frances Fitzgerald's study.²⁵ The "military escalation" which followed one year after the meeting with Moor could not but confirm the skepticism within WJP about American policy, and the direction of WJP response.

This escalation - the American invasion of Cambodia in May, 1970 - prompted a statement of criticism from the USCC 'International

Affairs Committee', continuing the rhetorical style of HL, and a more specific questioning in a follow-up by Bordelon, secretary of the committee as well as the director of the WJP.²⁶ In the follow-up, Bordelon emphasized the gap between the requirements for a just war and the actions of the government - lack of congressional approval rendered questionable whether the war had been 'declared by legitimate authority'; the succession of shifting causes invoked by American presidents obfuscated the requirements of 'just cause'; saving American prestige and the determination not to be the first administration to lose a war provided dubious grounds for the escalation of military activity and the just war requirement of 'right intentions'; and the conditions of 'proportionality' underlined in HL were now being posed in even more urgent form. No statement of the bishops attempted to make a similar application of 'just war' criteria.

The semi-annual meeting of the bishops had taken place just before the Cambodian invasion, but nothing had been said there about the war. Instead, the bishops in an official statement had thanked the president for announcing the establishment of a commission to study ways in which the government could help private and parochial schools. The political strategy of the executive with regard to the Catholic Church had been established - intermittent sounds of approval for Catholic schools (including a "folksy" presidential remark about his secretary Rosemary Woods having been at a parochial school), and support of the anti-abortion movement which was identified with the Catholic Church. The irony behind this strategy was not incorporated into any statements or actions by the hierarchy - the fact that the president could not "deliver", either on

parochial schools or, for the most part, on anti-abortion legislation, because of Supreme Court opposition (four of whose nine members are Nixon appointees). The executive strategy did, however, correctly calculate that favourable hierarchical reaction to these issues was more likely than opposition to administration policy in Vietnam.

The administration could ignore an outburst like that of Cardinal Cushing²⁷ (who, in any case, would never be a supporter of the Nixon administration, being too closely identified with the Kennedys), since there was always the different response of an Archbishop Lucey.²⁸ Bishop Begin of Oakland, California and his Senate of Priests urged withdrawal from Cambodia, Laos and South Vietnam in letters to President Nixon and the Central Committee of the North Vietnamese Communist Party, but even this type of response was more by way of exception to the general rule of Catholic acquiescence.²⁹

The first American bishop to express dissent with official government Vietnam policy was Victor Reed of Oklahoma City-Tulsa, who in June 1967, with seventy-nine of his priests (about one half of the diocesan clergy), urged an end to the bombing of North Vietnam.³⁰ In 1970 he helped finance, "as a private citizen", the mailing of an anti war statement to the forty thousand U.S. priests urging them "to publicly deplore the American policy in Vietnam"³¹. This statement was signed by three thousand priests (about 10% of the American Catholic clergy), among whom were two bishops (Buswell of Pueblo, Colorado in addition to Reed), the first two presidents of the NFFC (the only national organization of priests); well known theologians like Sloyan, Curran, McSorley, McBrien, John L. McKenzie;

older and widely respected clerics like John Tracy Ellis, John A. O'Brien, Charles Rice (the latter two were pioneer social action priests of the Ryan School), and Robert Drinan; the religious periodical editors Nerin and Sheerin (U.S. Catholic and The Catholic World³²). This symbolized the ever growing number of clerical, non-episcopal voices opposing the war, as did the letter from the American Jesuit Provincials on May 21, 1970, to all U.S. Senators:

- "1. We urge that you take steps to end this war without delay.
2. We urge that the national budget be channeled into peaceful directions by cutting back military appropriations.
3. We urge you to modify Selective Service regulations (the draft) to allow selective conscientious objection, as recently espoused by the United States Catholic Conference.
4. We urge that you take these positive actions to heal the alienation of our youth from this country."

The significant thing about this section of Catholic opinion was that it represented many of the priest-authors and educators most respected by the younger clergy (whom we shall see in the case of Louisville, which is representative, were overwhelmingly anti-war); and a pro-war policy was not supported by any number of people of similar standing. The latter relied on acquiescence more than articulation, and even in the national debate, just as in the ecclesiastical, this contributed to the erosion of pro-war sentiment.

WJP was caught between the continuing majority Catholic acquiescence, NCCB silence, and the growing number of clerical and lay anti-war voices, particularly of the young. On the one hand WJP, in the person of Patrick McDermott, Bordelon's assistant, prepared a paper, 'Christian Tradition and Peace-Making Today : Education and Action to build a World of Peace', which was presented as an official working paper at the third annual meeting of the Pontifical Commission in Rome, March 2-5, 1970, expressing a view of the war critical of government policy³³. On the other hand, the November 1970 NCCB meeting produced no echo of this, or of the national controversy in the wake of the extension of the American war into Cambodia³⁴.

CHAPTER III

1971

On July 29, 1971 the 'National Catholic Office for Information' of the USCC published a "Chronological History of Statements made by American Catholic Bishops on the war in Vietnam", which was claimed to be "an extensive though not exhaustive chronology of statements". This prompted Gordon C. Zahn, the sociologist and Catholic pacifist, to describe it as an attempt to disguise the overwhelming acquiescence of the American hierarchy in government policy¹. Taking this "chronological history" at face value it shows that from November, 1968 (when HL was issued) until July, 1971 less than thirty of the almost three hundred bishops in the country were on record expressing any kind of opposition to the American involvement in Vietnam². The three most outspoken critics of American policy among the Catholic bishops were, significantly, not even diocesan ordinaries but auxiliary-bishops, and of these three, two - Shannon of Minneapolis-St. Paul and Kelly of Providence, Rhode Island - had left the ranks of the hierarchy by July, 1971 (Kelly directly in consequence of NCCB acquiescence). The third - Gumbleton of Detroit - remained to become, as we are about to see, the somewhat reluctant prime mover of the November '71 statement.

Bishop Kelly on March 12, 1971 had joined a group protesting the war at the Newport, Rhode Island naval base where President Nixon was making an appearance. That same month Bishops

Gumbleton and Kelly joined an inter-religious campaign called "Set the Date Now", whose purpose was to urge the Administration and Congress to establish December 31, 1971 as the date to end all direct and indirect American military involvement in Indo-China³. At the April Bishops' Meeting in Detroit Bishop Kelly tried in vain to have a statement on Vietnam issued⁴. This April meeting preceded the '71 Bishops' Synod in Rome at which the two topics to be discussed were 'the priesthood' and 'justice in the world'. The latter topic was given no attention at the meeting, and from April until July 13th there was no effort by the bishops' delegates to the Synod to utilize their own 'justice and peace' staff at the USCC to prepare for the Synod discussions⁵. This underlines the lack of "conscientization" among the bishops, both with regard to the wider implications of American involvement in Vietnam for peace in the world, and for the symbolic effects of that involvement in the Third World.

Such was the reality which the public relations office of the USCC was trying to disguise in its "chronological history of statements" (the fact that it neglected to mention the statement of Archbishop Lucey, indeed the absence in its list of any statements supportive of government policy, underlines not only the validity of Zahn's criticism but also the embarrassing futility of any effort to demonstrate real opposition to American involvement in Vietnam by the NCCB, as distinct from individual, generally unrepresentative bishops - unrepresentative, that is, of the national hierarchy in its institutional expression as NCCB).

On May 7, 1971, the bishops of the New England province (Massachusetts, Vermont, Maine - fourteen bishops in all) issued a joint pastoral letter, which in its criticism of the lack of proportionability between the stated aims of the American war effort and the destruction being meted out on the people of Vietnam, in particular the policy of giving precedence to American lives as if they were inherently of more value than Vietnamese, went beyond HL in a significant manner. This, again, was not representative of the NCCB, and no other similar grouping of bishops produced such a statement⁶.

Individually, some bishops took up a stand critical of American policy. Bishop Durick of Nashville, Tenn. in May, 1971 issued a statement urging his fellow-citizens to petition for an amendment to the charter of the city-county government calling for an end to U.S. involvement in the war. Bishop Dozier of Memphis, Tenn. in June endorsed objection to the war in Vietnam as grounds for a refusal to answer the draft, and an individual's right to make an "ethical and moral" decision about military service, when he appeared before the Memphis draft board to support a young man's effort to obtain 'conscientious objector' status⁷. On June 9th, in a homily during a 'Mass for Peace' in his cathedral, Bishop Flanagan of Worcester, Mass. criticized the May pastoral of the New England bishops as not explicit enough in its condemnation of American actions in Vietnam⁸. On July 27th in his diocesan paper, The Catholic Week, Bishop May of Mobile, Alabama, called the "whole sad story" of the Vietnam war "a graphic picture of the futility of war in this day and age", concluding that "....now we are morally bound to.....

get out of there as fast as we can". In a September pastoral Bishop Primeau of Manchester, N.H. reiterated his opposition to the continuance of the American war.

An action which could be interpreted as at least mildly critical of American involvement, but more importantly as prefigurative of the attitude to be adopted at the November meeting with significant effect by its most prestigious supporter, was the call for an April 30-May 2 "time of prayer, repentance and mourning for all those who have already died in South-East Asia", supported by Cardinal Sheehan of Baltimore, Bishops Reed, Unterkoefler of Charleston, S.C., Dozier, Gossman (auxiliary in Baltimore), and Gumbleton. Unterkoefler on his own initiative, like Reed, Flanagan, Primeau, Durick, Dozier, had expressed opposition to the American policy in Vietnam. Archbishop Casey of Denver, Colo. wrote to President Nixon on July 13th at the urging of his Senate of Priests (like Begin of Oakland the year before):

- "1. The tradition and ideals of America will best be served by discontinuing our military presence in Southeast Asia.
2. The people of Southeast Asia must be allowed to determine their own destiny."

In his reply Nixon stated the usual reasons why the war was being dragged out as far as the American involvement was concerned - the need to have this bargaining chip in the negotiations, in particular to secure the release of the prisoners of war; the necessity of providing a "reasonable chance" for the South

Vietnamese to defend themselves and determine their own future (while declaring the American troop withdrawals were not being mortgaged to the indefinite future for South Vietnam) - describing this as "an honorable obligation which I believe the American people have acquired with respect to the people of South Vietnam, and an obligation which we must fulfill." One element of the letter did, however, record something which was not usually allowed to appear as an influential factor in the Nixon-Kissinger policy, the recognition of which was not communicated to the American people:

"There is little question that the presence of our troops in Vietnam has created division at home. This was among the reasons that I decided as soon as I was given the responsibility for this problem to withdraw our forces."

(American troop withdrawals were presented officially as a result of the success of 'Vietnamization', and the Nixon Administration was loathe to recognize publicly the existence of division at home - those opposed to government policy were considered to be a minority which could safely be ignored, even when the "minority" consisted of the biggest public demonstrations in American history of opposition to government policy, in October 1969 and November 1970.)⁹

Whatever action there was on the part of the American Catholic bishops still did not add up to anything except the voices of a small minority, less than ten per cent of the total number of bishops, with the same names appearing all the time (those recorded

here, in what becomes almost a litany until the end of this section). By contrast, the leaders of the largest religious order - the Jesuits - had already urged change of government policy, as we have seen, and on April 30, 1971 the provincial of the New England province wrote to the members urging them with the necessity of speaking out against the suffering being perpetrated on the people of South-East Asia.¹⁰

From May 21-23, 1971 a unique meeting was held in Paris which brought together American and Vietnamese Catholics opposed to the war. The principal organizer on the American side was Harry Bury, Newman chaplain at the University of Minnesota, and he was joined among others by Richard Griffin, Newman chaplain at Harvard, and Frank Bonnike, president of the NFAC. On the Vietnamese side clerical leadership was provided by student chaplains and youth chaplains, especially those of the YCW (the influential organization of 'Young Catholic Workers' founded at the beginning of the century by Joseph Cardijn in Belgium which spread throughout Europe, thence to Vietnam, and a traditional centre of progressive Catholic socio-political opinion). These Vietnamese were and continue to be the focus of anti-government opinion among Catholics in South Vietnam, many of them now in prison in consequence of their opposition to the military cliques ruling in Saigon throughout the American war.

Earlier there had been soundings on the possibility of a U.S. tour by such Vietnamese Catholics opposed to the war, but this was never realized, since it was opposed by Swanstrom and it was, not unexpectedly, found to be very difficult to obtain visas

from the American State Department¹¹. This was another example of the relationship between CRS, the American government, and the majority Catholic anti-communist Vietnamese who provided the most concentrated support for the Saigon military rulers.

The Paris meeting in May, 1971 acquainted the American participants directly with the Vietnamese Catholic minority opposition to the war (a minority whose views continued to be ignored by the general American news media, treated with disdain by the NC reports of the meeting - thus showing the unwillingness by the official organs of the U.S. Catholic Church represented by USCC to relate to the Catholics in Vietnam in terms other than those dictated by the established channel - CRS.)¹² No representatives of the USCC or the NCCB attended this meeting, or the Calcav meeting in Washington about the same time.¹³

CHAPTER IV

NOVEMBER, 1971 - THE BISHOPS' 'RESOLUTION ON
SOUTHEAST ASIA'

The November '71 Statement originated in a resolution from the Senate of Priests of the Archdiocese of Detroit urging the NCCB ".... to address themselves at their November meeting to the morality of the continuing U.S. involvement in Vietnam; and that, specifically, they concern themselves with the morality of the stated U.S. Government policy of Vietnamization"¹. The priests noted that the NCCB had made no further statement after HL, ".... during which time it has become increasingly difficult to imagine that the principle of proportionality has not been violated".

This resolution was forwarded to WJP, with a request that the Division inform the Senate whether or not the Division intended to submit a statement at the November NCCB meeting - if not, the Detroit Senate planned to have a statement placed on the agenda through the agency of one of their own Detroit bishops. No action was taken on the initiative of WJP, and consequently Bishop Gumbleton forwarded a short item for the November agenda on this Vietnam issue. Bishop Bernardin sent notice of this to the International Affairs Committee and Pat McDermott, Associate Director of WJP prepared a first draft before he left the Division in October.

The baton was then taken up by Edward M. Gaffney, at the time an Assistant Director of the NCCB "Ecumenical Affairs"

office who as a priest of the archdiocese of San Francisco, and member of the Senate of Priests and the Association of Priests there, had been involved in the Vietnam debate within the Church and in the Bay area. Gaffney saw the item on the November agenda and investigated the situation at WJP. Jim Jennings of the Division had corrected McDermott's first draft, a bland criticism of American actions in Vietnam and a call for a cease-fire and an American withdrawal, and Gaffney now revised that (Draft 3)². He then contacted Gumbleton and Robert Drinan, S.J. by sending a copy of Draft 3 to both on October 20th and meeting with Drinan that evening. Drinan expressed disapproval of these first drafts, as mediocre and full of "pompous and empty rhetoric"³ and drew up Draft 4⁴. The change from the environmental context of 3 (WJP trying to put things in a fashion designed to pass through the USCC and NCCB sieve) to that of 4 (the first Catholic priest in the twentieth century to sit in Congress, who in the process had demonstrated his independence from official ecclesiastical bureaucratic order) is apparent from the initial clarity of statement - "By any interpretation of the so-called just war theory traditional in Catholic doctrine any continuation of the war in Vietnam is morally forbidden".

He makes direct judgments on the questions of proportionality, and legitimacy of the means employed by the U.S. government in the war, and not just a HL statement of the question (far less the tentative approval of U.S. government policy in the '66 and '67 Bishops' statements). He brings up the issue of the obligation to make restitution for American action of destruction, recalls the outlawing of war in PT and GS, the obligation to practise

justice to the third world, the need to make the UN a real and effective instrument of peace. One statement in particular reveals not only the difference of perspective between Drinan and hierarchy, but also the reason why such a draft could never last the course through the successive hurdles of the USCC and NCCB, since it was predicted on the assumption that the whole historical trend of the American Catholic Church in its relationship with government could be stood on its head in one swoop (the Ellis conclusion from HL was not so easily translated from the general acceptance of moral responsibility to the particular application of critical moral judgment):

"As never before in all of American history we find ourselves in confrontation with the civil power and feel compelled to inform and rebuke the highest officials of the United States government that they are violating the law of man and the law of God by any continued hostilities in Southeast Asia. We urge all Catholics in America to join us in this moral judgment and to make it known throughout the land."

Gaffney kept in contact with Gumbleton, and for the successive drafts of the statement consulted with people at WJP and ODC. In draft 7 we have the most comprehensive version of the proposed statement⁵. This involves an overlapping of the first three drafts with Drinan's, the removal of those sections of the latter that were considered to be impossible to pass through the NCCB, while retaining the basic argument (proportionality - the available evidence makes clear that at

this point there is clearly no benefit for us or the Vietnamese proportionate to the intense toll of human suffering inflicted on all involved in this war." : "...the continuation of the war cannot be justified by the traditional Catholic principle of proportionality."; legitimacy of the means employed - the indiscriminate killing of civilians through massive air and artillery fire power which was expressed in Vietnam by the designation of "free fire zones", where everything that moved was fair game). The most significant addition is the inclusion of the issue of amnesty as a means of healing the wounds in American society caused by the war and thus promoting reconciliation in a divided society. This was an echo of the 'Declaration on Conscientious Objection and Selective Conscientious Objection' published by USCC on October 21st⁶.

Gaffney pressed on Gumbleton the need to drum up support for the prospective statement among his friends in the hierarchy, but when he met Gumbleton on his arrival in Washington on Sunday evening, November 14th he discovered that this had not been done. However, help in saving a Vietnam statement from the anticipated oblivion came from an unexpected quarter - the secretary of USCC and NCCB himself, Bernardin, who on the Saturday, November 13th, rescued Gumbleton's item on the agenda at the Administrative Committee meeting immediately prior to the full assembly and arranged the appointment of three members of the Committee (Archbishop Medeiros of Boston, Archbishop Byrne of Minneapolis-St. Paul, Bishop May of Mobile, Alabama) who were given the task of drawing up a statement to be submitted to the whole NCCB in

response to Gumbleton's item.⁷ Draft 7 was passed along to them and they drew up a text (Draft 9)⁸ which was the first version of the proposed statement actually distributed to the NCCB assembly at the initial gathering on the Monday morning, November 15th.

When draft 7 and draft 9 are compared it is immediately evident that the former has been emasculated and the latter reverts to something closer to the initial blandness represented by draft 3. In particular, the direct "application of Christian moral principles" to the Vietnam war is reduced to respectful recommendations (the "deep sympathy" for "those leaders on whose shoulders have been placed the heavy burden of first urging this war and now of bringing it to a close", expressed in both drafts (Draft 7, p3; Draft 9, p1) - in 7 is placed in the context of a "duty to inform our leaders of the conclusions which we set forth in this statement and to urge that they act in accord with these conclusions" ("...any) further continuation of this war is unjust and morally indefensible"; "...it has long since become evident that this war is a moral evil in which all of us have become involved, and a scandal the Christian conscience can no longer endure."): in 9 by contrast, "....with all due respect, we feel an obligation to make these urgent and specific recommendations in the name of justice and peace to our nation's leaders" (the "recommendations" conveniently dovetail with announced American government policy, and there is no indication of any Christian obligation to judge the conduct of war in accordance with traditional Christian moral principles, such as those of the 'just war' criteria). The only items of draft 7

retained in full in draft 9 were the papal and conciliar quotations (draft 7 by contrast with Drinan's - draft 4 - had made a point of oiling the material with the relevant "authoritative" writ, since the people within the ecclesiastical bureaucracy knew from experience the indispensability of such lubrication, especially for 'controversial' exposure). In draft 9 the gospel of reconciliation and forgiveness is directed to "our fellow Americans", but the special case of COs and SCOs is ignored, in spite of the fact that the USCC statement of October 21st could have been used as a quasi-authoritative precedent.

Faced with this draft 9, those who had been involved since the initial letter of challenge from the Detroit Priests' Senate now awoke from their slumbers, so that what could have issued in a conventional avoidance of controversy provided instead the spark which ignited the unique phenomenon of a Vietnam debate in the NCCB. Bordelon, the director of WJP, and Gaffney accepted the challenge presented by draft 9 and got down to some serious "politicking". Gaffney contacted Gumbleton to arrange a meeting of sympathetic bishops, Bordelon distributed texts and lobbied with and through his episcopal and Washington circle (people at the ODC and the State Department). The meeting held Tuesday in Gumbleton's room was the most maverick and decisive event until the full NCCB debate on the Thursday. Even the business of contacting "sympathetic" bishops was a risk, since the exposure of such a procedure could have been used with effect by the opposition (those who either did not want the NCCB on record with regard to the war or who wanted a

statement supporting American policy). Archbishop Medeiros had already indicated his opposition to USCC-NCCB staff participation and his belief that the bishops could prepare a statement without such support (draft 9 exemplified this procedure!). However, Vatican II had provided a modus operandi which if employed could take care of both obstacles. The ploy was to have a bishop or a group of bishops (preferably the latter) draw up some modi to a distributed, officially "received text", in which case it would be necessary to form a committee, including periti as well as bishops. No bishop could object to such a procedure and, more importantly, no American bishop would be inclined to find fault with such a recently experienced precedent for overcoming the potential imposition of a "received text" like draft 9 (thanks to Cardinals Lienart and Frings, who had exemplified perfectly at Vatican II the requisite ecclesiastical equipment for upsetting curial routine - uninhibited challenge of such stylus curiae with progressive, "democratic" notions of procedural style and content; expressed by one "ancient of days", preferably over the number allotted to man by the psalmist, and with some visible sign of venerable age and deportment.)

Gaffney and Gumbleton assembled their group of modi authors by approaching their friends among the three hundred bishops, those who were known as sympathetic to an anti-war position (hence the recurrence of those names with which we are already familiar from this historical review), and making assumptions about some others. Thus they assembled a group of nineteen, with Bishop Flanagan of Worcester, Mass. as their

spokesman (Gaffney had got to know Flanagan through his work with ecumenical affairs at USCC-NCCB). The others were Primeau and Gerety, who had been associated with Flanagan in the New England Bishops' pastoral of May 7 (the fact that Medeiros, who had put his name to this but had helped to draw up draft 9, which dropped draft 7's endorsement of the New England-Boston Province's item on "Vietnamization", was associated with draft 9 after going through the process of the May 7 pastoral is at least a harbinger of the denouement we shall soon observe); the two bishop brothers Hurley whom Gaffney knew, all three being from San Francisco, Francis Hurley now bishop of Juneau, Alaska, and Mark Hurley, bishop of Santa Rosa in northern California - Francis had served as an administrative officer at USCC when it was still NCWC, and Mark was a friend of Gaffney; O'Donnell of Madison, Wisconsin, Malone, of Youngstown, Ohio, and Buswell of Pueblo, Colorado (prominent exponents then and now of what is conventionally described as "progressive" or "liberal", whether these refer to social or ecclesiastical issues); Curtis and Donnelly from Connecticut (the former a moderate progressive bishop, the latter well known for his involvement in the mediation of labor disputes, in particular in recent years those involving the United Farmworkers); Gossman (Baltimore auxiliary) and Sullivan (Richmond auxiliary), Wycislo of Green Bay, Cosgrove (auxiliary in Cleveland) Hunthausen of Helena, Montana, and Helmsing of Kansas City (the first two moderate-progressives; Wycislo had indicated a view critical of the American policy; Helmsing would be known to Gaffney from 'ecumenical affairs', Hunthausen and Cosgrove the unknowns who,

fortunately, were in agreement with the procedure.) Dougherty, Unterkoepfler and Gumbleton made up the nineteen who accepted and endorsed Gaffney's plan of action.

Gaffney drew up a list of modi which were designed to reinstate into the proposed NCCB statement all the important points of draft 7 which had been dropped by the Committee of Three (Medeiros, Byrne, May) in draft 9. This list, 'Modi on Vietnam Resolution', was approved by the nineteen and in their name Bishop Flanagan submitted this to the Committee of Three on the Wednesday⁹. At this point Dougherty and Bordelon, as the chairman and the director of the corresponding committee and division of USCC which alone could be considered the appropriate consultative organs ('international Affairs'; WJP) and who were acting as consultants to this ad hoc committee, were joined by Gaffney for the meetings on Wednesday and Thursday evenings and he acted as secretary from that point - this was done on the initiative of Bordelon, who of course knew what Gaffney had been doing to organize the counter attack. Although Dougherty, Bordelon and Gaffney had no vote in the acceptance or rejection of any part of the statement, it is clear that their input was in the direction of the Flanagan modi¹⁰. Thus, this text (Draft 11) which they submitted to the three bishops on Wednesday went beyond the first "received text" of the Monday (draft 9), in the direction again of draft 7:

"It is our firm conviction, therefore, that its (the war) speedy ending is a moral imperative of the highest priority." (Draft 11, p1)

".....we recognize the need at this point in history to urge upon our fellow Americans a spirit of forgiveness and reconciliation.....We speak with concern for the young men who bear the heaviest burden of this war: both those who chose conscientiously to serve in the Armed Forces.....and those who in good conscience resisted the Vietnam war....For the young men who resisted this war in good conscience, we reiterate our plea of October 21, 1971, that the President grant full pardon of any convictions they may have incurred under the Selective Service Act." (Draft 11, p4-5)

From the Wednesday evening meeting of this group of six (the three bishops of the ad hoc committee, Dougherty, Bordelon, Gaffney) came the text submitted to the NCCB assembly on Thursday morning, November 18th, for debate that afternoon.¹¹ This (Draft 12) retained the main content of draft 11, eliminated some inessential material (Draft 11, p2, No. 4; p4 "Now's not the time....a divided society."), and dropped the more specific CO and SCO material of draft 11 (p5 ".....and that the thousands of young men who fled to Canada....legal impediments."; "...for young men in our day who opted in good conscience not to engage in war at all."; p5, Second paragraph.) The most important omission was this CO and SCO material, and Gaffney regretted after the final vote that he, Dougherty and Bordelon had been unnecessarily timid and too willing to accept this omission in favour of an easier acceptance of the rest of the text.

When Archbishop Medeiros presented the 'Resolution on Southeast Asia' for debate on Thursday afternoon the phrase "as amended in light of the modi received by the Special Committee of NCCB Administrative Board" covered over this whole shift from the "received text" of Monday morning (draft 9) to this very different text of Thursday (draft 12). The three pages of the Flanagan group modi (note 9) are the only documentary evidence explaining this shift. Draft 9 was demolished by these modi and its authors (Medeiros, Byrne and May) accepted the weight of argument favouring points made in the modi.

For example - the modus on page one, paragraph two exposes the HL tactic of raising the question (in this case "proportionality") as a substitute for making a conclusion from the moral principle, and the same is true of the following modus on page one, paragraph three; the modus on page one, paragraph five touches a sensitive episcopal nerve which would have been easily exposed in full debate - "We reject the implication that moral questions such as this are best left to those with competence in military strategy." These examples underline an important characteristic of the capacity and potentiality of NCCB intervention in social and political controversy which on a more universal stage was expressed at Vatican II in GS - if an issue can legitimately be presented as a moral issue, no self-respecting bishop can shy away from addressing himself, singularly or in concern with his fellows, to that issue. Thus, the tactic of those (whether bishops, lay Catholics, or members of the general public) who wish that the bishops do 'not' address themselves)

publicly to such issues must be to argue that these are
 ..
 military matters, or political, or economic "realities", which
 must be accepted as not falling within the realm of competence
 entrusted to the guardians and spokesmen of religious matters.
 The alternative is likewise clear - "...let not our silence
 be based on a lack of competence in the area of military
 strategy, which is hardly a prerequisite for coming to a
moral judgment about a moral problem." (Italics mine) The
 fact that the American Catholic hierarchy has traditionally
 addressed itself to other issues, primarily the continued
 existence of Catholic schools and the omnipresent questions of
 divorce, birth control, abortion, pornography, etc. is due in
 great part to the conventional wisdom (evident among the
 hierarchy and expected by the politicians and much of the
 general public), according to which these issues are considered
 to be the legitimate domain of hierarchical pronunciamentos,
 whereas socio-economic-political issues, even when these are
 considered by the bishops, either remain below the surface of
 the Catholic and public consciousness (e.g. the 1919 'Bishops'
 Program of Social Reconstruction'), or fail to receive anything
 like the attention given by politicians and the public to the
 school/sex statements.

However, the Thursday afternoon debate of November 18, 1971
 on draft 12 of the 'Resolution on Southeast Asia' broke with
 tradition and must be considered the central consideration of
 this section, and the most significant precedent for the future
 role of the American Catholic hierarchy in socio-political

debate. In the first place, it was the one and only time when the NCCB, in plenary session, debated the issue of the Vietnam war. Indeed, Monsignor George Higgins told Ed Gaffney that this was the first real debate he had ever witnessed in his twenty-five years' experience of the American bishops' meetings; the first time he had experienced the phenomenon of the bishops dividing into two opposite directions on an issue.

In the one direction was the opinion articulated by Cardinal Carberry of St. Louis, Archbishop Hannan, and Abbot McCaffrey of Belmont, North Carolina, who were opposed to the Resolution: in the other, the members of the modi group of nineteen, joined by others in the course of the debate, in favour of the resolution¹². The speeches of McCaffrey and Gumbleton were the most obvious evidence of the division between the two sides. McCaffrey invoked the doctrine of presidential privilege of information and expertise ("The President has the last say in foreign affairs, and we are undercutting the President. We - the body of bishops - reflect the American inadequacy in reflecting on international affairs. I suggest that we get experts to brief us. Moral principles don't exist in a vacuum but in reality."), in line with the tactic noted earlier - episcopal incompetence in dealing with the issue¹³. He exemplified the vulnerability of such a view to the reactions of episcopal lèse-majesté - the touch of superciliousness in his remarks was not likely to endear himself to his older episcopal colleagues, even those who would agree with his opinion (the hierarchy being especially conscious of the gradations of rank and age - a claim to superior knowledge might have been better digested if it came from a thirty-eight

year old cardinal, hardly if its proponent was an upstart abbot nullius!). Gumbleton bombarded the bishops with statistics of death and destruction, but whatever their impact he too suffered under a disability - he was only an auxiliary-bishop and too well known as an anti-war "radical" (what used to be known as a "peacenik" - an example of the popular acceptance of the military definition of reality!) Most of the other "interventions" conform to the known views of their proponents, with the possible exception of Begin of Oakland, who showed that even a bishop who had gone on record in some way critical of American policy could yet be reluctant to go beyond the minimum expression of dissent, and seek to procrastinate.

The most important speech of the debate was that of Cardinal Sheehan. As a respected elder statesman, in spite of a poor speaking voice (too high-pitched and without resonance), he was heard in total silence as he made an emotional speech which expressed the feelings of one for whom the issue of the war had become a source of personal anguish. Among other things he made the following declaration:

"The war has become an evident evil that threatens to destroy all respect for authority and all moral values in a whole generation of young people. Its speedy ending brooks no needless delay."

The effect of Sheehan's speech was heightened by the fact of its unique quality. With few exceptions (Cardinals Cooke of New York and Carberry of St. Louis), as noted by George Higgins,

the bishops of the big inner-city dioceses, from which came the bulk of the blacks, chicanos, and poor whites, who made up the vast majority of those who actually had to fight in the war, these bishops remained silent, and Sheehan was the only speaker of top rank (the only Archbishop, not to mention the only Cardinal-Archbishop of a major See) who spoke to the point of the actual human experience of the war. Gaffney believes that this speech was decisive in the final analysis of the final vote, and turned the whole course of the debate in a direction away from the impersonal debate of government policies and disputed military actions to a personal "conscientization" facing up to the events in Vietnam as they registered in the personal, moral experience of the American people. In effect, Sheehan had expressed the legitimacy of presenting the Vietnam war as a moral issue, much more than a question of government policy and actions, which demanded a response from those who claimed to speak with authority on the moral issue. While the speech of Sheehan might have had no auricular quality, its resonance reached the more important area of moral conscience and there found its mark.

Action on the resolution was postponed until Friday and the group of six (Medeiros, Byrne, May, Dougherty, Bordelon, Gaffney) met from 8 p.m. until 12 a.m. Thursday evening to revise the Resolution (now Draft 12) in light of the debate and the subsequent modi. The Flanagan group had been there first with their modi to Draft 9, and with the two "consultants" (Dougherty and Bordelon) and the secretary (Gaffney) members of this cabal there was no need for them to do much more than sit back while these three endeavoured to preserve as much as possible of

Draft 12 against any efforts of the Committee of Three to resurrect Draft 9. Gaffney had decided to try and conciliate Archbishop Hannan because Hannan, unlike McCaffrey, carried weight in the Conference and, as the debate at Vatican II on GS had demonstrated, he articulated conventional Catholic support of "patriotic" themes (the U.S. is not the aggressor, concern with the POWs, only military objectives were the target of American bombing). He discovered that Hannan's main objection was to the ceasefire proposals (Draft 12, p1, paragraph 4 - "We are mindful of the serious difficulties - as part of the process of withdrawal.") Gaffney considered these were expendable, and to bolster the section on conscientious objectors he added a reference to the October 21st statement, and the condition calculated to placate those who could not stomach the granting of complete amnesty - "....with the understanding that sincere conscientious objectors should remain open in principle to some form of service to the community."

The criteria which guided the Committee of Three and their periti in revising draft 12 were explained by Archbishop Medeiros at the Friday morning assembly¹⁴. The most important was number two - "The resolution should include some clear moral statement on the war based on traditional moral principles, but should refrain from political or military judgments, especially if they are problematic or unilateral". In terms of the debate of Thursday afternoon and the personalities involved, this was in effect an attempt to respond to the most significant and influential speech (Sheehan's) while conciliating Hannan and

McCaffrey and Carberry (who supported the other two who obviously knew more than Carberry about the subject matter - much as Spellman and Sheehan, the latter only until he found out that he had been precipitate, had put their names to Hannan's petition at the closing stages of Vatican II). The result is the central phrase - "It is our firm conviction, therefore, that further prosecution of the war cannot be justified by traditional moral norms."¹⁵ The opposition of the "patriots" had succeeded in making sure that the 'just war' criteria were not applied directly - hence the judgment on proportionality, and on the legitimacy of the military actions employed in Vietnam which had been clearly expressed in Draft 7, was gone (in deference to "....should refrain from political or military judgments, especially if they are problematic or unilateral"); and in its place the one criterion of proportionality (without the actual word being used) is made to cover both the criteria of the 'just war' principles, leading to an obfuscation which avoids answering the questions posed in HL (whereas the Boston bishops' pastoral of the preceding May had criticized the bombing and the prejudice against Vietnamese lives in favour of American). However, this central phrase, even if it remains too general and does not clearly express the "traditional moral norms" (i.e. the 'just war' principles), still remains the clearest statement on record of the NCCB judgment against the moral legitimacy of the Vietnam war even though, as we shall see, its acceptance in accord with proper voting procedure was superceded.

Gaffney contacted Hannan Friday morning and read over the

phone the revised text (Draft 13), to which Hannan offered no objections. When this final version was put up for the vote at the concluding Friday morning assembly it was approved by 158 votes in favour to 36 against the Resolution (by now, in accordance with the customary practice, many bishops had left Washington for Rome, but even if all of these had voted negative the Resolution would have passed; and in any case the actual vote must stand as the clearest expression of the American Catholic hierarchy position on the issue of the war.) The actual vote came as a surprise to Gaffney, who had anticipated a much larger negative vote. This also reflected what happened at Vatican II - the preponderance of speeches opposed to some controversial proposals (e.g. liturgical reform, religious liberty) was not reflected in the votes, which approved of the proposals in overwhelming numbers.

There followed a scene bizarre even in the annals of NCCB meetings. Some time later, when the assembly had moved on to other business, Cardinal Carberry interrupted, out of order, to question the wording of the central sentence of the Resolution - "It is our firm conviction...." Medeiros was called upon to answer Carberry and, again quite out of order, said his notes indicated that the Committee of Three had indeed accepted the phrase ".....the speedy ending of this war is a moral imperative of the highest priority" and that this should be the actual wording. No further discussion took place, no other vote was taken, so that, after a Resolution had been approved, its wording was changed through the intervention of one of the members, on the approval of one member of the official Committee of

Three. To emphasize the extraordinary character of the action, a further addition was made by Medeiros in response to another solitary intervention requesting a reference to the PoWs, again without any further discussion and without any vote being taken to discover if the assembly, which had just voted in favour of a Resolution (Draft 13), now approved of the changes made in what they had originally approved. Instead the explanation of Medeiros was accepted and a pro forma voice vote unanimously accepted the final text¹⁶. Underlying the bizarre event, then and later, was the suspicion of Carberry, later taken up by Cardinal Krol, after the assembly had adjourned, that there had been some tampering with the Resolution on the part of the periti, specifically Gaffney. Krol told Bernardin to investigate and the result is the December 3 1971 'Memo, Bernardin to Bordelon, Re: NCCB Resolution on Southeast Asia' (Note 10, Appendix H), which details the event and documents the dismissal of the charge.

Since all along my principal source of information is Gaffney, it is apparent that I accept Gaffney's dismissal of the charge of tampering with the wording, thus hoodwinking the Committee of Three, the same charge dismissed by Bordelon's memo, in particular p2. I have based this account on the recollections of Gaffney, and included are the very honest descriptions of his attempts to have as strongly critical a resolution as possible passed by the Bishops' Conference. I see no reason to believe that he deliberately tampered with the central sentence, and the existence of Bordelon's memo,

distributed as it was to all concerned, with no further objection taken to this account of events, is in my opinion testimony enough of Gaffney's veracity.

Of course, the result of the change was to further weaken the force of the criticism - whatever application of "traditional moral norms" there was in the approved text (Draft 13) was further weakened by the even more general character of the amended version (Draft 14), by a return to the wording of Draft 12 - "...its speedy ending is a moral imperative of the highest priority." This is documented in the story which appeared in The Washington Post¹⁷ from The Post's religious affairs' specialist, William R. MacKaye. The headline of MacKaye's story - 'Bishops call Viet War Immoral' - reflects Draft 13 and Bordelon's briefing of MacKaye, whereas the report quotes Draft 14 which could be interpreted otherwise (the same confusion is evident in the story appearing in The New York Times¹⁸, which also records the differing interpretations of Hannan and Gumbleton).

In January, 1972, Bordelon signed his USCC death warrant when his article, 'The Bishops and Just War' appeared in America (January 8, 1972, pp.17-19). This interpreted the 'Resolution' in the sense of Draft 7, using the very words of the original material which had been dropped on the way through the NCCB machinery. Cardinal Krol, now president of NCCB, made his displeasure known to Bernardin, the General Secretary, and subsequent events carried this to the logical conclusion. Bordelon had resigned from his post by the end of 1972, and

Gaffney had already left the Conference. The final example of Bordelon's powerlessness came in October, 1972, exactly a year after the statement on conscientious objectors, when he was unable to put out a statement to back up the October '71 'Declaration', while President Nixon and Vice-President Agnew were denying the morality of amnesty for the COs and SCOs who had avoided the Draft.

The last word in 1971, immediately after the November statement, belonged to Bishop Albert L. Fletcher of Little Rock, Arkansas, who was reported by NC (12/6/71) as opposed to the Bishops' Resolution, declaring that the United States was "defending South Vietnam from unjust aggression", and that he was among a "large minority" of bishops who opposed the resolution.

CHAPTER V.

1972

The same pattern of response was maintained throughout 1972. On the one hand, the familiar names of those bishops critical of American war policies: on the other, continued NCCB acquiescence and "diplomatic" ambiguity, with an occasional "patriotic" reaction from a familiar voice. In February Archbishop Robert J. Dwyer of Portland, Oregon, a champion of conservative causes in the Church, as a frequent columnist on The National Catholic Register and Our Sunday Visitor, in a letter to his archdiocese questioned those who called the Vietnam war "unjust and immoral" and who were against war in general (in effect he disagreed with the whole tenor of the November 'Resolution').¹ The April '72 NCCB meeting was notable for exemplification of the contrast already described - concern with human life before birth (in this case, as a response to the 'Presidential Commission on Population Growth and the American Future' whose Report of March, 1972 had recommended abortion²) and silence regarding those human victims of the American bombing in South-East Asia³.

When the meeting was over a further escalation of the war, after the Paris peace talks had broken down, prompted a statement from Bernardin, general secretary of NCCB and USCC, under authorization from Cardinal Krol, NCCB and USCC president, with no input from the WJP staff (a further indication of the wide gap, now manifest between the parties⁴). This was intended "to repeat and reemphasize" the November '71 Resolution that "the speedy

ending of this war is a moral imperative of the highest priority".

The tone of this statement is set by the initial analysis:

".....the renewed North Vietnamese aggression, followed by the stepped-up U.S. bombing response, appears to mark a new - although, one hopes, temporary - stage in the war."

This is given additional support:

"As at many stages of this tragic conflict, so now it is difficult to portion out responsibility for the latest developments (which does not prevent the following) although, in fairness, one must say that the aggressive actions of the North Vietnamese government initiated this new round of fighting."

The evident bias is hardly assuaged by the addition:

"The priority of the moment, however, is not to assign blame but to find ways of ending the violence. One trusts that our government will take the lead in this effort."

Especially if this is compared with the Boston Bishops' pastoral:

"Our primary concern in the matter at hand, as Bishops, is for the consequences of American policy in Vietnam."

The recommendations of the Krol-Bernardin statement correspond to the analysis:

"....withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops from the South coupled with cessation of the bombing of the North and prompt resumption in good faith of the Paris peace talks..."

These were not calculated to upset the administration⁵. This was underscored at this time, and later in 1973 by the increasing rapprochement between President Nixon and Cardinal Krol (the president making^a speech in favour of parochial schools at the 'National Catholic Educational Association' annual assembly in Philadelphia, while the cardinal joined the group of churchmen invited to take Sunday morning services at the White House.)

The advent of Cardinal Krol to the presidency of NCCB-USCC enthroned the triumph of acquiescence and "diplomatic" ambiguity at the pinnacle of the Catholic Church's institutional expression in the nation's capital. The annual assemblies, which had been plenary sessions twice a year - November in Washington, April in another American city - now reverted to one annual assembly in November in Washington and regional meetings of bishops in April. The acquiescence and the ambiguity continued because of the precedence given to the traditional concerns, like parochial schools and abortion, over the issue of the war. The presence of the war to the American consciousness demanded a minimum of critical comment strained through the NCCB-USCC sieve. This was now firmly in the hands of the principal representative of American Catholic "conservative diplomacy". He was chiefly interested in the furtherance of internal politics - the institutional prerogatives of the Church, as expressed in its influence through the parochial schools and on family life - and, in the general political forum, only as this impinged on the latter. Hence the lack of concern with American policy in Vietnam.

However, the changing ecclesiastical and general political

climate (national and international) rendered this scenario itself ambiguous. NCCB-USCC never could be an American 'Vatican' and its president was now one who had himself acknowledged the limited extent of the institution⁶. While Vatican II had promoted episcopal collegiality, it had also weakened the possibilities of national episcopal centralization, by attenuating the juridical character of papal monarchy (the pre-eminence of Cardinal Spellman, like the earlier short-lived pre-eminence of Cardinal O'Connell, had been founded on close links with the papacy). The unfolding events in Vietnam gave impetus and added numbers to the group of bishops continually outspoken against American policies - whatever the preference of Cardinal Krol for diplomatic silence on the American government's Vietnam war policy, in favour of attempts to influence the government on issues considered more appropriate to the Church.

In response to President Nixon's address to the American people on May 8, in which he described further measures to intensify the pressure on North Vietnam, with the mining of North Vietnamese posts and a step-up in the bombing of the north, a statement was issued by the 'American Catholic Coalition for Peace' which protested the escalation and repudiated the "immoral military measures", questioned the president's invocation of "national security and honor" and declared that these were not absolutes, that there were compelling values to be taken into account - reverence for life; the fact that other international issues were prejudiced; self-determination of all nations precludes the linking of Vietnamese politics to American prestige. This statement was signed by Bishops Buswell, Donnelly, Evans (auxiliary in Denver), Gumbleton, Schoenherr⁷ (another

Detroit auxiliary), and Sullivan⁸.

..

At the same time (May 10, 1972) Bishop Unterkoepfler addressed a pastoral letter to his diocese, 'Pentecost and Peace', in which he declared that the "war in South East Asia has become morally intolerable.." ⁹ Recalling his previous call the preceding May for prayer for peace there, he added:

"If we continue on the course as a nation to dissipate our resources and energy at home for destructive purposes abroad, how will it be possible for us as Americans to rise to any new cause for good which will require the total dedication of a free people who understand the goals of peaceful living among nations?"

Bishop Edward W. O'Rourke of Peoria, Illinois described the mining of Hanoi-Haiphong as "dangerous and immoral brinkmanship"¹⁰. Bishop Begin of Oakland called for a "unilateral ceasefire" by the U.S., and in one comment evidenced progression from his speech of November '71 to a definite endorsement of a 'just war' critique:

"When the time comes that there is no proportion between the good to be hoped for - in this case, the liberation of the South Vietnamese - and the magnitude of the harm that is done, it is indeed time to call a halt, to stop. That time is now. That time is overdue."¹¹

Only one bishop at this time was recorded as supporting publicly the policy of the administration and attacking "Catholic

pacifists" - Bishop Charles McLaughlin of St. Petersburg, Florida.¹²

In July, Cardinal Dearden and his two auxiliaries (Gumbleton and Schoenherr) urged Catholics to demand an immediate end to the war in Vietnam:

"....an immediate end to the conflict would be more honorable than the continued destruction."¹³

By now Dearden was no longer president of NCCB-USCC where he had played the role of conciliator of the different personalities and philosophies represented among the three-hundred U.S. bishops. He was therefore in a better position to be seen as supportive of the views of his more outspoken auxiliaries (the contrast between Dearden's and Krol's auxiliaries - the latter would not have dared to be outspoken on any issue without Krol's imprimatur - is testimony to the difference between the two cardinals).

The most controversial statement made in the summer of '72 came from Bishop Mugavero of Brooklyn, in a pastoral read at all Masses in the diocese on July 2nd, in which he called for an end to the war and criticized the escalation of the bombing in North Vietnam as "...an extension of an action which long ago exceeded the limits of morality." He declared that the attitude, "my country right or wrong", was not morally acceptable to Christians, talked about "the misadventure in Indo-China" in which millions have suffered, backed up the CO and SCO position of the October '71 'Declaration', and commended his words to the people "...as

you reflect on the critical problems of the world in the light of the Gospel of Christ."¹⁴ This pastoral was reported in Catholic papers all over the country, and provoked a volume of criticism in the New York area and elsewhere which indicated the novel character of such a statement from such a quarter (the contrast with Cardinal Cooke's continued acceptance of the administration policy was evident.)

At the level of NCCB-USCC response, two events of 1972 are significant. The first took place in January - the 'Ecumenical Witness' Conference' on the War, in Kansas City, January 13-16. This had been organized by the National Council of Churches (NCC). The intention was to bring together as wide a spectrum of Church anti-war opinions as possible. The USCC had been invited to participate and the Committee for International Affairs at its meeting September 11-12, 1971 had recommended accepting the invitation, contributing financial support and active Conference participation. This recommendation and the NCC invitation were turned down at the USCC Administrative Board meeting, September 14-15, 1971. A letter from Bernardin to Dr. Robert S. Bilheimer, Executive Director of the NCC, dated September 23rd, gives the Administrative Board's reasoning, and is an important piece of evidence in its own right of the situation at the top of USCC:

In reviewing the invitation, the Administrative Board took note of the ongoing and rapid withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam. In light of this, the Board felt it would be more appropriate for USCC, looking to the future

rather than the all too tragic past, to concentrate its limited resources immediately on ways and means of helping the distressed people of Vietnam to rehabilitate their devastated country. The fact that the United States bears such a heavy and disproportionate burden of moral responsibility for the widespread destruction which the war has brought to Vietnam and for the incredible suffering of the Vietnamese people makes it all the more imperative, in the opinion of the USCC Board, that the churches in this country take the lead in organizing the fullest possible measure of support, both public and private, for the all-important work of reconstruction."

This articulated a familiar attitude - haste to elude the task of moral judgment, in favour of a CRS-type operation of relief and rehabilitation in the wake of destruction:

"....The Board is totally opposed to any further continuation of the war....Indeed, the war has already shaken our political and social structures almost beyond the breaking point and has made it difficult if not impossible for the United States to face up realistically to its own staggering economic, social and political problems, which threaten to tear our nation apart if they are left unsolved much longer."

Such "total opposition" has not been apparent throughout this review, and the whole burden of the letter is in the direction of glossing over the past by the subterfuge of looking forward to a more hopeful future:

"The USCC Administrative Board earnestly hopes and prays, however, that by the time the conference is convened the war in Vietnam will, at long last, be approaching a merciful end. If this is the case - and there is reason to think it may - it would then seem most desirable, and hopefully feasible, for the agenda of the NCC conference to be revised in such a way as to give adequate attention to ways of helping Vietnam to repair the ravages of one of the most tragic wars in history and to begin to heal the breach between the conflicting parties and thus establish a just and lasting peace in Southeast Asia."

Events did not oblige. The hoped-for "merciful end" (at least for Americans) came almost exactly one year after the Kansas City Conference.

The Conference, which took place two months after the November '71 Resolution, attracted over five-hundred participants, and despite the USCC Administrative Board's rejection of the invitation to participate the two-hundred Catholics present constituted the largest delegation from any one church. The bishops who attended were almost all from the 'Modi' group - Flanagan, Mark Hurley, Durick, Wycislo, Unterkoepfler, Helmsing, Davidson of Salina-Kansas, Murphy (another Baltimore auxiliary), Evans, Gumbleton, Dougherty. A non-American bishop attended, on invitation from the NCC, who figures prominently in the following section - Helder Camara of Recife, Brazil. The most notable American Protestant churchman who was a critic of the American war was present - Eugene Carson Blake, Secretary-General of the World Council of Churches. Blake

Blake was not invited to officiate at the Sunday White House services during these years in spite of his unique prestige as a churchman.

There was no attempt to disguise the direction of the conference - "U.S. participation in the Indochina war is immoral and must be totally stopped."¹⁵ A "Roman Catholic caucus" was formed which brought together those involved with the Catholic attempts to achieve "institutional" ecclesiastical opposition to the war (as distinct from those like the Berrigans who were taking a more individualistic approach). Among this group were Jim Jennings of WJP, Peter Henriot, SJ. of the 'Center for Concern', Gene Boyle of the NFPC (whose annual assembly in 1972, March 12-16, in Denver had as its topic "Ministry for Justice and Peace"), Harry Bury (the organizer of the 'International Assembly of Christians in Solidarity with the Peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia', which met in Paris, 1970 and 1971, and in Canada, 1972¹⁶ and 1973). They decided to try and influence the NCCB April '72 meeting to condemn the U.S. bombing and continued American involvement as "immoral and unjustified" (as we have seen, without success); to move ahead on the whole question of the military chaplaincy (they had been informed that Cardinal Cooke had sent the October 21, 1971 Declaration on COs and SCOs, the November '71 Resolution and a report of the debate to all the chaplains), by promoting a civilian chaplaincy to military personnel, and urging war protest by the military chaplains¹⁷; to petition Cardinal Krol as president of the NCCB on the question of Church investments in war-related industries¹⁸; to gain the support of Catholic lawyers for amnesty efforts on behalf of war resisters..

As well as the important ecumenical dimension of this Conference, therefore, the Kansas City meeting helped to promote important elements of the 'Justice and Peace' agenda within the American Catholic Church which is presently being addressed by increasing numbers of Catholic institutions, and its co-ordination with that of the NCC. Efforts to change the Selective Service System, and to influence the investment policies and responsibilities of religious institutions are the present results of this coordination.

The second significant event at USCC-NCCB in 1972 was the attempt by the Committee for International Affairs to issue a statement on the war which concluded, in the light of further American escalation, that "American participation in this war is morally indefensible".¹⁹ A meeting of the Committee, June 19-20, 1972 (eight of the fifteen members present) passed the proposed statement 7-1. In accordance with USCC procedure, the statement was mailed to all members of the Committee for their approval. In the light of the '71 saga the reply from (now) Cardinal Medeiros in a letter from his secretary, dated July 1, 1972, offers corroboration of his position at that time. The secretary noted that "...only part of statement he can approve", namely the first two paragraphs, after which Medeiros would conclude:

"We can no longer escape the conclusion that every effort and sacrifice must be made by all parties concerned to bring about an immediate and just peace to South East Asia."

Thus, there would be no hint of condemnation of American actions and continued participation, no deploring of the escalation. The

reply of Unterkoepfler, in a letter dated July 5, 1972, contrasts markedly with that of Medeiros - he wanted the proposed statement to be given "careful reworking":

"I think reasons should be given why we deplore the recent escalation of the war in Indochina. Secondly, reasons should be given why we also deplore the actions initiated by our government which contributes to the escalation.... Paragraph Three could be strengthened by some factual material - the number of air strikes per week - the anti-person weapons.... I believe the term "moral outrage" is rather vague. Perhaps another word would communicate the same idea to the general public."

The minutes of the June 19-20th meeting also show concern with the issue of corroborating evidence, which will now become an important element in the concluding stages of this present review, and a pointer to the future direction of all ecclesiastical interventions in this kind of political arena. It is this issue which will determine the character of the interventions - are they intended to face political situations honestly and factually, or are they merely ways of avoiding such a responsibility? The present review suggests the latter.

".... bringing together statements about war in Indochina and relating these statements to already accepted guidelines which allow one to make moral and political judgments in this area. Documentation is to support positions reached previously."

A working draft (July 31, 1972), 'The War in Indochina : Some Guidelines and Data' was prepared with this in mind.²⁰

Meanwhile, the final revised statement (July 7, 1972) was dispatched and the voting went as follows: of the eight bishops on the Committee, seven voted in favour (Dougherty, Dozier, Gerety, Grutka, Gumbleton, Unterkoepfler and Wycislo), only one against (Medeiros); of the others, five were in favour, two against.

When the statement was sent to the Administrative Board of the USCC, five bishops approved (Dougherty, Head, John B. McDowell, May, Mugavero), seven disapproved (Carberry, Cooke, Krol, Medeiros, John J. Maguire, Gallagher, John J. Ward), and thirteen had not replied by August 8th (Dearden, Byrne, McDonagh of Louisville, Manning of Los Angeles, Bernardin, Curtis, Leonard of Pittsburgh, McCarthy of Phoenix, McManus, William A. O'Connor, Perry, Spence, Wycislo). Thereafter, the whole thing was shelved.

At the November 1972 NCCB meeting in Washington a 'Resolution on Imperatives of Peace' was passed by a vote of 186 to 4 as the concluding Vietnam negotiations were going on. This re-echoed the November '71 Resolution, and as the final NCCB statement encapsulates those aspects of their response which we have already observed. Gumbleton did succeed in having a reference to the bombing inserted. Since only one side was engaged in that activity, it could be interpreted, as Gumbleton did, as a better statement than the '71 Resolution, because it was directed to a specific

American policy²¹. However, such a small advance, after the well-publicized bombing of civilian targets in the preceding months, was an even more obvious sign of the NCCB acquiescence and its almost unlimited extent. In any case the bulk of the statement manifested the tendency expressed in Bernardin's letter:

"It is vitally important that Americans now turn their attention to the task of reconciliation not only in Southeast Asia but also in our country.....We must be unstinting in the expending of our moral, material and technical resources and skills on behalf of the people of Southeast Asia who have suffered so grievously."

No attempt was made to examine the war according to traditional 'just war' criteria:

"The experience of recent years amply illustrates the fact that grave ethical and moral questions regarding warfare remain unresolved."

By attempting to placate McCaffrey and Cardinal O'Boyle, who demanded that the right of self-defence be included in the resolution, the outlawing of war as the "utterly treacherous trap" was itself weakened:

"While recognizing the right of self-defense, we are nevertheless convinced that war is not an apt means of settling disputes."

In all this, the Resolution demonstrated conclusively the impossibility for the NCCB to face up to the reality of what America

had been doing and was continuing to do in South-East Asia. Any responsibility on the part of NCCB to stand in criticism on the actions of the American government from the point of view of Christian moral norms was ignored.

Again, as before, the voices of episcopal criticism were heard far away from the confining framework of the NCCE assembly, and came to a crescendo around the turn of the year with the stepped-up bombing of North Vietnam which stamped Christmas, 1972, as the most egregious example of American perfidy and callousness in the whole course of the war. Hitherto silent voices joined the chorus of protest - Bishop Paul F. Anderson of Duluth, Minnesota called the resumption of bombing "an immoral means to a just and lasting peace"²². Bishop Clarence E. Elwell of Columbus, Ohio:

"Whatever faults other people may have, it is not right for the American people to sanction violence in the pursuit of peace, and it is important for our elected leaders to know that they cannot expect us to support those things which in conscience we know to be wrong."²³

Familiar voices condemned the immorality of the bombing - Bishop Cletus O'Donnell called it "insane" ("The most immoral aspect of the war has been the suffering and death inflicted on countless thousands of non-combatants."); the "fourteen bishops of the Boston province expressed "dismay and horror" over the renewed bombing.²⁴

On December 29, 1972 a telegram was received at WJP office from the 'Commission Francaise Justice et Paix':

"This testifies to fact that French Catholic opinion is appalled at the outrageous bombardment of Vietnam. Alarmed at the silence of the Church in the United States. We are expecting Justice and Peace of your country to take a courageous position." (12.02 p.m.)

This had been sent to Bishop Dougherty as chairman of WJP and a reply went back under his name:

"Acknowledge receipt of your telegram about bombing of Vietnam. Am forwarding by air mail recent position taken by Cardinal Krol President of National Conference of Catholic Bishops. Assume prompt committee review about further action." (2.40 p.m.)

This referred to a statement of December 22, 1972 of Krol (written by James Rausch - the recently appointed General-Secretary in succession to Bernardin - and Russel Shaw of the USCC communications department, with no reference to WJP) which did not go beyond the conventional general pleading to both sides. As for the "prompt committee review" - we have already seen the fate of the June, 1972 proposed statement. Whatever progress was being made within the Committee for International Affairs (now 'Social Development and World Peace' - Dougherty continuing as chairman) in the matter of coming to terms with the facts of the situation in South-East Asia and the responsibility of the bishops to respond, remained within the Committee.

In any case, the hour of American deliverance was at hand, and the final word was left to Cardinal Krol, as on January 24, 1973

he welcomed the news of the Paris peace agreement which ended this stage of the American war in Vietnam:

".....a tribute to the courageous and persevering leadership which has achieved this result."

S E C T I O N F O U R

SECTION IV

LATIN AMERICA

INTRODUCTION.

Latin America is today the archetypal theatre for the contemporary drama of 'Church and Society' - 'Church and politics', as it relates to the situation of the Roman Catholic Church. The reasons for this lie in the history of the countries below the Rio Grande since Spanish and Portuguese colonialism. Another factor is the changing relationship between the Church and society in different countries in consequence of a political situation which is systemically unstable. While, within the Church, the effects of the Second Vatican Council have directly impinged on the cultural and social situation of the countries of Latin America much more significantly than to this date is true of Europe or North America due in part to the historical traditions of the Latin American Church, and, most significantly, because of the political involvement of the Church with society since the conquistadores¹.

The concerns expressed in GS, MM, PP; the formation of the 'Pontifical Commission Justitia et Pax'; the '71 Synod; provide the terms of the Catholic response to the realities of contemporary Latin America. Anyone who has come into contact with this situation, even if only vicariously through the ecclesiastical experiences and through listening to some of those directly involved in Latin America realizes the immediate

relevance of the confrontation between the spirit of Vatican II, as expressed above all in GS, and the situation in Latin America. Here, directly, we find the Catholic Church face-a-face the realities of the Third World. The historical process is being reversed - the process which saw the Church as an essentially European phenomenon being carried to other regions of the world, and established in diverse civilizations while retaining its European forms. Now that the identification of unity and uniformity has been abandoned officially, and the local Churches have begun to set about the task of making the Church no longer a transplant but a native expression of the Christian koinonia, it is the turn of the non-European churches to preach the Gospel, and in particular the Gospel of justice and peace, to the churches of the first world - Europe and North America - 'per modum exempli'².

This is made urgent because of the situation within the Church and in the world as a whole. It is becoming increasingly impossible to relate to any of the branches of the Christian Church today, and to fail to be challenged by the concerns of 'justice and peace'. In this regard, the Christian Church is in advance of the national society, and this is precisely because its experience is much more international than the national society. When Machiavelli observed that the universalism of the Christian Church runs counter to nationalism, he was underlining a phenomenon whose relevance continues to operate, and today it must increasingly lead to a refusal by the Church to be confined by the interests and concerns of Europe and North America. Hence, the language of Church pronouncements, whether of the Catholic Church or the WCC, which

puts the priority on questions of justice - the need to change the present world economic order, the impossibility of peace in a world marked by inequity and injustice³. Hence also the unreality when blinkers are offered to contemplate the problems of affluence and the difficulties of capitalist speculation!

It is this Catholic experience which finds its most effective articulation in the context of Latin America, because the situation there, unlike Africa or Asia, is dominated by the very presence of the Church amidst the realities of the Third World. And this experience impinges upon the Catholic Church in the United States in two ways - the problems of Latin America, economically and politically, are bound up with its relationships to the colossus north of the Rio Grande; the Catholic Church in the countries of Latin America increasingly demands a response from the Catholic Church in the United States, as a responsibility deriving from its position within American society and as a fellow member of the Catholic koinonia.

This section, therefore, in which we shall consider the response of the American bishops to the present situation of Latin America, will give us an opportunity to consider directly the first component part of the tandem which today describes the relationship between church and society, church and politics. This will lead us into a perspective of the total panorama which now dominates international relations - the third world of Africa, Asia and Latin America, in relation to the worlds of Europe, Russia, North America. It is implicit in the whole thesis that just as

'justice and peace' go together in the description of 'international relations' from a Christian perspective so too the concerns of 'peace' in South-East Asia involve questions of 'justice', while the concerns of 'justice' in Latin America have implications for 'peace' there, throughout the hemisphere, and indeed throughout the world. The division of this thesis into sections must not be taken as any indication that these questions can be treated separately - it is not the least vital insight of the ecclesial language that it recognizes the inseparability of economics and politics, 'justice' and 'peace'.

This section will have two chapters - the first sketching the foundation of the 'Latin American Bishops' Conference' (the counterpart of NCCB-USCC) and the initial 'Inter American' contacts pre-Medellin; the second, after establishing the central experience of Medellin, will consider the initial response of the American bishops to the post-Medellin Latin American Church. Two presuppositions are operative here - one general, one particular. The general is a value judgment I make - the present situation of the Catholic Church in the countries of Latin America is the most significant Catholic experience for our purposes ('justice and peace' - 'international relations'). It is impossible to deal with 'the American Bishops and Foreign Policy' without considering Latin America. The particular presupposition is that the attitude adopted by the American bishops to the evolving situation in Latin America must be paradigmatic, since it provides the classic example of 'justice and peace' - the Catholic Church directly involved in the 'Third

World' (the Latin American Church as part of that world, the United States Church as part of that world's problem). It would be cause for great confusion if the results of this Section's investigation did not correspond and add significant depth to the course of events described in the previous Section. Such confusion is not anticipated!

CHAPTER I

BEFORE MEDRELLIN, 1968

The establishment of the Latin American Bishops' Conference (CELAM - 'Consejo Episcopal Latino Americano') came as a result of the first General Assembly of the Latin American Bishops, on the occasion of the thirty-sixth International Eucharistic Congress at Rio de Janeiro (July 25-August 5, 1955). The only previous plenary assembly of the Latin American bishops had been held in 1899 (a "sign of the times" of papal absolutism and episcopal individualism); the next General Assembly was to be Medellin, 1968 (the most important date in the history of the Latin American Church). CELAM was to be based on an annual meeting of delegates from each of the episcopal conferences of the countries of Latin America, from the Rio Grande to Tierra del Fuego. Pius XII gave his approval to the Statutes of the new organization on November 2, 1955. In these CELAM was described thus:

"...es el organo de contacto y colaboración de las Conferencias Episcopales de América Latina."

(Estatutos, I, 1)

Its functions were:

- "1) Estudiar los problemas de interés común para la Iglesia de América Latina con vistas a buscarle la solución adecuada.
- 2) Procurar una oportuna coordinación de las actividades católicas en el continente, con el fin de asegurar su mayor eficacia.

- 3) Promover y sostener iniciativas y obras que, directa o indirectamente, presenten un interés común.
- 4) Ocuparse de la preparación de Conferencias del Episcopado Latinoamericano, cuando la Santa Sede decida convocarles...."

Principally responsible for the initiation of CELAM were Bishop Manuel Larrain of Talca, Chile and Helder Camara, at that time auxiliary-bishop in Rio de Janeiro. Larrain was a vice-president from the beginning, later president of CELAM, 1964-1966; while Camara became his fellow vice-president in 1959. During the crucial period of Vatican II the two main founders of CELAM were at the helm (the appointment of the old Cardinal of Rio as first president did not prevent the real leaders from acting).

Initially, CELAM expressed the traditional concerns of the Latin American hierarchy for the internal order of the church, and the defence and promotion of conventional religious interests. Their attitude to social and political questions still retained the characteristics of the conception of the Church as "the expression of the culture and values of a people whose Catholicity had never changed".⁴ Men like Larrain and Camara, who had become more and more aware of the changes of culture and values of the traditional society, and who had been formed by Catholic social teaching in the RN and QA tradition as transmitted through the European Catholic intellectual and social movements, were very much in a minority and struggled to modify the conceptions of their fellows. For his progressive views Larrain was continuously under attack from the traditional elites in Chile; Camara had

an uneasy relationship with his mentor and superior the Cardinal of Rio.

At the fourth annual meeting of CELAM at Fomeque, Colombia in 1959 this perdurable tradition was given its characteristic anti-communist flavour:

"Se planificó la acción apostólica de la Iglesia frente al problema de la infiltración comunista en América Latina, en los sectores social, educational y de la opinión pública. Se trató asimismo del Comité Latinoamericano de la Fe (CLAF)."

It was in this same atmosphere, dominated by the Cuban Revolution, that there took place at Georgetown University, Washington D.C. from November 2-4, 1959 the first 'Inter-American Bishops' Conference', sponsored by the 'Pontifical Commission for Latin America', which had been set up in 1958 to promote a church-wide concern for the problems of the Church in Latin America. The membership statistics presented to this conference showed that the countries of Latin America had 34% of the Catholic population of the world, but only 9.5% of the priests⁵. This alarming statistic was combined with worries about "Protestant proselytism" and "Communist infiltration"; and although Camara raised the question of the problems created by the lack of social and economic justice⁶, it was the specifically ecclesiastical context, as described in the former conception, which was given precedence. This Georgetown meeting led to the formation of the 'U.S. Bishops' Committee for Latin America' (LAD), as the service agency for the 'Bishops' Committee' at the NCWC.

The statement of the Bishops' Committee describing the programme of the new agency serves also to describe the nature of the relationship to, and the proposed assistance for, the Church in Latin America from the U.S. Church:

- "1) To maintain a liaison with the Pontifical Commission for Latin America in Rome (CAL) and the Episcopal Council of Latin America (CELAM).
- 2) To operate an orderly program of aid under the authority of the U.S. bishops.
- 3) To assist U.S. religious communities in providing personnel to Latin America.
- 4) To transmit requests for personnel and material aid as received from the bishops of Latin America.
- 5) To provide information on the Church's needs in Latin America to U.S. Catholics, in particular to the bishops, priests, brothers, sisters and lay-leaders."⁷

Cardinal Cushing was appointed chairman of the Bishops' Committee and he in turn selected the Maryknoll priest John Considine as the first director of the 'Latin America Bureau'. To complete the organizational picture - at their 1965 meeting in Rome during the final session of the Council, the American bishops established an official assistance program for Latin America to be organized by the Bureau, with an annual collection to be taken up in all churches for the purpose, in addition to the Bureau's own fund-raising efforts (the 'Latin America Fund'). The 'Catholic Inter-

American Cooperation Program' (CICOP) was initiated in 1963 "to bring U.S. and Latin American Christians together in mutual understanding and friendship"; for which purpose an annual three day conference is held in January each year which brings together those in the continent who are knowledgeable and involved with the Latin American scene and interested American Church people.

The period of the late '50s - early '60s, when all this top-level ecclesiastical activity was taking place, corresponded both with the era of Vatican II and the increasing American involvement in South-East Asia. Clearly, this political context could not be without its influence on the specifically "ecclesiastical" scene, particularly the United States Catholic Church scene, but it is not easy to disentangle the various strands of the involvement. A study done on the Bishops' Committee for Latin America (the only such study I came across at that Division) makes a point of directly linking the ecclesiastical effort with American political interests⁸. Although I am dubious about the directness of the linkage between Church and government, I am quite prepared to recognize the implicit connection between the mentality of the majority of the ecclesiastical hierarchs, Latin and North American, and the political hierarchs. This was still the era of cold war anti-communism, and the identification of the Christian Church with the interests of the Western Alliance. Pope John only gradually emerged from the shadow of Pius XII in this area, with Mater et Magistra (1963), which initiated the process of dialogue with communism (symbolized

in the Italian centro-sinistra and Krushev's son-in-law being received in audience by the pope)⁹. In the United States, the advent of the Kennedy administration, symbolic for the whole history and situation of the American Catholic Church, did not mean a change in the policy of confrontation with communism. President Kennedy resented the presence of Fidel Castro in Cuba and was intimidated into the disastrous Bay of Pigs adventure. Having claimed to be more concerned with the "red threat" than the previous Republican administration of Eisenhower, he was vulnerable to pressure from the military and secret service adventurers. This chastening experience, soon followed by the crisis of fall '61, ultimately led to wiser counsels of prudence and caution in international politics, in tune with policies of détente and with the conciliatory spirit promoted by Pope John. Looking back, it is difficult to appreciate the very different atmosphere from that of today in which these ecclesiastical and political events took place.

The bizarre way in which the Bay of Pigs prisoners were freed - when Robert Kennedy phoned up Cardinal Cushing to have Cushing finance the American agreement with Castro - belongs to this same atmosphere. There can be little doubt that at the beginning of this period of increased involvement by the official organization of the American Catholic Church with the Church in Latin America there was a strong streak of anti-communism and Catholic protectionism running through the whole operation. We have already seen this expressed by the tone of the official statements of intent. Modifications were to come in the course

of the next few years, under pressure from the evolving situation in the United States and Latin America, and from within the Church through the course of Vatican II and the development of a 'justice and peace' constituency.

The seventh, eighth, and ninth reunion of CELAM took place in Rome (1963-1965) during the Council and led to a reorganization of the Consejo: a reform of its structure by the creation of special departments to promote various fields of church activity throughout the continent - liturgy, evangelization and catechetics, pastoral ministry, ecumenism, and social action. An important Study Session was sponsored by CELAM, July 13-30, 1964 at the Major Seminary in Porto Alegre, Brazil, on the 'Theological Bases of Pastoral Planning and Action in Latin America, in keeping with the Aggiornamento and the Council'. This had been in preparation for two years, under the direction of an ad-hoc commission of CELAM whose members had been appointed by Larrain (president of CELAM by this time), with Archbishop McGrath of Panama the director. The latter had come to the fore at the Council as a forthright exponent of progressive causes, and from now on he was one of the leaders of the progressive bishops in Latin America. As his name suggests - Marcos McGrath - he is of mixed parentage, a member of the Holy Cross Order (C.S.C.), who was a student at their famous academy, Notre Dame, and is a bi-lingual, bi-cultural churchman, a very important participant in the whole U.S.-Latin American scene¹⁰. He became second vice-president of CELAM in 1966, also Secretary-General in 1967 (chief administrative officer, like Bernardin for the NCCB and USCC¹¹).

Ironically, in view of later events in that city, the bishops appointed by Larrain to the ad-hoc commission for the study session all showed up in Porto Allegre except the Archbishop of Medellin, Colombia! These were McGrath, Scherer of Porto Allegre and Lorscheider of Santo Angelo, Brazil (all progressive exponents). The 'Adveniat' Fund of the German bishops financed the meeting, including the travel expenses, with a grant of \$30 thousand¹². The faculty included Carlo Colombo (auxiliary in Milan and Pope Paul's unofficial personal theologian), Daniélou and Roguet (Council periti, the former from the Institut Catholique, later Cardinal and spokesman for conservative ecclesiastical interests; the latter the director of the Centre Pastoral Liturgique, Paris), and Houtart (another Council peritus, the "technical consultant" for the CELAM office in Rome during the Council - 'peritus at large' for Latin American bishops - a very important exponent in his own right, and a most authoritative voice in all questions that pass in review here).

Joseph Gremillion (the future secretary of the papal commission 'Justitia et Pax, still at that time 'Secretary for Development' at CRS), was authorized by Archbishop O'Boyle of Washington to represent the NCWC (an indication of the still ad-hoc character of American hierarchical structure). Gremillion was the only American present. In his report (p3) he records the following:

"I have been frankly nonplussed by the query from one prominent ordinary who is secretary-treasurer of his country's bishops' conference: "And in the United States, how fares 'the Church of the Poor?'"

Referring to LG (esp. para. 8), this bishop was expressing the new theology of the Church, in terms which are male sonantes when compared with former triumphalism, not to say disturbing when contrasted with the affluent figura of the Church in the U.S.A.

In the summary of the talks given at this study session one comes across important indications of the effect the Council was having. Thus, Colombo confessed his conversion to "non-juridical theology", since the time of the first meeting of the principal conciliar theological commission in 1960:

"Scholasticism forgot that ecclesiology (knowledge of the Church) must reach the people. Rather than definitions, images from the bible should be used."

His description of the Church reflected the influence of the "new theology" (or, rather, the more traditional vocabulary rediscovered):

"The Church is a communion which we live, forming a community which we are.....Humanity has a future, because God continues to join Himself to man to become the Body of Christ, the Church."

He interpreted the phrase "the signs of the times" as involving the necessary task of the Church to speak to the world and to listen to it, which would mean a different theological vocabulary and agenda from that of the manuals.

This same summary of the talks shows the kind of thinking being transmitted to the ecclesiastical elites in Latin America, taking a direction which would arrive at Medellin 1968:

"In the past man was defined too much by contemplation, rather than by his creative role in constructing a better world. This latter constructive role gives a truer picture of man, and of the Christian vocation.

The Christian must dedicate himself to upbuilding a just social order of world dimension....Disorder and instability in society are due to sin, as well as to technical reasons....In her relation with the State, the Church must not claim rights, but rather offer her services to the whole society. One of the greatest of these services is the inspiration of citizens to participate wholeheartedly in the upbuilding of this world....Technical advance and world-wide socialization are creating a new world community in which two problems stand out: (1) Nuclear armament, and (2) the inequality of economic and social development among the nations...The poorer nations must strive to correct their own interior disorders which result from social injustice. They must reform their own societal structures to promote the common good."

Gremillion was attuned to this type of thinking, but there were few like him who thus enjoyed the benefits of being exposed to the theology behind GS and the "alternative" voices from the Third World. No similar venture took place in the United States at this time, and it was only in 1967 at Notre Dame that an American audience came into contact with the theology behind GS (the same Notre Dame conference already referred to in connection with the description Gremillion gave of his job ¹³). In fact, the period

period of the Council affected the organization of CELAM much more radically than it affected the USCC. Although the American Catholic Church hierarchical structures were much older than CELAM, the re-organization prompted by Vatican II did not come within sight of what we are about to see at Medellin. One reason is the absence of dynamic bishops like Larrain, Camara, McGrath. Another is the growing influence of men like Houtart and the religious sociology which was now being utilized throughout Latin America. The facts of economic injustice and oppression were daily reality in Latin America, whereas the United States was only beginning to awaken from slumber to the implications of the Vietnam War. The social action movement within the American Church had lost steam since the depression of the '30s, and while it continued to influence many Catholics, including many bishops and priests, the post-World War II improved social conditions helped to dampen its dynamism (Section II, Chapter 4). And this same movement had yet to find out the extent of the world-wide implications of the Christian commitment to social justice¹⁴.

The difficulties of the task ahead are reflected in a comment Gremillion records on the occasion of this Porto Allegre meeting:

"In extending aid the richer nations can be properly motivated by a well-ordered selfishness (egoismus ordinatus)."

As a man then engaged in trying to gradually extend the work of CRS beyond the stop-gap relief needs to the wider demands of socio-economic development, he was being introduced to the conflict

between the increasing demands of the growing number of voices from the Third World and the cosy self satisfaction of America of the '50s and early '60s¹⁵. This American environment was not conducive to moral appeals based on the responsibility of common humanity, or the rich for the poor, but would only respond to carefully directed demands on its own self interests. This had been the experience of 'Foreign Aid'¹⁶. But from the Third World the consciousness that was now increasingly coming to expression was of the basic injustice of the whole international and National politico-economic "disorder" which condemned them to suffer the consequences of other peoples' interests, and to have insult added to injury by the exploitation being increased in the name of "aid".

The first post-Vatican II reunion of CELAM was held in October, 1966, in Mar del Plata and reflected the influence of the Council and the Porto Alegre meeting, its topic being "The Role of the Church in the Socio-Economic Development and the Integration of Latin America". A delegation of bishops presented their conclusions to Secretary-General U-Thant at the United Nations (January 31, 1967) and to the Secretary-General of the 'Organization of American States' (OAS)¹⁷. These were incorporated into the Medellin statements and will be formulated in the following Chapter. 1966 is known, however, not for the meeting at Mardel Plata but for the tragedy that happened earlier, on June 22nd, when Bishop Manuel Larrain was killed in a car crash on his way to the airport to attend a CELAM meeting. The Latin American Church thus lost its most important

leader at the very time when his progressive views were beginning to make headway among the ecclesiastical leadership. Although Larrain's work was crowned at Medellin (in his inaugural address there Cardinal Landazuri Ricketts stated that it was Larrain who had pioneered the way which led to Medellin), his death deprived the Latin American Church and the Church in Chile of irreplaceable leadership. The course of events since has underlined Larrain's indispensability, not least the loss of steady direction in the Christian Democratic Party of Chile, and the absence of his leadership when Allende became President¹⁸.

As CELAM was experiencing the influence of aggiornamento, the gap between it and the American bishops was growing. There was no sign of any equivalent attempt by the North Americans to begin to address questions of national and international social justice and economic reform until HL in 1968. At the 'Inter-American Bishops' meeting in Miami, May 30-31, 1967, Archbishop Carroll, Vice-Chairman of the U.S. Bishops' Committee for Latin America, described a minimalist interpretation of U.S. church involvement:

"Until further advised, our United States Committee considers as its program the relatively limited goals represented in the five objectives established at the Inter-American Meeting organized by the Holy See at Georgetown University in November '59, namely (1) to cooperate with the Church in Latin America in its upsurging program toward greater strength; (2) to permit the Church in the United States to labor jointly with the Church in Latin America toward serving the

common spiritual, cultural and other interests of our Church in the Western Hemisphere and, indeed, throughout the globe."

(It can be taken as another "iron law" of ecclesiastical politics that the degree of practical involvement and commitment to social or religious change and reform is in direct proportion to the clarity and precision of statement. The language of Medellin can be compared with the above in this respect.)

This Miami meeting demonstrated the gap now opening between the Latin American bishops, whose awareness of the involvement of the Church in responsibility for the social inequality and economic injustices in Latin America had been established in the "conscientization" promoted by CELAM and Vatican II, and the United States bishops, who lived with the conceptions of the past on which the 'Inter-American' dialogue had been founded. The different attitudes with regard to Castro's Cuba encapsulated the change. The Americans were still in the position of '59 and Carroll demonstrated that - his attitude to Cuba reflected the presence in his diocese of Miami of the Cuban refugees from Castro's revolution whose Catholicism was pre-Castro and pre-Vatican II, benevolently tolerant of the forms of capitalism which had promoted the conditions of mass penury and squalor, under American auspices, which had brought Castro from the Sierra Madre to Havana¹⁹. The Latin Americans, through the progressive leadership of men like Larrain and Camara, had left behind anti-Castroism and anti-communism and were coming to grips with the responsibility of the Church to promote radical reform of the

social and economic structures, which continued to condemn the mass of their people to squalor and oppression in the name of an economic system whose evils had been described in the social encyclicals (now given even more relevant form in 'Populorum Progressio', Easter, 1967)²⁰.

November 27-December 1, 1967, was the first time a group of U.S. bishops travelled to Latin America for an official meeting with the Latin American bishops, and this reflected the complacent paternalism of the North Americans in their dealings with their Latin American confreres. In practice, the Latin Americans were considered to be in the same position of suppliants requiring ecclesiastical aid (personnel and finance) as their countries in relationship to the Department of State (the 'Alliance for Progress' contained the same implications). Far removed from this attitude was the consciousness of exploitation and injustice now to be expressed at Medellin.

CHAPTER II

MEDELLIN, 1968

The first meeting of the reconstituted CELAM departments in La Capilla, Colombia, May 16-23, 1967 prepared the agenda for the meeting which was intended as Latin America's appropriation of Vatican II - the third 'General Assembly' of the Latin American Catholic hierarchy in Medellin, Colombia, the last week of August and the first week of September 1968. Like the previous Assembly in Rio (1955), this came in the wake of a Eucharistic Congress, in Bogota, attended by Pope Paul, who opened the Medellin meeting himself with an undistinguished speech of encouragement for the bishops' deliberations¹. The Pope had appointed the three Presidents of the Assembly - Cardinal Samore, head of the 'Pontifical Commission for Latin America'; Cardinal Landazuri of Lima, Peru; Archbishop Brandão Vilela of Teresina, Brazil, president of CELAM - and sent a delegation of consultants from the Vatican who had no vote in the assembly but were there to advise bishops at request. Seven apostolic nuncios attended but did not meet formally among themselves. One hundred and thirty bishops represented all the Latin American hierarchies - two official CELAM representatives from each country elected by the members of their respective national episcopal conferences, and in addition for every twenty-five bishops in a conference one was elected to attend. There were a hundred periti from all over Latin America, and one-hundred and twenty-five observers (priests, religious, lay). This was the largest meeting of its kind in the history of the Latin American Church.²

The outcome of Medellin, like that of Vatican II, is twofold - the experience of the participants and the results of that experience in the life of the Church in Latin America; the documents of the assembly as the permanent testimony of Medellin's message for the Church in Latin America and the whole oikumene³. The consequences of the experience can be observed in the actions of the leadership and general membership of the Latin American Church; Medellin's message is a prophetic word to the whole Catholic Church.

The documents of Medellin were approved by Paul in a letter of October 24, 1968, from the Cardinal Secretary of State to Cardinal Samore. The two which concern us here, because they express the Medellin position on international questions, are the statement on 'Justice' and the statement on 'Peace'.⁴ The Latin American bishops' 'Message to the Peoples of Latin America'⁵ (following the precedent of Vatican II's 'Message to Humanity'⁶) set the tone:

"Our peoples seek their liberation and their growth in humanity, through the incorporation and participation of everyone in the very conduct of the personalizing process."

"It is necessary to end the separation between faith and life."

The very first of their "commitments" they declare to be:

"To inspire, encourage and press for a new order of justice that incorporates all men in the decision-

making of their own communities."

Quoting Cardinal Sales of Brazil they put their credibility on the line:

"This assembly has been invited "to take decisions and establish programmes only under the condition that we are disposed to carry them out as a personal commitment even at the cost of sacrifice."

In this way the Latin American bishops described the mission of the Church in Latin American society as the liberating agent of radical social change towards a "new order of Justice".

In the 'Introduction to the Final Documents' the Bishops described this situation of mission in which the Church now found itself:

".... una nueva época histórica de nuestro continente, llena de un anhelo de emancipación total, de liberación de toda servidumbre,....de maduración personal y de integración colectiva. Percibimos aquí los preñuncios en la dolorosa gestación de una nueva civilización. No podemos dejar de interpretar este gigantesco esfuerzo por una rápida transformación y desarrollo como un evidente signo del Espíritu que conduce la historia de los hombres y de los pueblos hacia su vocación."⁷

Re-echoing GS they indicate the theological foundation of all

Christian efforts on behalf of justice and peace:

"....Dios, que quiere salvar al hombre entero, alma y cuerpo."

and express the same conciliar inspiration:

"En esta Conferencia General del Episcopado Latinoamericano se ha renovado el misterio de Pentecostés."

In the document on 'Justice' they express what is by now an ideological consensus, drawing on the tradition of the social encyclicals, GS, in particular Populorum Progressio, and apply it to the situation of their countries which they qualify thus:

"...las estructuras injustas que caracterizan la situación de América Latina."

Drawing on this same tradition they underline the Christian criteria which stand in judgment on all political and economic systems - the primacy of the bonum commune, and the universal nature of the goods of creation as directed by God the creator for the use of all men:

"Es el mismo Dios quien, en la plenitud de los tiempos, envía a su Hijo para que hecho carne, venga liberar a todos los hombres de todas las esclavitudes a que los tiene sujetos el pecado, la ignorancia, el hambre, la miseria y la opresión, en una palabra, la injusticia y el odio que tienen su origen en el egoísmo humano."

Por eso, para nuestra verdadera liberación,
 todos los hombres necesitamos una profunda conversión
 a fin de que lleque a nosotros el "Reino de justicia,
 de amor y de paz..... La originalidad de mensaje
 Cristiano no consiste directamente en la afirmación
 de la necesidad de un cambio de estructuras, sino en
 la insistencia en la conversión del hombre, que
 exige luego este cambio."⁸

Not that the Christian message is unconcerned with structures -
 rather, the Christian doctrine of man, created and redeemed,
 is the most fundamental determinant of the compatibility of
 the structures with the dignity of the persons whom they are
 meant to serve. The result in Latin America of this primacy
 of persons is that the structures are found wanting:

"El sistema empresarial latinoamericano y, por él,
 la economía actual, responden a una concepción
 errónea sobre el derecho de propiedad de los medios
 de producción y sobre la finalidad misma de la
 economía. La empresa, en una economía verdaderamente
 humana, no se identifica con los dueños del capital,
 porque es fundamentalmente comunidad de personas y
 unidad de trabajo, que necesita de capitales para la
 producción de bienes. Una persona o un grupo de
 personas no pueden ser propiedad de un individuo, de una
 sociedad, o de un Estado.

El sistema liberal capitalista y la tentación
 del sistema marxista parecieran agotar en nuestro

continente las posibilidades de transformar las estructuras económicas. Ambos sistemas atentan contra la dignidad de la persona humana; pues uno, tiene como presupuesto la primacía del capital, su poder y su discriminatoria utilización en función del lucro; el otro, aunque ideológicamente sostenga un humanismo, mira más bien al hombre colectivo, y en la práctica se traduce en una concentración totalitaria del poder del Estado. Debemos denunciar que Latinoamérica se ve encerrada entre estos dos opciones y permanece dependiente de uno u otro de los centros de poder que canalizan su economía."⁹

(In line with recent Catholic Church statements the bishops feel they have to acknowledge the ideological content of Marxist humanism, whereas capitalism is given much shorter shrift.)

In order to overcome these "sistemas y instituciones económicas inhumanas" they invoke the concept of Pope John's

MM:

"La socialización, entendida como proceso sociocultural de personalización y de solidaridad crescentes, nos induce a pensar que todos los sectores de la sociedad, pero en este caso, principalmente el sector económico social, deberán superar, por la justicia y la fraternidad, los antagonismos, para convertirse en agentes del desarrollo nacional y continental. Sin esta unidad, Latinoamérica

no logrará liberarse del neocolonialismo a que está sometida, ni por consiguiente realizarse en libertad, con sus características propias en lo cultural, socio-político y económico."¹⁰

They call for political reform to ensure the rights and liberties of the citizens, and the free functioning of intermediary structures - in line with another principle enshrined in Catholic social teaching ('subsidiarity) - that no larger institution should appropriate to itself what can be performed by a smaller institution, as long as the latter can function according to christian principles. The mission of the Church in the Latin American situation must take into account the absence of political and social consciousness:

"La carencia de una conciencia política en nuestros países hace imprescindible la acción educadora de la Iglesia...

Deseamos afirmar que es indispensable la formación de la conciencia social y la percepción realista de los problemas de la comunidad y de las estructuras sociales....

Esta tarea de conscientización y de educación social deberá integrarse en los planes de Pastoral de conjunto en sus diversos niveles."¹¹

Here we see clearly the influence of Paolo Freire, and his program of conscientização made the official pastoral-educational program of the Latin American Church. This is

naturally anathema to the traditional socio-economic political elites who rely on the continuance of "the culture of silence".¹²

In fine, they announce the mission of the Church to work for justice:

".....la educación social, la conscientización en orden al cambio de estructuras y la vigencia de la justicia."¹³

The same analysis is continued in the second document. The social situation is determined by "Tensiones entre clases y colonialismo interno", in which "Diversas formas de marginalidad" are characterized by the following consequence:

"Desigualdades excesivas entre las clases sociales, especialmente, aunque no en forma exclusiva, en aquellos países que se caracterizan por un marcado biclasismo: pocos tienen mucho (cultura, riqueza, poder, prestigio), mientras muchos tienen poco."¹⁴

"....las des igualdades excosivas impiden sistematicamente la satisfacción de las legítimas aspiraciones de los sectores, postergados. Se generan así frustraciones crecientes."¹⁵

The attitude of the privileged elite is to treat any attempt to change the system as subversion of social order or communism¹⁶.

Moving on to the international environment which has cultivated this Latin American situation, the document invokes the tradition from Q.A. to P.P. to describe the "imperialismo internacional del dinero" which has imposed on Latin America the distortions of the international economic

system - adverse terms of trade, flights of capital, increasing indebtedness¹⁷.

This leads on to one of the most significant sections of the Medellin documents, in which the bishops come to terms with that aspect of the Latin American reality which continues to bedevil all attempts at political action - "la violencia":

"No deja de ver que America Latina se encuentra, en muchas partes, en una situación de injusticia que puede llamarse de violencia."¹⁸

"Tal situación exige transformaciones globales, audaces, urgentes y profundamente renovadoras.

No debe, pues, extrañarnos que nazca en América Latina "la tentación de la violencia". No hay que abusar de la paciencia de un pueblo que soporta durante años una condición que difícilmente aceptarían quienes tienen una mayor conciencia de los derechos humanos."¹⁹

The analysis thus begins from the "situation of injustice", the "situation of violence", and the primary responsibility belongs to those who maintain that situation in defence of their personal and class privileges²⁰. This link between "justice" and "peace" was a central point of Paul VI's 'Populorum Progressio' (as it was to be of 'Octogesima Adveniens' of 1971, encapsulated in the phrase "If you want peace, work for justice.") Where the analysis falters, as it must inevitably, is in the resolution of the conflict

between the class interest of the privileged and the bonum commune. The remedy is proposed:

"La justicia y, consiguientemente, la paz se conquistan por una acción dinámica de concientización y de organización de los sectores populares, capaz de urgir a los poderes públicos, muchas veces impotentes en sus proyectos sociales sin el apoyo popular."²¹

But, as Freire discovered in Brazil, such action with the masses does not give the solace of popular support to "los poderes publicos" who are not in favour of change. This dilemma is not lessened by the sympathetic understanding of the bishops for those who have opted for a more direct approach:

"Nos dirigimos finalmente a aquellos que, ante la gravedad de la injusticia y las resistencias ilegítimas al cambio, ponen su esperanza en la violencia. Con Pablo VI reconocemos que su actitud "encuentra frecuentemente su ultima motivación en nobles impulsos de justicia y solidaridad". No hablamos aquí del puro verbalismo que no implica ninguna responsabilidad personal y aparta de las acciones pacificas fecundas, inmediatamente realizables.

Si bien es verdad que la insurrección revolucionaria puede ser legítima en el caso "de tiranía evidente y prolongada que atentase gravemente

a los derechos fundamentales de la persona y damnificase peligrosamente el bien commun del país" (Populorum Progressio 31) ya provenga de una persona ya de estructuras evidentemente injustas, también es cierto que la violencia o "revolución armada" generalmente "engendra nuevas injusticias, introduce nuevos desequilibrios y provoca nuevas ruinas: no se puede combatir un mal real al precio de un mal mayor". (Populorum Progressio 31)²²

The first thing which comes out clearly here is the perspective - recognition of the legitimacy of social change (the "illegitimate" resistences to change), and even the legitimacy of revolutionary insurrection in the face of tyranny. The caution which follows - that violence and armed revolution generally are self-defeating, since they engender new disasters - does not in any way alter the removal of legitimacy from an unjust "social order". This has fundamentally altered the position of the Church in Latin America. Since Medellin the opposition of the conservative elites to the Church, as indeed the attempts by conservative circles in the Church (in the first place, bishops) to ignore what was accepted at Medellin, is convincing proof of radical change.²³

In this new perspective, the excesses of revolutionary violence are placed in a secondary position to the primary violence of the unjust order which is their cause. Thus the conventional estimation is stood on its head - instead of a

concentration on the opposition as a threat to law and order (the "convenient wisdom" of the ruling class), primary responsibility for social peace rests with the political powers and their willingness to change by instituting the necessary reforms towards a greater social justice. It is the status quo which is considered illegitimate, not the attempts (even violent) in favour of change. Revolutionary violence in this perspective is not automatically illegitimate (as it is in the conventional wisdom) but an invalid means to the legitimate end of social change:

"Si consideramos, pues, el conjunto de las circunstancias de nuestros países, si tenemos en cuenta la preferencia del cristiano por la paz, la enorme dificultad de la guerra civil, su lógica de violencia, los males atroces que engendra, el riesgo de provocar la intervención extranjera por ilegítima que sea, la dificultad de construir un régimen de justicia y de libertad partiendo de un proceso de violencia, ansiamos que el dinamismo del pueblo concientizado y organizado se ponga al servicio de la justicia y de la paz."

The bishops thus find themselves in the ambiguous situation of denying legitimacy to the unjust social order (hence the removal of the ruling class support for the Church²⁴) while opposing what must appear to many as the only means to overthrow this unjust order - revolutionary violence - given the unwillingness of the ruling class to modify their privileged

control of the state. Hence the sense of disbelief which must strike anyone familiar with the ecclesiastical politics traditional since Constantine - the varied attempts by ecclesiastical authority to come to terms with the political power (dominating or being dominated by it, endeavouring to change it by supporting a revolution, or in most cases a counter-revolution). The prophetic stance was left to individuals (Jägerstatter), as was legitimate resistance to tyranny (Stauffenberg and Bonhoeffer)²⁵, but here we have the ecclesiastical hierarchy of Latin America in its most authoritative 'persona' adopting a prophetic political theology. Camillo Torres symbolized and enacted the tragedy of the Christian revolutionary who takes up as a last resort armed resistance against the oppression of injustice²⁶. Helder Camara expresses the necessary dilemma of the Christian who experiences oppressive injustice but accepts the burden of non-violence as the only way to redeem the oppression and free oppressed and oppressors.²⁷

Medellin was the achievement of those churchmen who had for many years been working for the establishment of a renewed vision of the Church and its mission, in the tradition of personalist philosophy, liturgical ecclesiology, and Catholic social teaching;²⁸ the achievement of CELAM, which with the progressive leadership of Larrain, Camara, Sales, McGrath, and their advisors (theologians, philosophers, social scientists) had brought the bishops of the countries of Latin America together in a commitment to ecclesiastical and social reform,

inspired by the aggiornamento of Vatican II and the demands of the revolutionary situation of the continent²⁹.

The present record is mixed. While the Medellin statements stand to challenge the practice of the bishops and the influence of Church institutions in the social development of Latin America, the reality in individual countries often contradicts the high hopes of Medellin. The hierarchy procrastinates (Colombia), fails to give sufficient support to its more courageous members when their work on behalf of the poor encounters opposition from the social establishment (Ecuador), or remains silent as the oppression of the poor increases³⁰. On the other hand, there have been examples of courageous efforts to carry out the commitments of Medellin³¹. In Brazil the Church is at present the only voice of opposition to the authoritarian military rule³².

When we consider the response of the North American bishops, we have to examine how the experience and theology of Medellin was communicated to them, and what impact this had on them as leaders of the Church, particularly in questions of justice and peace. We are concerned here with the possibility of a "conscientización" communicated to and assimilated by the American bishops, similar to the "conscientización" of which John A. Ryan was the initial agent. Here we are in a position to catch only a glimpse of this experience, which is a present reality, but such a glimpse is an indispensable part of the horizon of this thesis.

The only U.S. bishop who was at Medellin was Humberto Medeiros, and his activity described in Section III shows no indication of a Medellin "conscientización". However, both in Brownsville, and now in Boston, he has shown a commitment to the cause of the poor and support for socio-economic reforms beyond the present policies of the American government. In this he is part of a majority consensus within the American hierarchy supporting the 'Social Action' reforming work pioneered by Ryan and his generation of Catholic leaders. - more adequate welfare and social security provision, national health insurance, federal housing, support of the migrant workers. But the point of controversy comes when reform is extended to criticism of the economic system itself and it is this attitude which Medellin enshrined.

At the 'Inter-American Bishops Meeting' in Caracas, June 3-5, 1969, the North Americans came face to face with this aspect of "conscientización". For the first time they met on a Conference level, as representatives of their respective Bishops' Conferences not just as ad hoc groups of bishops. All sessions were closed to the press. This format is best suited to the present investigation, because the information acquired of such a meeting is much more revealing of the true state of affairs than it would be of a meeting at which the participants are more self-conscious and concerned with their potential audience. The American delegates were Cardinals Dearden, Krol, and Cody, Bishop Bernardin, and six members of the Latin American Committee of NCCB - Carroll, Medeiros, Hodges, Green, Breitenbeck,

Hastrich. The main areas set for discussion were - the pastoral guidelines of Medellin, socio-economic problems, the role of personnel from the United States in the Latin American Church and their training³³.

Edgar Beltran of CELAM's 'Department of Pastoral Action' had prepared a "position paper" - 'Pastoral Guidelines for Latin America set by the Medellin Documents' - in which he described what was set down at Medellin as flowing from a vision of the Latin American reality and a theological judgment on this reality, a development of Vatican II - applying the Council teachings to the integral Latin American situation. In this vision the Church is pictured as dynamic - an efficacious source of development, integration and liberation for the Continent at this point in history. Following Vatican II, the "pastoral", not the "legal" image of the Church was emphasized, the importance of universal co-responsibility because of the universality of the Church (the need to inspire and lead the laity to take responsibility for Christian mission), the importance of a theology of the particular Church (diversity in unity, not uniformity; sensitivity to the needs and aspirations of the local koinonia), formation and growth in Christian faith and mission ("conscientización"). Of particular importance in Latin America was the LG emphasis on "the Church of the poor" (paragraph 8) - the Church in solidarity with the poor and the oppressed, dedicated to their liberation and redemption to a dignity worthy of the person created and redeemed "in Christ" - the "servant" Church, "incarnate" in the people, the "pilgrim"

Church ("A pilgrim Church is being built: she does not believe she is already established, but rather seeks to grow."³⁴)

At the meeting, to present "the Latin American reality" to be judged in terms of this theology, Carlos Acedo Mendoza (an economist and secretary-general of the 'Commission for Justice and Peace' of the Venezuelan Church) read a paper in which he described the failure of the 'Alliance for Progress',³⁵ and the Latin American resentment of the international economic system, with its built-in situation of dependency of the "underdeveloped" countries on the "developed".

"The paradoxical fact is that the industrialized countries which aid the non-industrialized ones are the ones which profit the most by trading with these same countries."³⁶

This dependency has increased, as the terms of trade show an ever greater differentiation in favour of the developed countries, with the burden of debt increasing in the underdeveloped. Foreign aid does little to correct the imbalance:

"90% of the aid given by the Agency of International Development (AID), was earmarked for the acquisition of North American products."³⁷

The result is that situation of "marginalidad" and "violencia" which Medellin described, and in which religion participates.

For this latter aspect another paper read at Caracas

complemented that of Mendoza - 'Inter-American Missionary Effort In Latin America', by Chrysostom Gaerets, O.P. He spoke of the necessity to ask questions about the nature of the missionary effort in Latin America, the dangers of American cultural imperialism caused by the nationalism and secularism of American culture influencing Latin America (a "work-culture", as opposed to a "leisure, person-centered" culture:

"The cultural invasion from the United States is not only secularizing the sacral at an alarming rate, but in many ways is completely materializing the spiritual heritage of centuries of Latin influence.")

He gave a three part description of the "Church as Mission" - preaching word of God to all men, establishing a hierarchically structured Church with its full liturgical life, the "social pastoral or social apostolate" ("the underdeveloped ministry"). The missionary contributes to the mutual effort by which a "third way" can be found "...which can preserve what is deeply Christian in both the work-centred and leisure-centred cultures, while carefully avoiding the excesses of both." U.S. personnel in Latin America should be in a "complimentary" or "supplementary" role:

"The areas of planning, programing, organization, efficiency in action, and pragmatic adaptation are normally part of the North American genius, even as reflective vision and wisdom are areas of weakness. The goal desired by all pastoral agents is a living

faith in the developing world of our time, but to achieve this, old Church structures must be reformed and many times completely new pastoral techniques have to be introduced. One conclusion of several missionaries from the States in Latin America after many years is that the Church can only begin effectively its renovation through the social apostolate. Likewise, only when catechetical programs and liturgical reforms are integrated into the social-human apostolate will a living Faith come forth from the People of God."³⁸

In an address on June 3rd, Archbishop Avelar Brandão Vilela of Teresina, Brazil (President of CEIAM) stated:

"...the conclusions of Medellin are the Magna Charta of the Latin American Church, applying to our reality the open, comprehensive spirit of the Vatican Council."

And the following day, June 4th, Cardinal Eugenio Araujo Sales of San Salvador da Bahia, Brazil, expressed 'con brio' the challenge of Medellin:

"Have we accomplished our duty, placing above material interest of our respective countries, the doctrine of our church? What have we done along with our businessmen, politicians, and all those who are the decision makers, not only in the United States, but also in Latin America to realize some action conforming to

the gospel as applied by the pontifical documents and the documents of the Vatican Council to the reality of today?.....

This would be a work of love against hate and revolution."

Since Cardinal Dearden was not present for the third and final day, June 5th, Cardinal Krol (then vice-president of NCCB, now president) made the closing remarks on behalf of the American bishops. I single out this statement here because it is the most significant example I have come across of the gap between the spirit and substance of Medellin and the reaction of the American hierarchy. It represents the immediate response of a leader of the hierarchy who was later to be voted into the presidency of NCCB, and who in the years immediately following this represented the most visible and most powerful influence in the hierarchy and at the USCC (as we have seen in Section III). Nothing that happened subsequently, in the following 'Inter-American Bishops' meetings which we can consider here, changed the attitude and policy which this statement reveals³⁹.

The first impression given in these remarks is the patronising tone, the absence of an expression of awareness that the United States Church has any responsibility for the socio-economic policies of the United States in Latin America, and the attempt to invoke the "separation of church and state" as an excuse for not becoming involved. In August, 1969, as we saw

in Section III, the "separation of church and state" did not prevent Cardinal Krol from questioning military spending, nor has it ever prevented American bishops from criticizing state legislation opposed to parochial-school aid. The complacent acceptance of the "free enterprise" system disregards the information supplied by Mendoza in his talk. Where this talk is mentioned, it is to bolster evasion of responsibility for the unjust economic system Mendoza was criticizing. Even when "injustices" and "exploitation of peoples" within the United States are recognized, this is unaccompanied by any attempt to describe how the Church can take part in the task of righting the injustice and ending the exploitation. The necessity of linking an understanding of the "reality" with a theological judgment (which Beltran had described in his "position paper" and which was the central fact of Medellin) is ignored. Instead, Krol made no mention of "judgment" and left the "reality" to "the experts".

The following two 'Inter-American Bishops Meetings' (in Miami, February 2-5, 1970 and Mexico City, May 18-21, 1971) confirmed the failure of "conscientización" in the case of the U.S. hierarchy, particularly since a third group of bishops were present who manifested some non-Latin American understanding of the "reality" and their responsibility - the Canadians. At Miami three bishops represented the 'Canadian Catholic Conference' - Plourde of Ottawa, Sanschagrin of St. Hyacinthe - Quebec, and Mahoney of Saskatoon - and a similar delegation as the one at Caracas represented the Americans (Dearden, Krol, Maguire - in

place of Cody, Bernardin, Carroll, Swanstrom, Medeiros, Hodges, Breitenbeck). Among the nine Latin Americans were the three principal heads of CELAM (Vilela, McGrath, and Pironio of Argentina) and Cardinals Ricketts of Peru, Maurer of Bolivia and Muñoz Vega of Ecuador.

The statement at the end of the meeting brought up the important question of the actual status of such meetings - did the bishops represent their respective Bishops' Conferences, or their respective Churches, and was the meeting merely an exchange of views or did it bind them in some way to take action in the light of their discussions? In the background was the Vatican II talk about collegiality - the responsibility of the bishops for the universal Church, the need to foster co-operation between sister Churches:

"Meetings with our brother bishops should become in a real sense meetings of churches. Episcopal collegiality should be seen as a service to the entire community of God's people. In this sense our discussion has turned to consideration of how the clergy, Religious, and laity can collaborate more effectively with the hierarchy in planning and implementing pastoral programs of the Church."

But later in the same statement this collegial aspect is played down, and commitment is left in the abstract (exactly the same tone as Krol's remarks):

"Although our meeting is informal and in no way binds its participants by the conclusions reached, nevertheless we express a willingness to commit our resources as Pastors in the realization of the Kingdom of God in Latin America with special attention to the problems related to integral human development of Latin American countries."

Two months after the 'Inter-American' meeting, at the 8th General Meeting of NCCB in San Francisco, April 21-23, 1970, a 'Statement of Purpose for Inter-American Bishops' Meeting' was issued which reflects this approach and is eloquent testimony of the absence among the American hierarchy of a desire to go beyond the minimum involvement:

"The Inter-American Bishops' Meeting is an informal gathering of Bishops of Latin America and North America. The designation of the participants is the responsibility of their respective Conferences and CELAM.

The purpose of the Inter-American meeting is primarily to promote dialogue among the participants, to provide an opportunity for them to share ideas regarding matters of mutual concern. Any conclusions reached in the meeting represent the views of the participating Bishops but not necessarily those of the Conferences to which they belong.

While as a result of the discussions which take place at the Inter-American meeting certain actions

may subsequently be taken by the various Conferences, the meeting itself is not called to formulate action programs."⁴⁰

An "informal gathering" is a far cry from the aspiration for "meetings of churches", not to mention a more comprehensive collegiality, involving all "the people of God", "in planning and implementing pastoral programs of the Church". At Caracas, Krol had made a remark which underlines his minimalist conception of collegiality, when he distinguished between bishops and "the People of God":

"We cannot assume all the responsibilities of the People of God, but we must instruct and inspire them...."

The American hierarchy was clearly uncomfortable with the "conscientización" to which they were being invited at the Inter-American meetings, and unwilling to become involved in any attempt to translate Medellin into action. Whatever influence these meetings might be having on individual bishops, the men at the top (Dearden and Krol) who had the greatest control over NCCR were not allowing this influence to affect the concerns of NCCR. This can even be seen in the words used by Cardinal Dearden in praise of Medellin:

"At the last meeting of the Latin American bishops joined together in CELAM in Medellin, there was evident a real sense of Christian awareness of the values that are involved in the progress of their people. A sense of Christian concern impelled them to recognize clearly the realities of the

situation, to appraise strengths and weaknesses, and to propose a program of action that will help to achieve for all their people a more human existence. We applaud them for their candor, their honesty, their integrity and their pastoral zeal. And in spirit we associate ourselves with them in their efforts to bring to their people a fuller realization of their human dignity."⁴¹

The Latin Americans were demanding more of the Americans than an association "in spirit" with their efforts. At the 'Inter-American' meetings the whole point in having people like Mendoza address the bishops was to present them with those "fundamenta in re" which could be used to inform their judgments and actions on the situation.

At Miami in February, 1970, a working paper of Gustavo Gutierrez was put before the bishops - 'Notes for a Theology of Liberation' - to focus their attention on the third topic of their discussions (the first had been the question of collegiality already mentioned, the second - pastoral programmes for Latin American students in the U.S. and Canada): the "concept of liberation in the light of the documents" of Medellin. This initial introduction to a discussion of "the theology of liberation" was followed up at the '71 Mexico City meeting, and this time from the North American side came the position paper - 'The Liberation of Men and Nations', by William F. Ryan, S.J. (of the 'Canadian Catholic Conference' staff) and

Joseph Komanchak (an American theologian from the New York archdiocesan seminary at Dunwoodie, Yonkers). The Mexico City meeting preceded the 1971 Synod of Bishops in Rome at which 'Justice in the World' was one of the topics for discussion and coincided with Pope Paul's 'Apostolic Letter' - Octogesima Adveniens - commemorating the eightieth anniversary of RN.

The Ryan-Romanchak paper emphasized the mission of the Church for social prophecy:

"In the midst of men God summons the Church to be a social prophet and catalyst - protesting every injustice, offering reasons to hope and motives to serve."

It noted that the Church's social teaching emphasizes moral and spiritual values over economic considerations and denies the "inevitability" of economic laws. Its most telling point was the "need for North American equivalent of the social overview initiated by the Latin American Church at Medellin". It described the Church's mission of reconciliation in a polarized society, by efforts to liberate politics from its paralyzed state, to restore it to the role of promoting the common good, offering a vision of a "desirable future" to balance the "predictable future" of technology. The 'Summary of Discussion' gives a view of the themes from the 'theology of liberation' and an indication of the practical policies to which such a theology leads.⁴²

The two authors of the paper whom I contacted during 1973 (Ryan in personal conversation, Komanchak in a phone conversation) said that they knew of no response by the American bishops to the paper. Ryan described the division between the American bishops on the one hand and the Canadians and Latin Americans on the other. The Canadians have shown a grasp of the Latin American situation and expressed willingness to cooperate with the Latin Americans. The Canadian Catholic Conference in Ottawa has openly encouraged efforts to influence Canadian government policies towards Latin America in the conduct of Canadian trade and aid, and most recently in welcoming refugees from Chile.

Unlike the subject of Section III (Vietnam) the lack of knowledge and sympathy among the American bishops for the position of their Latin American confreres adopted at Medellin could not be so easily excused by a lack of the resources required to provide them with such information. Part of the organization set up by the Bishops' Committee for Latin America had been the 'Catholic Inter-American Cooperation Program' (CICOP), founded in 1963, precisely for this purpose. The titles of the CICOP meetings listed in the bibliography outline the scope of this effort at "mutual understanding and friendship". Very few bishops in fact attended these meetings. Those few who did were without influence in the counsels of the inner circle of NCCB in this crucial period immediately after Medellin. Cardinal Cushing who had given his support to the Latin American Division, and in particular to the Director - Louis Colonnese - was burdened with increasingly severe illness

which prevented him from becoming involved. Colonnese conducted a vigorous effort to communicate the spirit and content of Medellin (he himself was present at the assembly), particularly through the CICOP meetings, and to lobby for support within NCCB and USCC for the progressive cause in Latin America. Within a year of Cushing's death Colonnese was fired from his job as Director (summer, 1971).⁴³

CICOP itself has survived just long enough for its demise to be recorded as this narrative ends. Such an eventuality was not totally unexpected, since the same party which had brought about Medellin - the progressive social and religious exponents of aggiornamento within CELAM - found their North American forum at CICOP.⁴⁴ This put them on a collision course within the U.S.A. with those in American government and business who did not welcome the changed image of the Catholic Church presented at Medellin and given expression at CICOP. They had not only agitated for re-establishing relations with Cuba, and changing American support of the military imperialism of Brazil, but vehemently criticized the practices of American business south of the Rio Grande and demanded changes in the whole economic system. At its demise, at the end of 1973, CICOP was the only social action conference of its kind in the continent. The pressures to which it was subject are described in an article by Thomas E. Quigley, presently Assistant-Director of the Latin American Division, written before the decision at the highest level of NCCB-USCC was taken.⁴⁵

The course of events from those few significant remarks of Cardinal Krol at Caracas in 1969 has confirmed that policy of evasion which he then expressed. This has been supported in Latin America itself, because since Medellin a reaction has set in which has confirmed the survival of a strong traditionalist party within the Latin American hierarchies which has shown in practice an unwillingness to accept the policies expressed in the Medellin documents.

Medellin spoke directly to the tasks of government and the major institutions of society (industry, commerce, education, the military). Only a bishop who had accepted the "conscientización" was in a position to stand up to the winds of opposition with integrity and confidence: any other preparation was vulnerable to social pressure based on pre-Medellin and pre-Vatican II ecclesiastical politics.

The American hierarchy was of little help. Their outstanding Vatican II "conscientized" members (Hallinan, Meyer, Ritter, Reed) were dead. "The inheritance of John A. Ryan" - the attitude of social and economic criticism of the "convenient wisdom" of the prevailing capitalist order - had been set aside since the end of the Second World War in favour of a more constricted agenda. Most bishops were uninformed about Latin America, and the ones who attended 'Inter-American' meetings were either unsympathetic to the Medellin "conscientización" or not able to communicate to their fellow U.S. bishops any sense of priority for collegial efforts to

support Medellin policies. The direction of NCCB-USCC at this time went from a centrist - Cardinal Dearden whose policy was based on conciliating the conservative majority by gradually introducing changes supported by a minority of progressive bishops - to a conservative - Cardinal Krol whose policy was to introduce as little change as possible and to avoid controversy concerning the government's foreign policy - hence his attempts to prevent criticism of Vietnam policy and evasive action in dealing with the Latin American bishops.⁴⁶

At the height of ecclesiastical concern with Latin America (the aftermath of Medellin and the '71 Synod of Bishops) Krol was coming into prominence as the leader of the American hierarchy, meeting with President Nixon at the White House, giving the benediction at the Republican National Convention, limiting his criticism of American policy to the generalities of military spending. Krol's theology was confined by his Canon Law background pre-Vatican II. This was both an obstacle to the type of collegiality involved in working with Latin American bishops to change the complexion of U.S. Latin American relationships in line with Medellin, and to a broader understanding of the Church's mission in society beyond the confines of "ecclesiastical prerogative" (parochial schools, abortion). However, the influence of Medellin continues. The network of people within the Churches sympathetic to the "Social Christians" in Latin America continues to grow, encouraged by the increase of 'justice and peace' diocesan commissions, ecumenical efforts to change the policies of American business abroad, and the

heightened awareness of the quality of American foreign policy in the Third World in consequence of Vietnam and the overthrow of Allende. The "conscientización" is no longer confined to CICOP - the principal theological journals of influence publicize the 'theology of liberation'⁴⁷, spokesmen of the post-Medellin Church (Freire, Illich, Camara, Gutierrez, Segundo) have been given scope for communication of their views in the United States and in Europe. The course of events in Latin America itself has confirmed the analysis of Medellin and its further theological progression in "liberation" theology.

This theology and the action it inspires (whether in Panama, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Cuba) draws on a rich treasure of contemporary Catholic thought and experience which Vatican II has established in the consciousness of the Church. On the basis of the Church's mission of service in the world, the Christian vocation is interpreted as one of cooperation with "all men of goodwill" to redeem the social disorder in the direction of that justice, communion, and peace which Jesus announced in his preaching as the "rule" or "kingdom" of God. This vision of the "kingdom" (which finds New Testament expression in Mathew, cc.5-7, and Paul's letters to the Colossians and Ephesians) stands in judgment of all social, economic, and political orders and forms. It calls for transformation of these orders in the direction of that justice, communion, and peace of the Kingdom. To bring about transformation is the task, not of an "ortho-doxy" (Christian doctrine and theology understood as a formulation of the truths - abstract, essentialist, formal) but

of an "ortho-praxis" (Christian faith and theology as a critical reflection and action on the "reality", the "fundamenta in re", which demands, a commitment of the Church in the process of liberation of the oppressed and the oppressor from the situations of sin which define the socio-economic-political order). The Church, far from standing outside society and its institutions, is implicated in the "situations", and takes the side of the poor and the oppressed, not that of the oppressors, because the former's liberation is the condition and means of saving the latter.⁴⁸

S E C T I O N F I V E

SECTION V

In this final section I am going to reduce the debate to more particular and localized proportions, from which I shall consider the dialectic of "institution" and "ideology", our original starting point for the whole discussion. This is a 'limited' attempt to come to terms with this dialectic, in the first place because it is impossible of final resolution. An example of the Church as both "incarnational" and "eschatalogical"; and in the second place because I think only a tentative approach to an explanation of such an historically important issue is appropriate.¹ It is much easier to assemble the evidence of statements and actions in particular circumstances than to make sense of these against such a complex background as the situation of the American Catholic Church in the United States. Now that I have assembled the evidence and sketched in outline what I consider to be relevant themes in the history of the Catholic Church and its expression in the United States, I shall try here to bring the debate to some particular "Conclusions".

The principal focus of consideration in this thesis has been the official leadership of the American Catholic Church - the bishops. Here I am going to describe the response to the Vietnam War within other ranks of Church membership in one diocese of the United States, since this response reflects on that of the bishops and on the general area of foreign policy, as this is at present being presented in the Church in terms of concern for 'justice and peace'.

CHAPTER I

THE ARCHDIOCESE OF LOUISVILLE AND THE WAR

Catholics from Maryland were among the first settlers in Kentucky in the 18th century. Nelson, Marion, and Washington counties, south-east of the city of Louisville, became the area of Catholic population concentration in the new territory and Bardstown the first Catholic diocese west of the Alleghenies, with New York and Philadelphia one of the first three dioceses founded as suffragans of Baltimore (1812). The Catholic Church was "native" to this part of the United States, where the oldest and most respected institutions are Catholic (the mother-houses of the Sisters of Charity of Nazareth, Kentucky, of the Sisters of Loretto, of the Dominican Sisters of Springfield, and the Trappist Abbey of Gethsemane to which Thomas Merton belonged and where he is buried.) Bishop Flaget, first bishop of Bardstown, supervised an area which today includes the states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Michigan - the geographical and cultural centre of American Catholicism.

The diocese was moved from Bardstown to Louisville in 1841 as that city on the falls of the Ohio became the population centre of the region in the age of river transportation (the cities of Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Louisville, St. Louis, New Orleans, are all examples of the river port - Catholic population centre tandem.) Today the ecclesiastical province of Louisville includes the states of Kentucky and Tennessee, with the archdiocese of Louisville and the dioceses of Covington and Owensboro, Kentucky, and Nashville and Memphis, Tennessee. The Catholic population of the Archdiocese of Louisville (approximately two-hundred thousand) continues to be concentrated in the city of Louisville (Jefferson County) and the three historic Catholic counties. Within the Louisville city area one-quarter to one-third of the population is Catholic and Catholicism is

the major Christian denomination.

Kentucky, with a population between 5 and 5-1/2 million, is one of the smallest states of the Union, and in the same way the Archdiocese of Louisville does not rank with major dioceses such as Chicago, Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Los Angeles. However, its geographical and historical situation has placed the archdiocese in an interesting position, contiguous to the mid-west centre of American Catholicism, yet part of the most Protestant culture in the nation, that of the South (Southern Baptist Seminary is in Louisville), while being an indigenous Catholic community. Louisville has participated in the contemporary American experience, national and Catholic, while retaining the particular characteristics of its situation.²

Here we shall consider two examples of the Louisville Catholic response to the issue of the War which were reflected in the response throughout the American Catholic Church. These local experiences are a paradigm of the national Catholic response.

A. THE SENATE OF PRIESTS

As the Second Vatican Council ended Louisville was in the final years of the forty-year episcopate of Archbishop Floersch, a traditionalist of the old school. The initial stirrings of enthusiasm for change and for the new ways sanctioned by Vatican II were taking their normal form - liturgical programs; efforts among some of the younger clergy to organize in some form of priests' association (Archbishop Floersch inaugurated a Senate of Priests shortly before he retired and was succeeded by Archbishop Thomas J. McDonagh in 1967 who supported the new institution); ecumenical outreach; civic involvement by church people, especially in the civil rights' movement, open housing, fair employment practices, etc.

Louisville clergy are almost all natives of the diocese (unlike other parts of the country, especially the deep South and far West, where many, if not the majority, of the clergy are from other parts of the country or from Ireland.) Many of them studied in Rome, Louvain, Innsbruck, or in well respected American Catholic theological colleges - St. Meinrad's (the Benedictine foundation in Indiana), St. Mary's, Baltimore. In background and education they are well placed to understand their local situation and post-Vatican II Catholicism. The generation gap experienced in recent years among the Catholic clergy in the wake of Vatican II was reflected in the conflicts within the Louisville clergy, between those in favour of change, both in the structures and practices of the Church and in the work and life-style of the priests themselves (for the most part those under fifty), and those older priests who had been satisfied with the traditional structures and patterns of church life and could not understand the changes in the Church.

The newly formed Senate of Priests became the focus of this conflict. Since it was the younger group of priests who had been enthusiastic for the foundation of a senate, and since it responded to their desire for change and new forms of clerical authority and relationships, they controlled the operation of the organization from the beginning. This group of priests, who have been responsible throughout the American Church for much of the inspiration and vigour with which the aggiornamento was undertaken, were not all newly ordained men (although a lot of the Vatican II era ordinandi were included in their ranks), but relied on a strong corps of men in their middle and late 30s to form the backbone of their organizations. Since traditional clerical leadership had gone with age, promotion most often dependent on seniority, their emergence in the conciliar era was automatically a challenge to the prerogatives of seniority. Two possibilities opened up for the newly formed Senates of Priests - either the older clergy could be perused of their usefulness to give them their support and be prepared to give up some of their own traditional independence as pastors in charge of a parish, or the senate would increasingly act as a counterforce to temper the autocracy of the individual pastor. This was just one expression of the introduction of new conceptions of ecclesiastical leadership and authority which Vatican II had introduced under the rubric "collegiality."

The Senate of Priests also became the locus of all the issues of substance facing the Church, because it was the most obvious forum where the clergy could address these issues, just as the USCC-NCCB meetings provided the bishops with a common forum. In this embryonic fashion the Catholic Church has been re-discovering the qualities and importance of the forms of collegial government, with variations

according to the circumstances of individual countries and dioceses. The Louisville Senate of Priests became the locus of that issue which has dominated the immediate past experience of Americans - American involvement in Vietnam - because the Vatican II Church and its institutions, after GS, could not avoid such a challenge.

The issue of the war in Vietnam came before the Louisville Senate of Priests in the fall of 1971 (thus, immediately prior to the bishops' 1971 debate and Resolution), in the form of a resolution which found "the continued presence of U.S. military forces in Southeast Asia incompatible with proper respect and reverence for life, and that therefore such presence must be judged immoral."⁴

The minutes of the meeting record the discussion:

"In the discussion the Senators expressed many opinions, among which were the following: concern for the Church in South Vietnam if the Communists are allowed to take over; the timeliness of the statement; whether it was worth dividing the priests of the archdiocese to get the statement; the value of studying the issue and discussing it with those of varying opinions, etc."

When it came to the vote the seven votes in favour of the resolution and the eight opposed divided according to age - the younger men for the resolution, the older men against it - and the motion was defeated.

This resolution has been circulated among the priests of the archdiocese for discussion preparatory to the senate meeting of October 4th. The composition of the senate was based on a

system of proportional representation. The total number of diocesan priests (227) had been divided into seven groups according to year of ordination, with two representatives from each of these "peer groups" (numbering approximately thirty-five members) representing their group on the Senate. The religious -order priests (129) were represented by three of their number. The diocesan clergy held the preponderant position, with the religious under-represented.

"Peer group" meetings were supposed to be held in conjunction with the monthly senate meeting, to provide input and feedback for the latter. In the case of the October senate meeting, no meetings of the first three peer groups (those ordained before 1945) were reported. The other four groups were reported as holding a discussion on the resolution and taking a vote of those present at the peer-group meeting.

The voting was as follows - Group 4 (those ordained 1945-1954): 6 against, 16 for the resolution; Group 5 (1955-1959): 14 against, 10 for; Group 6 (1960-1964): 1 against, 8 for; Group 7 (1965-1971): 3 against, 32 for. The voting of group 4 is rather unexpected until it is noted, as it was at the senate meeting and recorded in the minutes, that groups 4 and 7 held a joint meeting to discuss the resolution. The voting of group 4, in contrast to that of group 5, reflects the result of the conscientization of this joint meeting (the older brethren responding to the anti-war views of the younger.)

At the October senate meeting the Vietnam resolution was not debated as a priority issue, but towards the end of a two-hour meeting, after the more parochial concerns of diocesan and clerical business. As the minutes show, there was the conventional form of opposition to such a resolution, but the voting was close. The

The only other note on the subject in the minutes shows the strong feelings of those in favour:

"The Senators were instructed to report to the secretary the names of those in their peer group who wished to publish the statement independent of the Senate."

This was subsequently done in the local Catholic weekly and reported in the Courier-Journal.

The wording of the Resolution shows an anticipation of the bishops' November '71 Resolution and attendant controversy: the judgment that the American military presence in Southeast Asia is "immoral". This was precisely the cause célèbre which provoked the extra-parliamentary proceedings to tone down the moral judgment, from "cannot be justified by traditional moral norms" to "the speedy ending of this war is a moral imperative of the highest priority." Finding the foreign policy of the United States "immoral" struck a sensitive nerve of a section of the Catholic clergy of the older generations. While the younger priests had few inhibitions about criticizing the government, the older ones had been brought up in a patriotic tradition in which "Americanist" attitudes determined their response to foreign policy and "separatist" tendencies had been for long limited to the preservation of Catholic schools and some details of personal morality. The patriotic, anti-Communist consensus reacted against criticism of American foreign policy. The presumption of morality lay with the government, and any information to the contrary (My Lai, civilian bombing) could not shake it - "concern for the Church in South Vietnam if the Communists are allowed to take over"; "timeliness of the statement"; "dividing the

priests of the archdiocese"; "studying the issue and discussing it with those of varying opinions." Much of this was subterfuge, because most of those in the older age groups had not bothered to arrange a discussion, and there was already a division among the priests, as the "peer group" voting showed.

While the younger priests had tried to place the Vietnam issue before all the priests of the archdiocese, the organization of the Senate of Priests was too much taken up with parochial matters like pastor-assistant relationships, personnel policy in the diocese, the new commissions originating from the Vatican II reforms of liturgy, religious education, and lay involvement in ecclesiastical affairs through parish and diocesan councils. With all these internal matters to be considered, the addition of the war issue involved more controversy on top of all the delicate work of changing the whole face of the ecclesiastical institution itself. Too many things had to be dealt with all at once and the national debate on the war was not considered to be a priority for the priests' senate at that time.

Those priests who were opposed to the war made use of any opportunities to persuade their confreres, but recognized the obstacle of acquiescence in government foreign policy among the majority of the clergy. The priests who had been formed by contact with Vatican II were accustomed to controversy and the questioning of the traditional. But the older generation of Louisville priests had accepted the tradition of Catholic patriotism. This was supported by the most recent expressions of such patriotism - the Second World War and Cold War anti-Communism - and the new aspects

of America's involvement in Southeast Asia were lost on those who had responded to these recent "uncomplicated" issues. Their conservative patriotism corresponded to their conservative ecclesiology. Some break in one or the other was required to undermine the consensus, and this they opposed. The same situation was evident in the parishes, because here also a critical voice came only from a new type of parish.

B. THE 'EXPERIMENTAL' PARISH

St. William's in the west-end of the city of Louisville is one of those "experimental" or "non-territorial" parishes which emerged in metropolitan areas of the United States in response to the changing conditions of Catholic life after Vatican II. The desire among some of the clergy to try new forms of parish ministry corresponded to the wishes of those laity who did not find what was offered in their territorial parish, in the way of liturgy, religious education, social action, adequate in the new awakening prompted by Vatican II. The particular circumstances of the diocese, the kind of bishop, the geographical location, the character of the local clergy, gave a local quality to the type of experimental parish which developed from this situation, and its longevity, but the forms of ministry and community experienced at St. William's are typical of this ecclesiastical initiative.⁵

The social situation of St. William's was an example of a national situation. The west-end of Louisville had been a collection of predominantly white ethnic neighborhoods, giving way to predominantly black settlement with the white flight to the suburbs and black immigration from the deep South after the Second World War. The Catholic parishes of the west-end had been traditional "national parishes" - the German parish of St. Anthony (today one can still see evidence of its origin in the German inscription over the main door), the Irish Parish of St. Columba. Black Catholics were served by St. Augustine and Immaculate Heart of Mary parishes (the former founded in 1869 by John Lancaster Spalding). In other parishes black Catholics were subjected to the same racial indignities they suffered in society as a whole.⁶

As the 60's succeeded the 50's the racial tension in American society was reflected within the Church. Although the bishops supported Civil Rights legislation, only a minority of Catholics participated in the Civil Rights Movement, and the priests and nuns who marched at Selma and joined in the other anti-segregation activities were criticized by bishops who were opposed to such Catholic support of the Movement. In Louisville a few priests joined the marches in support of open housing and fair employment practices.

The most visible effect of the social situation at that time was the deteriorating financial condition of inner-city parishes as the whites moved out leaving the burden of financing parishes and schools on the generally less affluent whites and blacks who remained. The national Catholic school financial crisis accelerated with inflation and the drop-off in the numbers of recruits to the teaching orders of nuns who had been the main source of parochial-school teaching staff. This made the financial survival of the traditional type of parish in the inner-city impossible,⁷ and gave scope to new ideas of regional and parish apostolate.

St. William's had been a traditional territorial parish experiencing the loss of parishioners and ever-increasing financial problems, so that the closing of the parish was imminent. Such a situation made the way open in May, 1966, for the initiative of a Fr. Ben O'Connor who wanted to establish a parish which would be directed at providing new forms of liturgy for any interested people in the city, and at building up a parish from that base and

and in accordance with the desires of the people who became involved. O'Connor was appointed pastor and was joined by a like-minded colleague - Vincent Grenough. Both of them had been involved in the formation of the Louisville Senate of Priests.

St. William's in its new form started off with about sixty members; by August, 1969, there were two hundred; by August 1972 around four hundred. Included in the new parish were those local Catholics who continued to come to St. William's. In the beginning, the St. William's community was concerned with personal spiritual development based on liturgy. By the fall of 1969 the growth of numbers led to the formation of a more structured community, including a Social Action committee interested in serving the needs of the local people of this socially deprived area in which the church was placed. The inherent dangers of paternalism in such a situation, where the majority of the members are middle-class whites who live outside the area, have been overcome by involving the local people themselves in this work. One of the most impressive features of St. William's is the spirit of uninhibited friendliness and lack of pretension about the place.

The structural form of St. William's includes a 'Town Meeting' as the main decision-taking assembly, open to all who are members of the parish (itself called 'St. William Center'), and held every three months, or in addition a special meeting for a major decision. The 'Executive Board' prepares the agenda for the Town Meeting and is composed of one member from each committee, four members 'at large', the priests of the parish. The Committees (Social Action, Education,

Liturgy, Hospitality, Finance, Housing, Peace) meet once or twice a month. Social Action has become the most important activity of St. William's in recent years, expressed in the operation of its 'Neighborhood Center', which fills the gaps in the provision of social services to the area, across the whole range of needs (food cooperative for the poor, looking after the financial affairs of people referred to it by government agencies, purchasing food stamps for those unable to get to the government offices, providing help to the elderly - "primarily a friend", in the words of the full-time social worker).

The relationship between St. William's and the ecclesiastical authorities is one of toleration. The Church authorities objected to the St. William's custom of taking Communion in the hand and having altar-girls as well as altar-boys. The question arose of inviting the Archbishop to the parish and what to do about the offending practices. At a 'Town Meeting' it was decided not to change the practices and to avoid embarrassment all round, not to invite the Archbishop.⁸ The attitude of "benign neglect" is a mutual compromise. St. William's goes its way, doing nothing to offend ecclesiastical susceptibilities unnecessarily, having no parish debt and being self-supporting, fulfilling its quota of the 'Archdiocesan Development Fund' annual drive, taking its full part in the work of the local 'West End Catholic Council.' When the original priests (O'Connor and Grenough) left, and the priest appointed by the Archbishop was not in favour of what he found at St. William's, he was transferred to another parish after a short period of turmoil, by mutual agreement of all parties, and his successor, Robert Mills, has been a more

appropriate choice.

The St. William's community is different from the ordinary parish. The people who belong to it are generally more committed Christians ("militants" they would be called in France) who in other parishes would form the leadership. They have been attracted to St. William's because it has offered them more in the way of personal and social involvement as Christians. It is not surprising, therefore, that only in St. William's was the issue of Vietnam a matter of concern in a way involving the parish as a community of Christians.

The unique phenomenon of the St. William's 'Peace Council' came about in response to a challenge proposed to the St. William's community by Fr. O'Connor in a New Year's sermon, January 1971, on the occasion of the Pope's annual 'World Day of Peace'. This marked another stage in the evolution of the community - from liturgy, through social action, to the larger concerns of world peace. The Peace Council was organized in April, 1971 and began holding bi-weekly meetings, averaging twenty-five people in attendance for the initial period, with about fifty active and associate members. From this group came the Peace Statement, which was presented to the Town Meeting and to the whole community.⁹ The community was asked to accept or reject this statement, and on May 27, 1971, of the 343 members voting, 92 percent voted to accept it as an expression of the community's views.

The statement embodies the spirit of non-violence expressed by Martin Luther King and best known in recent American history in association with his Civil Rights campaign. It recognizes the Vietnam war as an expression of the violence permeating the society and exported under the delusion that American might is the guarantee of

of right. Its position on the war - complete American withdrawal within six to nine months, with the discontinuing of military aid to the present Saigon government - is placed in a broad context of concern for an integral personal and social peace. As such, the statement is more theological than those we have considered from the American bishops. When the St. William's Peace Council proceeded to mail it in June, 1971, to all the priests of the city of Louisville and the chairmen of parish councils, with a return-postcard for those interested in cooperating with St. William's in working for peace, five parishes out of sixty responded.

The 'Peace Council' also arranged an informal discussion with Archbishop McDonagh in June, 1971, about their statement, and came away with the impression that the archbishop was not willing to speak out against the war. (only at the end of 1972 did Archbishop McDonagh express criticism of American policy, with the renewed bombing that Christmas provoking him to join the 'justice and peace' subcommittee of the priests' senate in protesting the action.) The 'Peace Council' established contact with the Louisville branch of CALCAV, formed at the same time.¹⁰ Later they promoted other anti-war activities - writing to their Congressmen, joining the 'war tax refusal campaign', supporting protests of anti-personal arms production, encouraging debate on the morality of the war. There was no equivalent activity in any other Louisville parishes. Some Catholics from other parishes attended their debates and the meetings they sponsored to explain anti-war activities, but no other parish joined them or sponsored similar programmes. Although the resolution for the Louisville priests' senate was being debated among the priests at the same time, there was no contact between them and St. William's.

CONCLUSIONS

This singular example of critical response to the American policies in Southeast Asia expressed the difference between such a unique parish with its spirit of initiative and independence, and the normal parochial situation:

"The majority of Catholics feel the Church should stay out of socio-political matters and concentrate on more traditional spiritual matters."

The American Catholic Church was ill prepared to face the complexities of the Vietnam debate. The success of the Americanists had led to an acceptance of the compatibility of Catholicism with the American way of life, which in the post World War II era had involved a complacent attitude to the foreign policy of the government. This was presumed to be a benevolent defence of the "Free World" against Communism, and this blanket conception lulled the inattentive to accept this justification for any and all American actions in the rest of the world.

This conformism was more pronounced among the older generation of priests than the younger, as we have seen in the case of Louisville, and this was due at least in part to the greater interest among the latter in the foreign-policy implications of the gospel which the theology of Vatican II encouraged.¹² Among the Christian denominations the Quakers and the Methodists in the United States had traditionally been most opposed to U.S. military involvements, supported disarmament and the strengthening of the United Nations, opposed the enthronement of national self-interest.¹³ The conservative-fundamentalist denominations of the "premillenarian" type were least concerned about applying their moral critique to their nation's foreign policy. Catholics came somewhere in between these

two groups, along with Episcopalians and mainline Protestant Churches. But in all denominations the clergy overall tended to hold more liberal attitudes to foreign policy than their parishioners.¹⁴ In the Catholic Church, the coincidence of Vatican II and the Vietnam War further strengthened the liberal attitudes to foreign policy among the younger clergy and led many of them to support the anti-war movement. As the war dragged on, more of the older clergy joined their ranks. Thus, the NFPC, which had a considerable number of middle-aged members, developed an outspokenly critical attitude to the war, as we saw in Section III, and many of the best known priests in the country did likewise.

However, the institutional energies of the Church continued to be employed in the more established structures - schools and parishes - and these were not capable of supporting efforts to change the direction of foreign policy. These institutions were socially conformist, since their *raison d'être* had been the establishment of the Catholic Church in the society. Any accommodation of divisions among the members would have detracted from that effort. Hence the organizational pressure was in favour of a united Catholic presence, in support of the government. When the monolithic Church was undermined by Vatican II's aggiornamento, and the credibility of American foreign policy by the Vietnam War, the traditional institutions, by their own inertia, complicated the general malaise.

The new institutions - priests' senates, experimental parishes - in which the ecclesiastical and national controversies could be tackled provided an image of more flexible forms of Church life better adapted to the changed conditions. But their specialized character and their limited membership left unanswered the questions of how the existing institutions could be updated and transformed

into agencies of aggiornamento incorporating all the people who professed membership of the Church. The problem of "institution" and "prophecy" describes the Catholic drive to bring people to the experience of community, without exclusion and without any form of gnosticism or elitism, while not obscuring the radical demands of social criticism which upset those in control of the status quo. This dilemma was present from the beginning of the Church but the new situation in the Church since Vatican II has revealed it clearly once more, since the Council tried to describe the total dimensions of the Catholic experience.

Another feature of the dilemma is the changing conception of ecclesiastical authority. If this has to be conceived according to a more "collegial" framework, as it must if the Church is to be true to its own nature, once more reiterated at Vatican II - the common membership of the people of God giving everyone an equal Christian dignity, authority in the Church a ministry of service, not a form of domination - the drawbacks of democracy begin to operate. In Section II we saw these reflected in the experience of the Protestant Church in the United States, described by Martin Marty, in which congregational control brought pressure against the non-conformist minister. It was to John A. Ryan's advantage that he was free from such pressure, and the more liberal attitudes to social action among the Catholic clergy than among the laity would be hostage to congregational pressure in a conformist society.¹⁵ However, this would be an expression of the true nature of the situation - if the Church is indeed 'in' the world, the mission of prophetic social criticism only becomes effective if the Church has emerged from the ecclesiastical cocoon to become engaged in the work of

transforming society, its structures and institutions, and not, just as abstract theory. This is the implication of that 'orthopraxis' to which the theology of liberation points, and in his own way John A. Ryan had understood the same consequence. The problems of society are ipso facto the agenda of the Church:

"Action on behalf of justice and participation in the transformation of the world fully appears to us as a constitutive dimension of the Church's mission for the redemption of the human race and its liberation from every oppressive situation."¹⁶

But the Church's mission is hostage to the identification of Church and Kingdom. Only a servant Church, a learning Church, a pilgrim Church, in dialogue with all fellow pilgrims can engage in the work of social criticism and social transformation, toward that better order of justice and peace to which the Church looks forward in its religious experience. An established Church is subject to the demands of social acceptance and the pressure to pronounce a blessing on the prevailing order. The aggiornamento of Vatican II has brought this dilemma to the consciousness of the Church in the present age, and directed the Church back to its origins - outside the establishment.